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2ABSTRACT 
Asymmetric Information, Learning and Project Finance: 
Theory and Evidence
Project finance is analysed in three separate papers plus a  survey. The 
survey highlights, inter alia, the recent development o f m ulti-stage models with 
learning and reputation. The following two chapters develop models where projects 
involve a  sequence of investments, while the final chapter is an empirical study. 
In Chapter Two an entrepreneur makes an initial investment and then faces an 
optimal stopping problem. It is socially optimal to  term inate a  high cost project 
when costs become known sufficiently early. But, due to  past investments being 
sunk costs, there is a  cu t-o ff point after which completion of projects is always 
optimal. With asymmetric learning the entrepreneur may conceal bad state 
realisations from investors until after the cu t-o ff date. The stopping problem is 
sometimes resolved by a loan commitment (a single-stage mechanism) and sometimes 
by convertible and redeemable Preference shares (a tw o-stage mechanism). In 
Chapter Three an entrepreneur begins with a project in the form of a  call option 
with two periods to  maturity. One period la tter another project becomes 
available. Exercise decisions are observable but non-contractible and contracts 
to  finance the second project cannot be written in advance of its arrival. With 
symmetric information about state realisations a simple rule for whether the two 
projects are best incorporated jointly as a  single firm or separately as legally 
distinct firms is given. If joint incorporation is optimal, a  contractual 
covenant to this effect may be required to overcome a  time-inconsistency problem. 
With asymmetric information the exercise decision for the first project becomes a 
signalling game with a  premature-investment pooling equilibrium. The 
time-inconsistency problem now becomes a useful device for eliminating the 
pooling equilibrium. The analysis implies that the covenants attached to 
financial contracts may differ according to whether information is symmetric or 
asymmetric. Finally, Chapter Four studies a unique sample of high growth 
entrepreneurial firms financed by 3i PLC. We characterise financing arrangements 
for these firms and discusses their relation with theories of optimal capital 
structure. Probit analysis is used to study the relation between collateral and 
risk. Contrary to the significant positive relation found by recent studies, we 
find no significant relation between collateral and risk.
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6PREFACE
This thesis analyses methods of financing investment projects. A primary 
concern is to  understand how financial contracts may overcome inefficiencies in 
investment due to imperfect, incomplete (asymmetric) information. The general 
area  of optimal financial contracts and security design consists of a  very  large 
literature, including principle-agency theory, ex an te  and ex post informational 
problems, incomplete contracts, liquidation versus reorganisation, product and 
input market interactions, and the market for corporate control. At the outset, 
therefore, we restrict the scope of our inquiry to those classes of models whose 
primary emphasis is on investment projects. This accounts for the words Project 
Finance in the title of this thesis. Of course, most of the models in the areas 
cited can and do have implications for the efficiency of investment. But many of 
their main results can be obtained without there being any role for investment. 
An example is the literature on corporate control and capital structure.
The four chapters in this thesis are designed to  be read independently of 
each other. The common thread binding the papers together is the emphasis on 
m ulti-stage investment projects with learning. Thus, the main argument is tha t, 
unlike adverse selection and signalling, the implications of learning for 
financial contracts remains largely unexplored. Yet this seems to  be an im portant 
feature of projects involving inventions and innovations. As a  testimony to  the 
importance of these kinds of projects we may note the substantial growth of the 
U.K. venture capital industry during the 1980s.
The first chapter of the thesis provides an introductory survey on project 
finance. In addition to highlighting the role of learning, the chapter makes a 
number of other observations concerning the state of the literature. In terms of 
generality, the most important observation is that many of the commonly observed 
financial contracts, such as the standard debt contract, are optimal only within
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some restricted class of contracts. Two examples of imposed restrictions are 
monotonicity of the payoff function and limited liability. In particular, the 
la tte r  restriction is usually a  consequence of model design making limited 
liability synomonous with the resource constraint for non-negative consumption. 
We argue that this modelling approach is theoretically unsatisfactory because it 
fails to  explain the limited liability feature of most commonly observed 
financial contracts.
Chapter Two derives the optimal financial contract for a  principal-agent 
model with a  form of information revelation which has not hitherto been 
investigated. Our hypothesis, which we call temporary asymmetric learning, 
assumes there is symmetric information a t both the first and final dates, but 
th a t the entrepreneur may gain an informational advantage a t some intermediate 
date. This assumption extends a traditional private information model to  an 
intertem poral framework. Alternatively, it can be thought of as a  variation on 
symmetric learning problems. The temporary asymmetric learning hypothesis leads 
to  an interesting problem because a t the time of the informational asymmetry the 
entrepreneur must make crucial decisions about the future of the project. 
However, with symmetric information at the initial and final dates we are able to 
apply the theory of mechanism design to show that the optimal contract resembles 
either debt with a loan commitment option attached or a financial structure with 
convertible and redeemable preference shares. Some evidence is cited showing tha t 
these types of shares are commonly found in venture captial contracts. Another 
interesting feature of the model is that the extent of limited liability 
associated with project terminations is derived endogenously.
Chapter Three addresses the question of whether and how asymmetric 
information may affect decisions to incorporate two projects jointly as a  single 
firm or separately as legally distinct entities. This question has received very 
little attention in the literature as most models implicitly assume tha t
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technological factors prevent separation of new investments from existing assets. 
By contrast, the projects in our model can be operated independently. Amoung 
models which allow for separable projects, the model in this chapter is the first 
which does not rely on exogeneous factors, such as the taxation benefits o f debt, 
to  m otivate joint incorporation of projects. Instead, the optimal mode of 
incorporation derives from the fact tha t a  new project is essentially a  call 
option with two periods to  maturity: following the initial investment in a  
project the entrepreneur chooses to  implement the second stage investment a t one 
of two dates. The model posits an ex post informational asymmetry in the form of 
costly -sta te  verification so that debt is optimal. However, debt finance leads to  
the Myers [1977] Under-Investment problem and, with symmetric information, it is 
the minimisation of these distortions which determines whether joint or separate 
incorporation is optimal ex ante.
Two interesting features arise in this framework. First, a  tim e-inconsistency  
‘problem may arise where in some circumstances the entrepreneur will try  to  renege 
on an ex ante optimal promise to incorporate projects jointly. This problem, 
which has not previously been modelled formally, provides a  justification for 
covenants to  financial contracts and/or corporate charters which bind the company 
to  joint incorporation of projects. The second feature of the model is the 
existence of a  premature -  investment problem where by all investment options are  
exercised a t the first available date in order to  avoid sending a  bad signal to  
investors. This problem can occur when there is asymmetric information and 
projects are  incorporated jointly. In addition to  the analysis of optimal 
’’incorporation covenants”, the premature-investment problem represents^ a  novel 
and significant contribution to the current literature on project finance with 
asymmetric information.
The final chapter studies balance sheet data from a  sample of high growth 
entrepreneurial firms. The study is in two parts. The first characterises, by
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sample average, the financing arrangements for these firms both in terms of the 
type of financial instrument and in terms of the distribution of claims among 
entrepreneur and venture capitalist. The la tter consideration is a  unique feature 
of the study. Also, we compare our statistics with those of U.K. publicly listed 
companies to  highlight the special features of finance fo r high growth firms. The 
second part of the chapter undertakes a probit analysis of the relation between 
collateral and risk. For this purpose, our data exhibit two unique features. 
First, we can make the important theoretical distinction between inside and 
outside collateral. Second, our ex post measures of risk are  computed on the 
basis of com pany-by-company, rather than bank-by-bank, data. In contrast to  the 
significant positive relation found by recent studies, we can find no significant 
relation between collateral and risk. Some suggestions are  offered concerning 
these negative results.
CHAPTER ONE
AN INTRODUCTION TO PROJECT FINANCE
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How can entrepreneurs and firms best finance their investment projects? This 
question is one component of a much broader inquiry into optimal corporate policy 
and financial contracts tha t began with Modigliani and Miller’s [1958] famous 
irrelevance propositions. These state that for perfect and complete markets
(without taxation): (1) the market value of any firm is independent of its 
capital structure, and; (2) the cu t-o ff point for investment in the firm is 
completely unaffected by the type of security used to  finance the investment. 
Since Modigliani and Miller [1958] a  voluminous literature has developed 
examining how the irrelevance propositions are affected by various market 
imperfections. In this paper our aim is to  survey those theoretical issues which 
are  most relevant for the financing of investment projects. Thus, we are 
primarily concerned with the second, rather than the first, of the irrelevance 
propositions.
Restricting attention to  investment projects means th a t we do not survey 
models of taxation benefits and bankruptcy costs of debt, issues of liquidation 
versus reorganisation, strategic interactions with product or input markets, or
theories of capital structure based on corporate control contests (i.e. 
takeovers). We provide two justifications for omitting this fairly  substantial
literature. First, our restricted scope accords well with the project-oriented 
focus of the other papers in this thesis. Second, the issues not covered can be 
found in excellent surveys by, for example, Allen [1990], Harris and Raviv 
[1991], Masulis [1988] and Miller [1988].
Our basic approach in this survey is to try  to  explain the underlying 
rationale fo r why each set of assumptions produces particular results! We also 
highlight the sensitivity of some results to the particular assumptions upon
which they are  based. However, taking the above approach has lead to  a 
correspondingly low emphasis on comparing and contrasting the empirical 
implications of each theory. Nevertheless, this seems a  favourable trad e -o ff in 
view of the empirical content of Harris and Raviv [1991].
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The main conclusions of this survey are tw o-fold. First, although some 
financial contracts, such as debt, correspond well with casual observation, they 
are in fact optimal only within some restricted class of contracts. Two examples 
of imposed restrictions axe limited liability and monotonicity of payoff 
functions. Second, further development of the recent costly -state  falsification 
model would likely be fruitful. The costly-state  falsification model is 
interesting because contracts resemble equity, although without full limited 
liability. In contrast, most other information-based models predict tha t debt is 
the optimal contract. Also, costly-state falsification appears to  be a natural 
framework in which to assess the reasonableness of the monotonicity constraint 
mentioned above.
In addition to  these conclusions, the survey identifies a  number of recent 
developments in the literature. The most prominent is the distinction between 
private information and symmetric by non-verifiable information. Models of 
learning and reputation-building have also been a subject of recent interest. A 
less prominent development is the interaction between financial structure and the 
optimal incorporation mode for new investment projects. The question here is 
whether a  new project should or should not be incorporated jointly with existing 
assets.
The survey is organised into four main sections followed by a  summary and 
conclusions. The first three sections correspond to  models of agency/moral 
hazard, ex post informational asymmetries, and ex ante informational asymmetries. 
The fourth section discusses models that combine agency costs and ex ante 
informational asymmetries. Section 5 provides a brief summary and discussion of 
the previous four sections and is followed by conclusions in Section 6.
1. A g en cy  C o sts /M o ra l Hazard
An entrepreneur who owns a profitable investment opportunity may be unable to
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self-finance all investment requirements associated with his or her project.
Undertaking the project requires that the entrepreneur raise finance by writing a
contract with outside investors. Once the necessary funds have been obtained the
entrepreneur/m anager implements an investment project by taking various actions.
In general these actions will be imperfectly observable and, therefore, cannot be
specified in the financial contract. The agency cost o r moral hazard theory of
project finance refers to  the conflicts of interest th a t can arise between the
contracting parties due to  the non-contractibility of actions. The two main areas
2
of conflict identified in this literature are : (1) conflicts between outside 
shareholders and entrepreneur/managers; and (ii) conflict between shareholders 
and debt holders. Our discussion below of these conflicts is cast in terms of 
whether the agency problem or moral hazard occurs before or afte r state 
realisations. In the terminology of Arrow [1985], the former is classified as 
moral hazard with hidden action and the la tter as moral hazard with hidden 
information. This distinction is convenient because the nature of conflicts and 
their potential resolution differ significantly.
1.1. Moral Hazard with Hidden Actions
Jensen and Meckling [1976] consider an entrepreneurial firm which is 
initially 100 per cent equity financed (i.e. owned solely by the 
entrepreneur/m anager). In order to finance an investment the entrepreneur must 
raise funds by issuing debt and/or equity shares, both of which have agency 
costs. Other types of financial instrument and the potential role of managerial 
remuneration functions are not considered. Issuing equity to  outside investors, 
who have no ability to control the day -to -d ay  actions of the incumbent manager, 
leads to the standard principal-agent problem: the entrepreneur, as manager, 
bears a  non-pecuniary cost of effort or human capital investment but receives 
less than 100 per cent of the returns at the margin. Hence, there is a conflict 
of interest between managers and shareholders, which we refer to  as the problem
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of managerial incentives. In addition, if risky debt is issued then the 
entrepreneur’s payoff function becomes convex in project returns and this creates 
an incentive to substitute in favour of risky projects. The expected return  to  
debt holders falls because their payoff function is concave in project returns 
and this leads to a  conflict of interest between shareholders and debt holders. 
We refer to  this as the problem of the risk-sh ifting  incentive, although in other 
papers it is sometimes referred to  as the asset-substitution effect.
The managerial and risk-shifting incentive problems suggest tha t insiders 
(the entrepreneur or manager) can impose costs on one or more groups of outside 
investors. However, rational investors will anticipate these agency costs and 
price their financial claims appropriately. Thus, agency costs are  ultimately 
borne by the original owners of the project. In general, we would expect these 
owners to  offer financial and/or managerial contracts which maximise their 
expected utility. In the following we discuss the possible solutions, looking 
first a t optimal financial contracts and then a t optimal managerial contracts.
Optimal C ontracts
Haugen and Senbet [1981, 1987] claim tha t both the managerial and
risk-shifting incentive problems can be eliminated by the appropriate mix of 
convertible debt, callable debt and managerial stock options. The idea behind 
their analysis is that the correct mix of these put and call options can be found 
such th a t the entrepreneur/m anager’s wealth function passes through the 
firs t-b est solution and has a slope that mimics the optimal marginal trade-o ff. 
Hence, the entrepreneur bears the full cost of increased perquisite consumption 
or lower effort. However, the results of Haugen and Senbet depend on their 
specification of the entrepreneur’s utility function and also suffer from an 
inappropriate application of the Option Pricing Model.
For the case of risk-shifting incentives Green [1984] shows how convertible 
debt or warrants may be used to resolve these conflicts between bondholders and
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shareholders? Green derives his result in a model where the entrepreneur 
maximises his or her expected payoff. Convertible debt or w arrants can resolve 
the incentive problem because the entrepreneur’s residual payoff in 
non-bankruptcy states becomes concave in returns. In terms of Figure 1 we can see 
th a t the risk-loving behaviour is induced by the convex structure OAB. All points 
to  the right of A are  non-bankruptcy states. With debt th a t is convertible into 
equity shares the payoff function over these states can look like AFG, which is 
concave. With appropriate conversion parameters the risk-aversion induced by the 
concave section can exactly offset the risk-loving behaviour induced by straight 
debt?
For the case of managerial incentives Innes [1990] shows tha t the form of the 
optimal financial contract depends on whether outsiders and/or insiders to  the 
firm can manipulate earnings. If earnings can be manipulated then the class of 
tru th -telling  contracts is restricted to the set of contracts with monotonically 
non-decreasing payoff functions and the optimal contract for a  risk neutral 
entrepreneur is the standard debt contract. In this case actions are  second best 
when debt is risky. If, however, earnings cannot be manipulated, then the optimal 
contract is a  ”live-o r-d ie” contract. This contract states th a t there is a
critical profit realisation below which all profits are paid to  investors and
above which no profits are paid to investors. Figure 1 illustrates the
entrepreneur’s residual payoff with both debt (OAB) and live-o r-d ie  (OCDE) 
contracts. A live-o r-d ie  contract provides the greatest incentive for high effort 
but does not necessarily attain  first-best.
An A pplication to  V enture C apital C ontracts
Chan, Siegel and Thakor [1990] apply the managerial incentives problem to  a 
tw o-period model of venture capital contracts. In their model both the
entrepreneur and venture capitalist have ability to  operate the project. In a 
given period either the entrepreneur or venture capitalist is in control of the
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Figure 1: Contract P ayoffs
Payoff to 
Entrepr.
0 CA
Debt = OAB 
L iv e -o r-D ie  = OCDE 
Debt + W arrant =  OAFG
project and takes an action which affects the project’s probability of success. A 
key additional feature is tha t the entrepreneur’s skill a t operating the project 
is initially unknown by either party  (i.e. there is symmetric information). In 
the first period, therefore, the entrepreneur operates the project so tha t his or 
her skill level can be determined from cash flows. The optimal financial contract 
is shown to  exhibit many of the features common to  venture capital contracts, 
including a  prohibition on external funding a t the intermediate date, a  buy-out 
arrangem ent if the entrepreneur’s skills are demonstrated to  be deficient, and an 
sharing arrangem ent where by the entrepreneur’s share of second period returns is 
a function of the observed level of skill.
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1.2. Moral Hazard with Hidden Information
The previous section has been concerned with the case where actions occur
afte r contracting but before resolution of uncertainty. This means th a t rational
investors, given tha t they know the structure of the problem, can correctly 
compute the entrepreneur’s actions in equilibrium. In contrast, the moral hazard 
problems of this section have the property tha t the entrepreneur privately 
observes a  state realisation before taking an action. This changes the nature of 
the problem because investors cannot know whether a  particular observed outcome 
is due to  the state  realisation or the agent’s action. We begin the section by 
re-analysing the problem of perquisite consumption. Following this we discuss two 
agency problems known as Jensen's free cash flow theory and Myers' 
under-investm ent ‘problem, and also introduce two recent developments referred to 
as stopping failures  and non-verifiable information.
Perqu isite  Consumption
The managerial incentive problem discussed in this section is best 
interpreted as perquisite consumption. The managerial e ffo rt and human capital 
investment interpretations are better suited to  ex ante, ra ther than ex post, 
moral hazard. As in the previous section, it can also be shown tha t convertible 
debt and managerial stock options are unable to  eliminate excessive perquisite 
consumption (see Farmer and Winter [1986], Narayanan [1987], and Williams
[1987]7). Williams [1987] is a particularly interesting model which combines ex
ante moral hazard in the form of risk-shifting incentives with ex post perquisite 
consumption. The main result is tha t debt does not necessarily induce 
entrepreneurs to  increase risk. The structure of Williams’ model is as follows. 
The entrepreneur/m anager chooses project risk and then observes the state
realisation in the form of project cash flow. Debt holders (and other prior 
claimants) are paid and then the entrepreneur consumes perquisites. Further 
payments may then be made to external investors a fte r which any excess cash
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belongs to  the entrepreneur. It is assumed that failure to  pay the debt holders 
leads to  the immediate removal of the entrepreneur so th a t no perquisites can be 
consumed. Investors are risk neutral while the entrepreneur’s utility  is linear 
in wealth, strictly concave in consumption of perquisites and additively 
separable in wealth and perquisite consumption. With these assumptions, Williams 
shows tha t an increase in the face value of debt may lead entrepreneur’s to  
choose less risky projects. This result, which contrasts with the analysis of 
Jensen and Meckling, is due to interactions between risk and perquisite 
consumption. To see this note that the entrepreneur’s ability to  consume 
perquisites following the state realisation is like a  contingent claim. For low 
state realisations the maximum feasible consumption is low and so the marginal 
utility of perquisite consumption is high. Consequently, for relatively low state 
realisations an increase in debt (or prior claims) reduces feasible consumption 
and increases marginal utility, which in turn induces the entrepreneur to  place 
greater weight on low realisations by initially choosing projects with lower 
risk. In addition to this result, Williams shows tha t even when risk is 
increasing in debt the potential adverse effects on bondholders are  more than 
offset by decreases in the consumption of perquisites. Thus, the idea th a t debt 
leads to  a conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders is not a 
general property?
Jen sen ’s Free Cash Flow Theory
In the finance literature the problem of perquisite consumption is often 
recast in terms of managerial discretion over investment expenditure. The basic 
story, due to  Jensen [1986], is that managers have incentives to  cause their 
firms to  grow beyond the optimal size because this increases the amount of 
resources under their control and, hence, their power (and possibly managerial 
remuneration). Thus, a sequence of good state realisations generating high cash 
flows can lead to conflicts between manager and shareholder as managers begin to  
invest in projects with negative NPV, rather than increase dividend
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distributions. This is known as Jensen’s free cash flow theory. (In this context 
”free cash flow” is defined as cash flow in excess of th a t required to  fund all 
projects with positive NPV).
Jensen argues, therefore, that a  key advantage of debt over equity is th a t it 
can prevent over-investment by forcing management to  pay out cash. A more formal 
model of optimal capital structure is developed in Stulz [1990]. In this model 
free cash flow can be either positive or negative and lead to  o v e r-  and 
under-investment, respectively. A crucial feature of Stulz’s model is th a t the 
m anager’s marginal utility of wealth is approaching zero so tha t it is impossible 
to  align conflicting interests with an appropriate managerial incentive scheme. 
Stulz assumes the realised level of free cash flow is private information of 
managers and tha t they always claim it to be negative in an attem pt to  persuade 
existing shareholders to vote for additional external funding. Realising this, 
shareholders determine external funding by trading off the potential losses from 
over-investm ent with those of under-investment.
Myers U nder-Investm en t Problem
The previously noted risk-shifting incentives of debt occur because an 
increase in project risk effects a wealth transfer from debt holders to  
shareholders. As a result of this transfer, shareholders may over-invest by 
undertaking projects with negative NPV. Similarly, we would expect 
under-investment to  occur if undertaking a positive NPV project were to  lead to  a 
reverse transfer of wealth from shareholders to  bondholders. Myers [1977] 
illustrates this possibility in a one-period model of growth options. At date 0 
the firm owns a technology which will produce an investment opportunity a t date
1. The gross value of this investment is V(s), where V(s) is increasing in sta te  
s and the value of s becomes known to the firm a t date 1. For simplicity, we 
assume tha t V(s) is known with certainty conditional on s. To exercise the 
opportunity (i.e. invest in the project) costs an amount I. If we let sa be such
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th a t V(s°) = I, then the investment is socially optimal for ail s > s a. Now 
suppose, for whatever reason, that the firm has debt outstanding with face value 
B. Clearly, if B has senior claim on the cash flow from the prospective 
investment then it will only be financed if s > s 6, where V(s6) = I + B. Thus, if 
the sta te  realisation falls into the interval (sa,sft) the firm fails to  exercise 
a  socially profitable investment. This is referred to  as the Myers 
under-investm ent problem.
Implicitly, the above analysis makes several im portant assumptions. First, 
th a t the project cannot be incorporated as a  separate legal entity. Separate 
incorporation would prevent the existing debt holders from gaining any value from 
the new project. In practice, however, separation of new from existing projects 
may be costly either for technological reasons or because it is prevented by 
covenants attached to existing debt contracts. A second im portant assumption is 
tha t existing claims cannot be renegotiated. In the example above, the debt 
holders have an incentive to  forgive a portion of the debt because the value of 
their claims fall to  zero unless the investment option is exercised. Myers [1977] 
and Hart and Moore [1990] argue, however, tha t when debt claims are widely 
dispersed, renegotiation may not be feasible due to  hold-out and free-rider 
problems.
In an optimal contracting framework the Myers under-investm ent problem can be 
overcome with convertible debt (Chiesa [1988]) or loan commitments (Berkovitch 
and Greenbaum [1991]). The choice between convertible debt and loan commitments 
depends on the source of uncertainty at the contracting date. Convertible debt is 
optimal when investments are fixed and there is uncertainty about the 
distribution of returns. On the other hand, when the investment requirement is 
the main source of uncertainty the loan commitment contract is optimal. A loan 
commitment contract specifies a maximum borrowing limit, say £, and a  usage fee, 
u, which varies according to investment requirements. This is a  slight variation 
of Myers [1977] as we now assume V is constant and I = I(s), a  function of s. In
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this case, better state realisations translate into lower I(s) and, hence, higher 
surplus, V -I(s ) -B . Thus, without violating incentives for truthful reporting, it 
is possible to  make the usage fee an increasing function of C -  I(s), so tha t 
entrepreneurs with good realisations pay more. The additional expected revenue 
from the usage fee can then be offset by a lower face value of debt, B, such tha t 
investors make zero expected profits and all projects with positive NPV are 
undertaken.
One potential problem with the ’’optimal contracting” approach above is that 
these models may fail to include important complicating features. For example, 
suppose debt has an important taxation advantage over equity and various hybrid 
contracts. Then, in general, we would expect only limited use of hybrid contracts 
such tha t the marginal cost due to distortions equals the marginal benefit of 
debt. It is therefore useful to consider how the incidence of under-investment 
can be minimised by the covenants attached to debt contracts. Such covenants may 
include seniority provisions, collateral provisions and restrictions on dividend 
payments (see Berkovitch and Kim [1990] and Stulz and Johnson [1985]). Another 
approach to  this problem is to introduce adverse selection into the moral hazard 
model and assess the extent to which under-investment can be mitigated by 
signalling and reputational considerations. These factors are discussed in 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
Stopping Failures
The under-investment problem discussed above can be characterised as an 
optimal exercise problem. The problem there is that outstanding debt makes the 
entrepreneur reluctant to exercise some worthwhile investment options. A natural 
extension of this research is the possibility that entrepreneurs, rather than 
being reluctant, may be too willing to exercise an investment option, i.e. there 
may be a stopping failure in the sense tha t once an investment process has begun 
it may be difficult to induce entrepreneurs to terminate unprofitable projects.
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In contrast to the Myers under-investment problem, which requires tha t
renegotiation is prohibitively costly, a stopping failure can occur precisely
because investors are unable to precommit against renegotiating initial contracts 
in the face of inefficiencies ex post. Models of this type include Dewatripont 
and Maskin [1989] and Chapter Two of this thesis (Hansen [1991a]).
The structure of my own model is as follows. An entrepreneur has a  project 
requiring a  sequence of sunk cost investments and an effo rt decision. The project 
is either low cost (positive NPV) or high cost (negative NPV). In the former case 
to tal cost is Cq+Cj while in the la tter case to tal cost is Cq+Cj + Cj , where the 
subscripts are the dates a t which the investments are made. At date 0 nature 
chooses whether the project is high or low cost and this is initially unobserved 
by either party. If the project is high cost then the entrepreneur has an 
exogenous probability of learning this a t either date 1 or date 2. The crucial 
distinction is that a t date 1 the to tal future investment requirement is cx+ c2
while a t date 2 it is only c2. Thus, the parameters of the model are set so tha t
it is socially optimal to  terminate a high cost project if this becomes known a t 
date 1, but to  otherwise complete the project if this becomes known only a t date
2. A self-financing entrepreneur will follow the socially optimal stopping 
policy. An entrepreneur with no initial wealth will need to  raise finance from 
investors who learns about to tal cost a t date 2, i.e. afte r the critical 
”po in t-o f-no -re tu rn” date. Thus, knowing that investors cannot credibly commit to  
refuse finance for the final stage, entrepreneurs may conceal their private 
information until after date 1. The paper shows tha t for some param eter values 
the stopping failure is resolved most efficiently by a  one-stage mechanism which 
corresponds to  debt with a loan commitment option attached. For some other 
param eter values efficient stopping requires a tw o-stage mechanism which can be 
interpreted as combinations of convertible and redeemable preference shares. 
These types of arrangements are observed in venture capital contracts.
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N on-V erifiab le Inform ation
The previous models of this sub-section have the common property th a t sta te  
realisations are privately observed by the entrepreneur. A closely related class 
of models develops moral hazard problems when state realisations are commonly 
observed but are non-verifiable by third parties, e.g. law courts (Aghion and 
Bolton [1988] and Hart and Moore [1989, 1990]). N on-verifiability of states is 
motivated by the costs of writing contracts and/or the difficulty of accurately 
defining and describing relevant state realisations.
The main advantage of assuming symmetric but non-verifiable information is a 
simplification of the renegotiation game that arises in the event of ex post 
inefficiencies. Apart from this, the results of most models are similar to  the 
case of moral hazard with hidden information. An example is Aghion and Bolton
[1988], which analyses the role of debt in effecting transfers of control between 
entrepreneur and investor. In their model the investor is a  more efficient 
controller of the project in low state realisations because the entrepreneur is 
reluctant to incur the non-pecuniary costs associated with liquidation. Debt 
increases the probability that the transfer of control takes place in low states 
while enabling the entrepreneur to make high-value contributions in high states.
In another model, Hart and Moore [1990] develop a variation on Jensen’s free 
cash flow theory where the manager is very wealthy and has an insatiable appetite 
for investment (i.e. as in Stulz [1990] the manager’s marginal utility of wealth 
approaches zero). In their model all cash flows accrue a t the end-date  so tha t 
free cash flow a t intermediate dates is non-positive and hence any investment 
must be funded by issuing new securities. Hart and Moore point out th a t the 
ability to  raise funds for any new investment will depend on the seniority rules 
specified by existing claims. For example, if there is debt outstanding then 
financing with equity shares may be difficult because the debt holders have first 
claim to any cash flows generated by the investment. This idea is developed to 
allow for a general structure of claims and seniority rankings. Thus, the primary
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role of debt in Hart and Moore is to control the manager’s ability to  bring cash 
in to  the firm whereas in Stulz [1990] the role of debt is to  get cash  o u t.
2. Ex P o s t  In form ation  A sym m etries
In this section we begin by discussing the costly -sta te  verification 
literature and follow on with a recent model of costly -state  falsification. A key 
distinction between the two is that the former assumes there axe costs of 
verifying or monitoring the state realisation while the la tte r assumes it is 
costly to  falsify or hide the true state realisation. The costly -state  
falsification approach is an exciting new development because optimal contracts 
can look very much like equity shares. This, of course, is in sharp contrast with 
the debt contracts commonly associated with costly-state verification.
2.1. C ostly-State Verification
The term costly-state verification refers to  a situation where only one of 
two parties to a contract can costlessly observe the state  realisation. However, 
the uninformed party  can become informed by taking some appropriate costly 
action. This class of models was first analysed by Townsend [1979] and, in the 
specific context of investment projects, has been extended by Diamond [1984] , 
Gale and Hellwig [1985], Williamson [1987], Chang [1990] and Bester [1990]. Here, 
as before, there is a  risk neutral entrepreneur with an investment project but 
with insufficient wealth to be self-financing. The entrepreneur therefore seeks 
external finance by offering a contract with promised repayments, possibly as a  
function of the project’s return. However, since the external investor does not 
initially observe project returns, he or she will not know whether the 
entrepreneur reports the true outcome. Indeed, whenever the repayment function is 
increasing in project returns the entrepreneur will have an incentive to  
under-report income. One possible solution is for the investor to  act so as to
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verify the entrepreneur’s report irrespective of how good the report is. But this 
cannot be optimal since verification, here interpreted as bankruptcy, is a  costly 
process. In general, minimisation of expected verification costs subject to  
honest reporting by the entrepreneur requires tha t the verification decision be 
random (see Townsend [1988]). However, if we restrict attention to  the class of 
contracts with deterministic verification functions then, with some further 
assumptions, the optimal contract is shown to  be the standard, debt contract, i.e. 
there is some critical level, say ?, such that: (1) for reports above r 
verification does not occur and repayments are constant; and (2) for reports 
below r verification (bankruptcy) occurs and all returns in excess of the 
verification cost are  paid to the investor1.0
Gale and Hellwig [1985] and Williamson [1987] consider the efficiency 
consequences of debt when investments are divisible and indivisible, 
respectively. They show that investment may be less than the firs t-best level. 
For the case of divisible investments, an example is where the pecuniary cost of 
verification in each state is increasing in the level of investment. Thus, 
compared with the firs t-best level, the loss from a  small reduction in investment 
may be more than offset by the gain from lower expected verification cost.
An important qualification of the Townsend, Gale and Hellwig and Williamson 
results is tha t they are derived within a one-period framework. Chang [1990] 
shows th a t in a  m ulti-period framework a simple condition is sufficient fo r the 
optimal contract to  be debt with commonly observed features such as coupon and/or 
sinking fund payments1.1 In the context of a two-period model the condition is tha t 
verification costs for each date be increasing in the value of the firm’s assets 
a t that date. The interim coupon and sinking fund payments then result from 
minimisation of to ta l verification costs.
Several other features of the standard costly-state verification model should 
be noted. First, since the model assumes entrepreneurs have no illiquid wealth 
(e.g. human wealth from present value of prospective labour earnings), the
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limited liability constraints arise trivially from the resource constraints 
requiring non-negative consumption for the entrepreneur. Second, the debt 
contract of the standard model is not renegotiation-proof. Since costly 
verification/bankruptcy is inefficient ex post it is sequentially rational for 
the original contract to  be renegotiated. In particular, if creditors are less 
efficient operators of projects we might expect a  new contract to  be written 
under which the entrepreneur maintains ownership of the project a t a  reduced 
level of debt.
These issues are studied in Bester [1990], who finds an interesting 
interaction between renegotiation and limited liability. In his model the 
entrepreneur can put up some personal wealth as collateral, but the maximum 
amount is limited so that debt remains risky. It is also assumed tha t both the 
project and the collateral are less valuable when owned and controlled by the 
investor. On this basis, we might expect tha t posting collateral increases the ex 
post inefficiencies and would be suboptimal. However, Bester shows tha t this is 
not necessarily true. For any given probability th a t the creditor will force 
bankruptcy (rather than renegotiate), an increase in collateral reduces the 
probability tha t the entrepreneur under-reports his return. It turns out tha t if 
the inefficiencies associated with changing project ownership are  sufficiently 
high relative to those associated with collateral, then an increase in external 
collateral will reduce expected total bankruptcy costs. In contrast to  the 
screening models discussed below, Bester shows tha t use of collateral is more 
likely to  increase efficiency if the project is high risk.
2.2. C ostly-State Falsification
In the previous sub-section the assumption of costly -state  verification 
implied tha t outsiders could not observe project return unless some deadweight 
loss was incurred. The term costly-sta te  falsification  represents the reverse 
side of the coin because now outsiders can perfectly observe returns unless the
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12agent actively hides (i.e. falsifies) some portion of i t .  Falsification is 
assumed to  be a costly activity. A general model of costly falsification is 
developed by Lacker and Weinberg [1989], but in terms of project finance we can 
imagine a  legal structure where all registered companies must publish audited 
accounts annually. Since these accounts must balance on both sides and reconcile 
with bank statements and so on, deceiving auditors is not a  trivial exercise.
Two key differences between costly verification and costly falsification 
suggest tha t their optimal contracts may be quite different. First, the decision 
as to  whether deadweight costs are to  be incurred shifts from the uninformed 
agent (investor) to  the informed agent (entrepreneur). Second, in the earlier 
model the cost of verification is increasing (or a t least non-decreasing) in the 
magnitude of the returns to be verified, while in the present model the costs of 
falsification depend on the extent to which returns are  falsified, i.e. if we let 
x  be the actual realised return and y* the return displayed to  outsiders, then 
z  — x-y> is the amount of output being hidden. Verification costs are increasing in 
x  while falsification costs are increasing in z  (they may also be a  function of 
x).
In contrast to the standard debt contract in the verification model, Lacker 
and Weinberg show that the optimal non-falsification contract is generally 
non-contingent on some left-hand interval of returns and increasing with a  slope 
strictly less than one on the right-hand interval. Under some conditions the 
repayment function is linear on the right-hand interval. This la tter property 
makes the contract resemble equity, but without full limited liability for the 
entrepreneur, i.e. it is akin to venture capital finance with collateral 
requirements. However, Lacker and Weinberg show th a t optimal non-falsification 
contracts are not always globally optimal. Their sufficient condition for 
non-falsification to be globally optimal requires th a t the entrepreneur not be 
too risk averse and/or that the cost function not be too convex. For example, 
non-falsification is optimal if falsification costs are  proportional to  the
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amount hidden, z.
3. Ex A nte In form ation  A sym m etries
The models considered in this section have the common feature tha t 
information is asymmetric a t the time of contracting. The key assumption is that 
the entrepreneur, as an informed insider, knows much more about his or her future 
prospects than do investors (outsiders). Two types of model are  considered in 
this section. First, we review the literature for models where the informational 
asymmetry is uni-dimensional. The typical model is of a number of entrepreneurs, 
each with a  single project characterised by an investment requirement and a 
distribution function for returns which accrue one period la ter. These models, 
beginning with Stiglitz and Weiss [1981], are discussed in Sub-sections 3.1 and 
3.2 on adverse selection and screening. The second type of model allows for 
informational asymmetries along two dimensions. The p ro to -type is the Myers and 
Majluf [1984] model where outsiders are uninformed about the true values of both 
existing assets and an investment option. Our discussion of this area, which 
begins in Sub-section 3.3 on signalling13, highlights the sensitivity of optimal 
financing strategies to  the assumptions of the model.
3.1. Adverse Selection
Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] show that a  debt contract leads to  under-investment
14(via credit rationing) when projects are ranked by m ean-preserving spread (MPS). 
The rationale for their result was the standard lemons ‘problem (Akerlof [1970]) 
where by bad (high risk) projects drive-out good projects. In the context of 
credit markets, adverse selection can occur because with debt contracts the 
entrepreneur’s expected returns increase with a mean-preserving increase in risk. 
However, de Meza and Webb [1987] show that Stiglitz’s and Weiss’s MPS assumption 
is inconsistent with debt being the optimal equilibrium contract. Instead, the 
optimal contract is an equity contract. Moreover, with equity contracts the
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aggregate level of investment attains first-best levels.
For the case of first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD)15 and where each
project has only two feasible state realisations, de Meza and Webb [1987, 1990]
show tha t debt finance is optimal and that even in the presence of risk aversion
aggregate investment will never be lower than the firs t-b es t level, and will
16often exceed i t . That debt is the unique Nash equilibrium can be seen as follows.
First, the assumption of only tw o-state realisations limits the set of feasible
contracts to  debt and equity. Second, compared with equity, debt gives the 
entrepreneur a  higher payoff in high profit states and a  lower payoff in low 
profit states. This implies that equity cannot be a Nash equilibrium since if all 
other financiers offer zero-profit equity contracts, each financier can make 
positive profit by offering a debt contract. Doing so would a ttra c t the higher 
quality entrepreneurs since they have greater probability weight concentrated on 
high-profit states. On the other hand, debt is a Nash equilibrium because any 
financier which attempts to  a ttrac t higher quality entrepreneurs by offering an 
equity contract will also a ttrac t the lower quality entrepreneurs. Given that 
other financiers are offering zero-profit debt contracts, any equity contract 
which is attractive to higher quality entrepreneurs will imply negative profits 
for the deviating financier.
The above analysis is conducted in an economy where each project has two 
possible realisations: success or failure. We have noted that this
characterisation limits the set of feasible contracts to debt and equity. In
general, with more than two feasible state-realisations FOSD is not sufficient 
for debt to be optimal. Innes [1991] shows that the relevant conditions are that 
higher quality be defined by the monotone likelihood ra tio  property and a 
monotonicity condition which requires investor payoffs to be non-decreasing in
profits1.7 In the absence of the monotonicity condition the optimal contract will
generally take the form of the ”live-or-d ie” contract in Section 1.1.
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3.2. Screening
The financial contracts and associated market equilibria identified above are 
all characterised by some degree of pooling of entrepreneurs. Some o f the lower 
quality entrepreneurs may drop out of the market but the remainder all receive 
the same credit terms. There are several possible responses to  this situation. 
One is for high quality entrepreneurs to  take observable actions which 
distinguish themselves from lower quality types. This is the subject of the next 
section on signalling. Another response is for investors (or lenders or banks) to  
offer a  menu of contracts and thereby sort or screen entrepreneur types through 
self-selection. Potential screening mechanisms include collateral requirements, 
investment size, and long-term contracts.
The role of collateral as a potential screening device was first analysed in 
Stiglitz and Weiss [1981]. However, they did not allow lenders to  vary 
simultaneously both interest rates and collateral requirements. Once this is 
allowed for most models of competitive banking with projects ranked by either MPS 
or FOSD obtain separating equilibria with market clearing, provided entrepreneurs 
have arbitrarily  large amounts of collateral available (Bester [1985] and Besanko 
and Thakor [1987a, 1987b]). The reason is that good borrowers, being less risky, 
will offer more collateral in return for lower interest rates than will bad 
borrowers. Thus, we obtain the single-crossing property th a t is necessary for 
separating equilibria to  exist. A similar analysis also applies to  models with 
divisible investments, though the equilibrium can be characterised by either 
under- or over-investm ent (Milde and Riley [1988]). If, however, collateral is 
limited then one-period contracts can lead to rationing in the sense th a t some 
borrowers have positive probability of being denied credit (see Besanko and 
Thakor [1987a] and Calomiris and Hubbard [1990]).
Additional possibilities for sorting borrowers are available when the 
one-period model is extended to a multi-period framework. Two approaches have 
been studied. The first, in Webb [1991a], assumes there are two entrepreneur
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types —  high and low quality —  and that each will undertake a  succession of two
identical one-period projects. Webb shows tha t an investor can sort the
entrepreneurs by offering two types of contract. The first type is a  succession
of standard one-period debt contracts and the second is a  long-term  contract. In
the la tte r contract, the financing terms for the second project are made
contingent on the outcome of the first project. A good outcome leads to  a  low
second period interest ra te  while a  bad outcome leads to  a  high second period
interest rate . In addition to the higher interest ra te , a  defaulter is further
penalised because the amount of internal equity available for the second project
is reduced. Consequently, a low quality entrepreneur who has only low probability
of success in the first project will choose the standard debt contract while high
18quality entrepreneurs will choose the long-term c o n tra c t.
The above resolution of adverse selection involved extending the contract for 
one or more periods into the future. This requires th a t entrepreneurs have a  
succession of projects or returns. However, if entrepreneurs have only one 
project then an alternative possibility is to shift the contracting process back 
one period prior to  the start of the project. Thakor [1989] shows tha t it is 
sometimes possible to  sort entrepreneurs by designing a menu of loan option 
agreements. The idea can be illustrated with a tw o-period model in which the 
project begins a t date 1 and ends a t date 2. It is possible to  write a spot 
contract when the project begins (date 1) or to write a, loan commitment one 
period prior to the beginning of the project (date 0). As an example, suppose 
there are two entrepreneur types, good and bad, who have profitable investments 
provided interest ra tes fall in intervals [0,r3] and [0,r6], respectively, where 
rg > Tb. Also, there are two possible macro-economic state  realisations which 
translate into low and high interest rates, r, and r ft. The prior probability 
distribution over states and the subsequent state realisations (a t date 1) are 
commonly observed. Assume r, < rb < rh < rg so th a t r, is the low interest ra te  
(economy wide) in which the projects of both entrepreneur types are  profitable
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while rh is the high interest ra te  in which only the good entrepreneur’s project 
is profitable. Hence, there is a  problem of adverse selection in sta te  r / but not 
in state rh. Consequently, spot contracting a t date 1 does not perform well in 
sta te  rr  On the other hand, contracts written prior to  date 1 can use the 
possibility tha t state rh may occur to sort entrepreneurs. Specifically, consider 
a  contract which gives the holder an option to  borrow a t an interest ra te  r0 
where rb < rQ < rh. Clearly, the option is worthless to  a  bad entrepreneur since 
rQ exceeds the upper bound rb for which the bad type’s project is profitable. 
However, the option is valuable to the good entrepreneur because of the interest 
ra te  subsidy rh -  ra it confers in state h. Thus, a  contract which incorporates 
the loan commitment option will sort entrepreneurs because only the good
entrepreneur will be prepared to pay an up-front fee a t date 0 to  obtain the 
option. The bad entrepreneur will obtain finance through an actuarily fair spot 
contract a t date 1.
3.3. Signalling
A large portion of the literature on optimal corporate financial policy 
consists of signalling models. The four main types are: (1) signalling by
managers due to interactions between debt levels and managerial incentives (Ross 
[1977]); (2) signalling by risk averse entrepreneurs with the proportion of
equity holdings retained (Leland and Pyle [1977]); (3) signalling with dividend 
payouts (Bhattacharya [1979]); and, (4) signalling firm value by not investing in 
projects with low but positive NPV (Myers and Majluf [1984]). Each of these
models may have implications for optimal investment. However, in the case of the 
first three models the role of investment is not of prim ary concern. In contrast, 
the primary focus of Myers and Majluf is whether firms forego positive NPV 
projects. Thus, in keeping with our focus in this survey on investment projects,
19we discuss only Myers and Majluf [1984] and associated p ap ers .
The idea underlying Myers and Majluf [1984] can be illustrated by the
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following simple example. Suppose firms can be either type H or type L with 
existing assets of value V* and Vl, respectively, where V* > VL. These values are 
known to  managers, who act in the interests of existing shareholders, but are  not 
known by the market in general. However, the market knows tha t the type H firms 
accounts for a  proportion p of all firms. In the absence of separating 
equilibria, therefore, the market value of each firm’s existing assets is VP = 
pVH + (l-p)V L. Hence, VL < VP < Vp , and so the market overvalues low quality 
firms and undervalues high quality firms. If the managers of high quality firms 
attem pt to  finance an investment by issuing equity shares they must accept that 
the issue is under-priced. Quite simply, therefore, the managers will forego an
investment whenever the loss from underpricing exceeds the original shareholders
20share of the value of the new p ro jec t.
The Myers/Majluf model is clearly very stylised and employs a  number of 
restrictive assumptions. In particular, since firm types are  ranked by FOSD we 
would expect (from de Meza and Webb [1987]) that debt will dominate equity. These 
and other aspects are  considered in extensions to the basic model by Brennan and 
Kraus [1987], Constantinides and Grundy [1989] and Noe [1988], who show that 
there often exist non-dissipative  signalling equilibria (i.e. all firm types 
invest in all projects with positive NPV). However, as our discussion of these 
models proceeds it will become clear tha t the implications for the equilibrium 
method of finance is very sensitive to the assumptions of the particular model.
We begin the discussion with Noe [1988], who extends the Myers/Majluf 
analysis to  an arb itrary  number of firm types, allows managers to  issue either 
debt or equity or to  forego the project altogether, and also introduces residual 
uncertainty into manager’s information sets. The introduction of residual 
uncertainty has an asymmetric effect on market valuation of debt and equity. 
Without residual uncertainty for insiders, debt would either be riskless or 
prohibitively expensive, i.e. if Rt is the certain return on (firm) type t ’s 
project then debt F is riskless if F < Vt + Rt and prohibitively expensive if F >
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Vt + Rt. With residual uncertainty, debt becomes risky and its value can be 
expressed as a  fixed payment plus an option to default. This option value is 
higher for low quality types and may lead them to mimic any debt issue by high 
quality types. On the other hand, the proportional nature of equity claims means 
th a t valuation of equity is unaffected by the introduction of uncertainty. In an 
example with three firm types, Noe shows tha t all firm types accept the positive 
NPV project but the low and high types issue debt while the medium type issues 
equity. This equilibrium arises because the gain to  low types from issuing 
over-priced equity (i.e. imitating medium types) is more than offset by the gain 
in option value on debt from imitating high types.
The signalling equilibrium proposed by Noe implements the efficient 
investment policy since any project with positive NPV is undertaken. However, the 
equilibrium is only partially revealing since the high and low quality types pool 
with debt while the medium quality types pool with equity. The next two papers 
have the property tha t their equilibria are fully revealing. Brennan and Kraus 
[1987] show how financing strategies involving the initial capital structure can 
increase the cost of masquerading by low quality types and thereby achieve 
separating equilibria. In the case of FOSD, separation can be achieved by the 
simultaneous issue of new equity and repurchase of outstanding debt. This 
financing operation is relatively more expensive for low quality types since 
repurchasing debt kills the option to default on th a t debt. From the above 
discussion we know tha t the default option is more valuable for low quality 
types. For the case of mean-preserving spreads the revealing equilibrium involves 
the issue of convertible bonds, junior bonds, or packages of bonds and warrants.
In general, the procedure employed by Brennan and Kraus is to  invoke a 
’’lemons property” for each financing method: that is, for any proposed financing 
method, z, investors assume that it is issued by the worst type of firm in the 
sense tha t the value of z to  investors is lowest when issued by a  firm of this 
type. Investors value z  accordingly. Thus, for each financing z, all firms apart
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from the corresponding worst type would be undervalued if they announce z. They 
axe b e tte r-o ff  to  announce some financing method for which they obtain actuarily 
fa ir terms. This can only be done by choosing a  financing method which other 
types will not mimic, i.e. choose that financing method for which you are the 
worst type. This confirms to  investors tha t their beliefs are  rational.
The existence of Brennan and Kraus’ proposed equilibria is dependent on an
appropriate initial capital structure. Repurchasing debt is only possible if
there is debt outstanding. Another important aspect of both Brennan/Kraus and Noe
is tha t managers are assumed to act in the best interests of existing
shareholders. These features are avoided by Constantinides and Grundy [1989], who
consider a  model where the firm is initially entirely financed by equity and
partially owned by risk neutral managers. In this case the non-existence of debt
in the initial capital structure renders the debt repurchase solution infeasible.
However, with the explicit managerial maximisation, a  fully revealing signalling
equilibrium can be achieved by driving a wedge between managers and existing
shareholders. Essentially, this is done by a financing which comprises the issue
of convertible debt and a commitment to use excess proceeds to  repurchase stock
(cf. repurchasing debt in Brennan and Kraus). The wedge between managers and
shareholders is created by a  precommitment preventing the management from
tendering its own stock holdings. The repurchase of stock from existing
shareholders creates a countervailing incentive to  managers against
over-valuation of the firm since market prices of stocks are more sensitive to
firm value than is debt, i.e. the additional cash brought into the firm from
over-valuation of (convertible) debt is more than offset by the cash paid out on
the repurchase of over-valued stock. Thus, over-stating the value of the firm
21 22will reduce the manager’s equity va lue . ’
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4. Mixed A g en cy -In fo rm a tio n  Models
In each of the previous three sections we have grouped and discussed models 
according to the type of information problem being modelled —  whether it be an 
agency problem or ex ante or ex post information asymmetry. There are, however, a  
number of papers which, because they combine agency with asymmetric information, 
do not fit well into any of the previous sections. A number of these mixed models 
are  discussed in this section.
Two lines of motivation for mixed agency-informational models is provided in 
John [1987]:
(i) consider the problem of moral hazard with hidden actions as in Section 1.1. 
In this case the agency problem occurs because the agent’s action is either 
unobservable by investors or non-verifiable by third parties (e.g. law 
courts). Nevertheless, the investors are assumed to  understand the 
structure of the problem in terms of the entrepreneur’s preferences and the 
available set of investment technologies. With this knowledge the investors 
are able to completely determine the effects of each contract on the 
entrepreneur’s actions. Investors can, therefore, offer the best contract. 
Hence, a feature of the standard agency model is th a t outsiders know as 
much about the parameters as do insiders. A natural generalisation is 
therefore to  introduce (ex ante) asymmetric information about either the 
entrepreneur’s preferences or the investment technology;
(ii) information asymmetries a t the date of contracting can result in pooling 
equilibria or separating equilibria via screening or signalling (Section 
3). However, if there is a time lag between the issuing of claims and the 
implementation of investment decisions then new information can arrive 
which may affect the agent’s optimal investment action. This case 
corresponds closely with the standard model of moral hazard with hidden 
information (Section 1.2) except that the initial symmetry of information
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is generalised to allow for private information.
Besides the above motivations, mixed agency-inform ation models are 
interesting because the agency and informational aspects interact to  produce new 
results. One finding is that introducing ex ante private information into an 
agency framework can sometimes, but not always, help to  am eliorate the moral 
hazard problem.
In the following we begin with agency-adverse selection models and then 
consider agency-signalling models.
4.1. Agency and Adverse Selection
The most common method of introducing adverse selection problems into agency 
models is via information about the set of socially profitable investment 
opportunities available to  the entrepreneur. This approach is followed in the 
Myers under-investment model of Webb [1987] and in the risk-shifting model of 
Diamond [1989a]. Each of these models assumes that some positive amount of debt 
is optimal due either to taxation advantages of debt or to  costly-state 
verification. Webb [1987] constructs an economy with an arb itrary  horizon where 
there are two types of entrepreneur, a  and /?. These entrepreneurs are ex ante 
observationally equivalent: type a. always take value-maximising decisions while 
type /? behave strategically and may under- (or over-) invest according to how its 
actions affect investors beliefs (i.e. its reputation). The state  of the world a t 
each date is independently distributed across time and realisations are common 
knowledge. In this model a high reputation corresponds to investors putting a 
high probability on the firm being type a . A reputation is valuable because it 
reduces the cost of funding investments. Webb shows that provided the horizon is 
initially sufficiently long there will be a period where type /? entrepreneurs 
mimic type oc entrepreneurs by taking value-maximising decisions. However, as the 
horizon draws closer there comes a date where, for some state  realisations, value
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maximising investments are no longer consistent with maximisation of equity 
value. Thus, with positive probability the type f$ entrepreneur will eventually 
under-invest and will be correctly identified as type /?.
Diamond [1989a] combines adverse selection with ex ante moral hazard where 
some types of entrepreneur can choose the level of risk for their project. 
Altogether there are three types of (ex ante) observationally equivalent 
entrepreneur: type G have safe, positive NPV projects, type B have risky, 
negative NPV projects, and type BG have both safe and risky projects. As in 
Stiglitz and Weiss [1981], the parameters are such tha t in a  one-period model the 
type BG would choose the risky project if interest rates are high but would 
choose the safe project if interest rates are sufficiently low. The m ulti-period 
model is a simple repetition of the one-period model with the degree of adverse 
selection, and hence interest rates, falling over time as those entrepreneurs who 
previously took risky projects and failed drop out of the pool. Thus, the model 
has the property that if the adverse selection is initially sufficiently strong 
then the type BG entrepreneurs will begin by choosing the risky project (i.e. 
over-invest) but, if they survive, will later switch to  the safe project when
23interest rates are sufficiently low . In the final period a type BG who previously 
choose safe projects will continue to do so. This contrasts with Webb [1987] 
where the value of a  reputation falls over time so tha t a  type /? is subject to  
the under-investment problem in the final periods.
The previous two papers show that introducing adverse selection into an 
agency framework can sometimes fully resolve the agency problem. In contrast, the 
final paper for this section, Webb [1991b], illustrates how adverse selection can 
induce an agency problem that would otherwise not arise. The model assumes a 
continuum of entrepreneurs ranked by FOSD. Each entrepreneur has access to  two 
project types: project A is standard in that it involves a  single investment 
followed by a return, while project B, on the other hand, requires a sequence of 
two investments and produces a sequence of two returns. A key assumption is that
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the first period return for project B becomes common knowledge before the issuing 
of debt to  finance the second period investment. In the absence of adverse 
selection all entrepreneurs would choose the project with highest NPV. Suppose 
this is project A. With adverse selection, however, the equilibrium may be 
characterised by high quality types choosing B (i.e. low NPV projects) and low 
quality types choosing A. The reason is that the early cash flows of project B 
reveal information about entrepreneurial quality and so leads to  financing terms 
a t the second date which are closer to actuarially fair terms. Also, in 
equilibrium the implicit subsidy from high to low quality types is smaller with 
project B because all the lowest quality entrepreneurs choose project A. These 
two effects may more than outweigh the loss due to project B’s lower NPV.
4.2. A gency and Signalling
Necessary conditions for the existence of signalling equilibria are  th a t the 
signal be a costly action and that the marginal cost of signalling be decreasing 
in firm quality. The models in this section illustrate the point th a t agency 
costs can exhibit these conditions. John [1987] uses the probability of
risk-shifting behaviour as the underlying basis for separation, while John and 
Nachman [1985] rely on a  two-period Myers’ under-investment problem. In the 
la tte r model, state realisations each period are independently distributed and
privately observed by the entrepreneur. An intertemporal linkage is provided by 
making the second period expected return on investment a positive function of the 
first period state realisation, s^ To see how this works, let sx be distributed 
on [0,s]. Compared with the standard model without intertem poral linkage, 
entrepreneurs are more willing to invest because failure to do so is a  signal 
about poor future opportunities. Failure to invest signals to investors th a t the 
true value of sx is in some interval [0,s ), while investing signals th a t the true 
value is in the interval [s,s]. The intertemporal linkage means that these
signals affect the price of finance obtained for second period investments.
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In the above paper the introduction of private information helps to  alleviate 
inefficiencies in a  Myers under-investment framework. As before, however, this 
need not always be the case. Chapter Three of this thesis (Hansen [1991b]) 
illustrates this point with a model of investment-timing decisions when projects 
overlap. The paper is concerned with the impact of asymmetric information on 
whether projects should be incorporated jointly as a  single firm or whether they
24should be legally distinct en tities . The structure of the model is such tha t it 
is sometimes socially efficient for projects to be jointly incorporated because 
this creates diversification effects which reduce the incidence of the Myers’ 
under-investment problem. However, with asymmetric information distortions in the 
entrepreneur’s investment policies may arise which can make separate 
incorporation of projects more efficient ex ante. The idea is tha t firms who are 
in the process of raising finance for new projects may try  to  mislead the market 
about the performance of their existing projects. One way tha t they might do this 
is by prematurely exercising a low value investment option under the pretence 
tha t it is in a  high state. This creates an adverse selection problem because 
entrepreneurs whose projects are actually in the high state  would optimally 
exercise their project. Failure to do so would risk the project falling into the 
low state.
5. Summary and D iscussion
In the previous sections we have discussed in detail a wide range of models 
grouped according to their key informational assumptions. In the following 
paragraphs we provide a brief overview by re-grouping models by type of financial 
contract. We consider ordinary equity shares, standard debt contracts, 
convertible debt, loan commitments and long-term  contracts, and, in addition, the 
role of collateral. The section ends with some general comments regarding the 
optimal contracting literature.
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Ordinary equity shares have been shown to be globally optimal in models of 
adverse selection where projects are ranked by MPS (de Meza and Webb [1987]). In 
addition, some tentative support for the use of equity is provided by the
recently developed model of costly-state falsification, though this model does 
not produce the limited liability feature usually associated with ordinary equity 
(Lacker and Weinberg [1989]).
The standard debt contract is optimal within the class of monotonic contracts 
when there are problems of managerial incentives or adverse selection with MLRP 
(de Meza and Webb [1987], Innes [1990]). As discussed in Section 1.1 the 
reasonableness of a monotonicity constraint depends on whether managers and/or 
investors can artificially boost or sabotage the firm’s earnings. If these
possibilities are not significant then the optimal contract is a ”liv e-o r-d ie” 
contract. Standard debt contracts are also optimal in models of costly -sta te
verification provided the entrepreneur is risk neutral and stochastic auditing or 
monitoring is ruled out (Townsend [1979, 1988]).
Convertible debt, or debt with warrants, arises as an optimal response to  
risk-shifting incentives (Green [1984]), Myers type under-investm ent in growth 
options (Chiesa [1988]), and stopping failures (Hansen [1991a]). Issuing 
convertible debt can also help to solve the Myers/Majluf adverse selection 
problem if managers act on behalf of initial shareholders and firms are ranked by 
MPS (Brennan and Kraus [1987]). However, the optimal financing strategy can
change dramatically if managers act in their own interest (Constantinides and 
Grundy [1989]).
Under certain conditions both long-term debt contracts and loan commitment 
options can resolve extended versions of the standard adverse selection problem 
(Webb [1991a], Thakor [1989]). In addition, loan commitments can solve the Myers 
under-investment problem when the required level of investment is the main source 
of uncertainty (Berkovitch and Greenbaum [1991]). For long-term  contracts to  be a 
fully effective sorting device the number of projects available (in sequence)
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must exceed the number of entrepreneur types. In the case of loan commitments we 
require tha t entrepreneurs have sufficient initial wealth to  pay the up -fron t 
fees.
In addition to  the contractual forms discussed above, the literature reveals 
several potential roles for collateral. An important distinction is made between 
internal collateral, which is based on the assets of the firm, and external 
collateral provided by the entrepreneur’s personal assets. In the case of 
internal collateral the Myers under-investment problem can be minimised if debt 
contracts allow future investment projects to be financed by new debt secured on 
internal collateral (Stulz and Johnson [1985]). For external collateral, two 
possibilities have been analysed. The first is the role of collateral, coupled 
with interest rates, as a sorting device (Bester [1985]). The second is 
collateral as a  device to  aid pareto-improving renegotiations in the costly -state  
verification model (Bester [1990]). The screening theory implies tha t lower 
quality borrowers put up less collateral (but pay higher interest rates) while 
the verification model implies the reverse.
The above discussion has highlighted a number of restrictions required for 
optimal financial contracts to conform with common observation. This is 
particularly true in the case of standard debt contracts. Several additional 
remarks can be made about the generality of the optimal contracting literature. 
The first concerns the role of limited liability. Most models, especially the 
one-period variety, assume that the life of the entrepreneur or firm ends when 
the project ends. This effectively imposes on the problem a resource constraint 
in the form of non-negative consumption. The resource constraint is then 
interpreted as limited liability for the entrepreneur. Given tha t limited 
liability is an important feature of most financial contracts, including debt, 
equity and hybrid contracts, a  more satisfactory approach would be to  derive 
limited liability endogenously within the model. The availability of external 
collateral is one approach found in the literature. Another approach is the role
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of outside employment in multi-period models (Hansen [1991a] obtains partially 
limited liability).
As a  final comment we refer to Hart’s and Holmstrom’s [1987] suggestion tha t 
financial contracts are  inappropriate incentive devices. They argue tha t direct 
managerial incentive schemes are likely to  be cheaper than capital structure 
arrangements. Although this claim appears reasonable in the context of large 
public firms, it has considerably less appeal in the context of the 
entrepreneurial models studied in this paper. In these models, the optimal 
financial contract is synomonous with the optimal managerial incentive scheme 
(Green [1984], Innes [1990])
6. C onclu sion s
The objective of this paper has been to provide a  comprehensive introduction 
to optimal financing for investment projects. In the introduction to the paper we 
noted the omission of a number of interesting topics with implications for the 
relationship between finance and investment, but for which investment is not 
their primary concern. Nevertheless, the foregoing discussion covers a  wide range 
of models with numerous implications for optimal project finance.
The initial approach of the project financing literature was to assume 
straight debt and ordinary equity shares were the only securities available. More 
recently, the method of inquiry has involved explicit derivations of optimal 
financial contracts in the context of both individual firm optimisation and 
overall market efficiency. Many, but not all, of these contracts may to tally  
eliminate the proposed inefficiency; examples include risk-shifting incentives, 
Myers under-investment problem, stopping failures, and some types of adverse 
selection. We have noted, however, that although some financial contracts, such 
as debt, correspond well with casual observation, they are in fact optimal only 
within some restricted class of contracts.
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A number of other recent developments can be identified. The most prominent 
is the distinction between private information and symmetric but non-verifiable 
information. This distinction is particularly important for models focusing on 
the extent to  which renegotiation may avoid ex post inefficiencies. Models of 
symmetric or asymmetric learning and reputation-building have also been a  subject 
of recent interest. A less prominent development is the interaction between 
financial structure and the optimal incorporation mode for new investment 
projects. The question of whether a  new project should or should not be 
incorporated jointly with existing assets hats received relatively little 
attention in view of the prominence of the Myers/Majluf signalling literature.
At a  more fundamental and theoretical level, we can identify two other areas 
worthy of further research. First, as previously noted in Section 5, the limited 
liability feature common to most financial contracts has been imposed via 
resource constraints rather than derived endogenously within the model. Progress 
on this issue requires further development of m ulti-period models. Another 
research topic would be to further develop the costly -state  falsification model 
(Section 2.2) in the context of investment projects. This is an interesting topic 
because the existing models imply a contract resembling equity but without full 
limited liability. Also, costly-state falsification appears to  be a  natural 
framework in which to  assess the reasonableness of the monotonicity constraint 
that is often imposed on contracting problems.
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We do not attem pt to  trace these features back to  the more general pure theory 
of, for example, principal-agents or signalling. The interested reader can 
find relevant references in articles cited.
A third area of conflict can arise between shareholders and the firms 
customers and employees. This forms part of the literature on Product Market 
Interactions and is discussed in Harris and Raviv [1991].
The risk-shifting incentive is avoided if each investor holds all securities 
issued by the firm in proportion to their values.
First, the entrepreneur’s utility function is ill-defined: they assume
utility, U(V,F), is a  function of current market value of wealth, V, and the 
present value of perquisite consumption, F. This formulation is inconsistent 
with their claim tha t F is chosen prior to the resolution of uncertainty 
(Haugen and Senbet [1987,p.l091]). i.e. the appropriate function is expected 
utility over consumption and end-of-period wealth. Second, the option pricing 
model they apply takes as given the characteristics of the underlying asset 
(i.e. of the firm). This is not entirely appropriate as the model is being 
used to  determine the entrepreneur’s action choice for the firm.
Extension of the one-period problem to a framework where entrepreneurs 
undertake a  succession of projects can lead the contracting parties to
minimise risk-shifting distortions by building incentive effects into
long-term  contracts. In particular, Stiglitz and Weiss [1983] show tha t 
contract terminations and exclusion from the credit market may be used as an 
incentive device against risk-shifting behaviour. A credible th rea t to 
term inate a relationship in the event that the first project is unsuccessful
will lead entrepreneurs to choose safer projects. The th rea t itself is
seauentially rational because the alternative of charging higher penal
interest rates to  defaulters exacerbates the second period moral hazard 
problem to such an extent that termination is a better policy. The role of 
contract termination has also been studied by Bolton and Scharfstein [1990] in 
the context of costly -state  verification.
As noted by Green, his analysis is crucially dependent on the model being in 
discrete time. In a  continuous time model the put-option effect disappears due 
to  the put-call parity relation. Also, the results were proved for an
investment allocation problem over two projects (not mutually exclusive) and 
it is not clear whether or not they can be extended for three or more
projects.
Grossman and Hart [1982] analyse the role of debt as a bonding device to  
prevent excessive perquisite consumption. The idea tha t debt claims have
priority over managerial consumption is similar to  Williams [1987].
Moreover, stepping back a  stage to consider the form of the optimal financial
contract, Williams finds that it is necessarily discontinuous, i.e. the
optimal contract cannot be replicated by a combination of bonds, stocks and 
options.
Diamond develops the implications of costly-state verification for the role of 
financial intermediaries.
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Hart and Moore [1989] also obtain debt as the optimal contract in a  model 
where verification costs differ across assets. Specifically, they assume 
verification costs are infinite for cash flows but zero for physical assets. 
This means tha t it is impossible for the investor to  use verification 
procedures to  force the entrepreneur to pay out cash flows. But since physical 
assets are costlessly verifiable the investor can obtain some leverage over 
the entrepreneur by writing a contract which gives him the right to  seize 
these assets in the event of non-payment. Bolton and Scharfstein [1990] also 
assume verification costs are infinite for cash flows. However, instead of 
seizing assets, the financier induces repayment by using the th rea t to  
term inate future funding.
Coupon payments are interest payments made on a regular basis. A sinking fund 
provision requires the firm to  repurchase or retire  a  portion of the bond 
issue each year starting from a number of years to  m aturity. A failure to  meet 
the coupon or sinking fund payments results in default.
The problem of costly-state falsification is also closely related to tha t of 
ex post perquisite consumption, as discussed in Section 1.2. However, a 
distinguishing feature is that the model of perquisite consumption assumes 
tha t the entrepreneur’s utility function is of the form U(C,W), where C and W 
are perquisite consumption and wealth, respectively. A conflict of interest 
between shareholders and managers arises because shareholders only value W. In 
the model of costly falsification both parties to the contract value only W.
In addition, there is a  deadweight loss from falsification.
Strictly, the Myers and Majluf model belongs in the sub-section on adverse 
selection. However, we defer this model to our discussion of signalling 
because most subsequent developments of the model are to  do with signalling.
Roughly speaking, ranking by MPS means that all projects with the same mean 
expected return are ordered according to the variance of their returns.
A project first-o rder stochastically dominates another project if it has 
higher expected return.
The over-investm ent result requires that the supply of loanable funds not be 
backward-bending as a function of interest rates.
The la tte r ’’monotonic contract” condition can be motivated by a  requirement 
tha t investors never have an incentive to sabotage the firm or by an ability 
of entrepreneurs to  falsify their profit report (e.g. with hidden borrowing). 
The costly-state  falsification model of Lacker and Weinberg [1989] suggests 
tha t this constraint might be restrictive in some circumstances.
In contrast to Stiglitz and Weiss [1983] the possibility of optimal 
termination does not arise because the moral hazard problem is absent.
For an introduction to the class of models of Ross [1977] and Leland and Pyle 
[1977] see the survey in Harris and Raviv [1991]. For a  recent analysis of 
dividend signalling see Williams [1988].
Lucas and McDonald [1990] apply a variation of the Myers and Majluf-model to 
an infinite horizon stock market model where the informational advantage of 
insiders is temporary. They obtain a number of empirical predictions which are 
consistent with observed stock price (and volume) dynamics.
The above analysis assumes investments are indivisible. When investments are 
divisible the convertibility feature is not required for equilibria to be 
fully revealing. Instead, the face value of debt and investment level (and 
stock repurchase commitment) serve as signals.
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A further logical extension of the Constantinides and Grundy approach of 
explicit managerial maximisation is to derive an optimal managerial contract. 
Dybvig and Zender [1988] take this approach in a  model where the manager’s 
remuneration contract is determined prior to  the arrival of private 
information. They show tha t the optimal managerial contract always costlessly 
resolves the under-investment problem. However, the ability to  contract prior 
to  information arrival significantly alters the Myers/Majluf model because it 
opens up the possibility tha t the firm can also raise finance a t this prior 
contracting date. Basically, the under-investment problem cannot arise if 
investments can be financed with retained earnings.
Diamond [1989b] develops the implications o f this profile of risk-shifting 
behaviour for the role of monitoring activities.
Shah and Thakor [1987] also analyse optimal incorporation modes. They employ a  
tax  advantage for debt which, with symmetric information, would imply tha t the 
project be 100 per cent debt financed. They then introduce asymmetric 
information about project risk and show there exists a  dissipative (Riley) 
reactive equilibrium in which the degree o f inefficiency is decreasing in 
risk. Whether projects are incorporated jointly or separately then depends on 
risk of the project relative to existing assets. The implications of 
monitoring costs are also derived.
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CHAPTER TWO
VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCE WITH TEMPORARY
ASYMMETRIC LEARNING
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Consider the tunnel currently being built under the English channel. Between 
1987 and mid-1990 the estimated construction cost of the tunnel increased from 
£2.71 billion to  around £4.25 billion (The Times [p.26,1 June 1990]). However, 
although the channel tunnel may now be a loss-making venture, past investments 
are  sunk and so it is economic to complete it. This example illustrates two key 
features of new projects, whether they be large publicly-owned projects or 
smaller, privately funded entrepreneurial projects. The first key feature is that 
past investments are effectively sunk costs because an incomplete project has 
little or zero market value. This means that there exists a critical stage beyond 
which the project’s financiers are unable to  pre-commit against re-financing in 
the event of ’’unexpected” cost increases. The second key feature is that 
information about the profitability of the project is revealed during the 
investment phase. Moreover, due to intimate involvement in the project we would 
expect tha t it is the entrepreneur (rather than financier) who first receives 
this information. A self-financing entrepreneur who learns the project is bad 
prior to  the critical, ”po in t-o f-no-re tu rn” stage will term inate the project. But 
with external finance an entrepreneur may have an incentive to  conceal bad news 
from the financier until after the ”no-return” stage. The key problem for
financiers, therefore, is to design a financial contract which induces truthful 
reporting by the entrepreneur.
The above problem, which we call the stopping problem, is largely neglected 
in the extant literature on financial contracting with imperfect information. 
Instead, a large part of the literature during the late 1970s and 1980s focuses 
on various adverse selection problems arising from asymmetric information prior 
to contracting! These models typically posit a project consisting of an initial 
one-off investment followed by some payoff a t the end of the period. More
recently, there has been greater recognition of the importance of learning and
reputation building for understanding the trad e -o ff between debt, equity and
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various hybrid financial claims (see Chiesa [1988], Diamond [1989], Green [1984] 
and the surveys in Allen [1990] and Harris and Raviv [1991]). However, in these 
models the revelation of information occurs a fte r completion of the investment 
process and, hence, abandonment decisions do not arise.
An exception to  the above literature is Dewatripont and Maskin [1989]. Their 
model resembles the stopping problem in this paper in the sense tha t refinancing 
is also sequentially optimal. Dewatripont and Maskin assume an adverse selection 
problem whereby entrepreneurs know whether they are high or low cost prior to  
contracting. They argue that investors can sort loan applicants by deliberately 
remaining of a small size relative to the projects they are financing. By being 
small, investors can credibly pre-commit not to refinance high cost projects and 
so these types do not apply for loans. The implication is tha t a decentralised 
financial system with many small financial institutions will be more efficient 
than  a  centralised system as in Soviet style planned economies. In contrast, we 
do not allow any ex ante informational asymmetry. Our model assumes symmetric 
information a t the initial contracting date but allows an asymmetry to  develop 
during the investment process as entrepreneurs learn the project’s true cost. 
Eventually, the financier/investor will learn whether the project is good or bad 
(in the sense of an ex ante NPV) but this information arrives a fte r the 
”p o in t-o f-n o -re tu rn ”.
An important additional feature of our model is th a t the stopping problem is 
set in the context of a principal-agent model with a  risk neutral entrepreneur. 
Here, the expected gross return is determined by the level of entrepreneurial 
effort. The principal-agent framework serves several purposes: first, in the 
absence of the stopping problem, it ensures tha t debt is optimal within the class 
o f monotonic contracts; second, in the presence of the stopping problem it leads 
to  an efficiency trad e -o ff  between the face value of debt and level of redundancy 
payment as methods for inducing termination of high cost projects. Without the
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effort problem the optimal levels of debt and redundancy payment would be 
indeterminate.
We show tha t when cost-states are publicly observable the efficient solution 
can be implemented by a  contract in which the face value of debt is contingent on 
the sta te  realisation. When cost-states are not publicly observable 
state-contingent contracts become inadmissible. In this case our solution method 
is to obtain a fully-revealing equilibrium by applying the theory of 
"Implementation by Stage Mechanisms” (see Moore and Repullo [1988]). For some 
param eter values the contract will specify a single-stage mechanism (a loan
commitment option) to  be played once information is revealed to  the investor. For
some other param eter values, the single-stage mechanism fails to implement the 
efficient solution and it is necessary to resort to a tw o-stage mechanism. We 
interpret this la tter mechanism as a financial structure with convertible and
redeemable Preference shares, as are observed in venture capital contracts.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 1 describes the model and 
the first-best solution. Then, to provide intuition for the main results, two 
intermediate versions of the model are solved in Section 2. Section 3 presents 
the main results on contractual form. A discussion of our results in the context 
of the existing literature and our observations of venture capital contracts 
follows in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
1. The Model
In this section we describe in detail our assumptions concerning the types of 
agents in the economy, project technology, information, learning and 
verifiability, and our solution method. The section ends with a  brief description 
of firs t-best investment actions and also a  table summarising notation.
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1.1. A gents
There is a  single entrepreneur and many investors. The entrepreneur has 
identified a  potentially profitable investment opportunity requiring the input of 
financial resources and effort. However, the entrepreneur’s wealth endowment is 
zero. Each investor, on the other hand, is endowed with arb itrarily  large wealth 
but no project. Both the entrepreneur and investors are  risk neutral and each 
seeks to  maximise their own expected terminal wealth. The entrepreneur’s wealth 
is computed net of the non-pecuniary cost of effo rt, which we assume can be 
measured in monetary terms. For the entrepreneur the alternative to undertaking 
the project is to  be employed a t a wage, which we normalise to zero.
For investors the alternative to investing in the project is to  earn a 
riskless return of r per cent from a storage technology. For simplicity we also 
set r = 0. The investors are assumed to be profit maximizing Bertrand competitors 
in the financial ’’prices” they offer the entrepreneur (this is made precise in 
Subsection 1.4 below). Thus, in equilibrium the optimal contract will maximise 
the entrepreneur’s expected wealth subject to zero excess profits for the 
investor and other constraints to be specified below.
1.2. Project Technology
We consider a  single project lasting for three periods, dated t = 0, 1, 2, 3. 
To realise returns from this project requires a  sequence of indivisible 
investments, ct, with t e  {0,1,2}. In addition, effort is required only a t date 1 
and is perfectly divisible on [0,1]. The entrepreneur’s non-pecuniary cost of 
effort, passes through the origin and is convex in e: i.e. ■0(O) = O, and
•^’(e), ^ ” (e)> 0. Returns, R, accrue a t date 3. Figure 1 shows the time line 
representing these actions and events. We may think of the sequences { c j  and R 
as research and development costs and net operating income, respectively. 
Throughout the paper we assume the ct are specific to  the entrepreneur in order
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Figure 1: Time Line
t= o t =  i t =  2 t =3
R
to prevent the entrepreneur from selling outright the patent to  an investor?
All projects require at least two successive periods of investment. In this 
model projects are differentiated according to  whether they require the 
th ird -stage investment, c2. Any project requiring an investment a t date 2 has 
to ta l cost of c0+ c 1 + c2 and is called a high cost (h ) project. These projects have 
negative net present value (NPV). A low cost (£) project hats to tal cost of c0 + ct 
and has positive NPV. We denote the state of the project by s, where se{ ft^ } . In 
the next subsection projects are further classified according to  whether the 
entrepreneur learns the project’s state a t date 1 or date 2.
All projects have the same distribution of gross returns irrespective of 
their development cost (state s). R has support [0,oo) and distribution function 
F(R,e), which is twice continuously differentiable with respect to  R and e. The 
conditional expected return is:
where f(R,e) is the density function.
Higher levels of effort give rise to ’’better” revenue return distributions in 
the sense that expected returns increase, i.e. R’(e)> 0 . For technical reasons we 
formalise this property by assuming the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) 
and Convexity of the Distribution Function Condition (CDFC). MLRP requires:
where the subscript e indicates partial derivative with respect to  e. For any 
utility function increasing in wealth, including the risk neutral players in this
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model, MLRP implies first order stochastic dominance (FOSD)f i.e. Fe(R,e) <0. 
CDFC requires tha t F(R,e) be convex in effort a t each level of R. This condition 
and MLRP are sufficient (but not necessary) to invoke the First-Order Condition 
Approach in the effort problem.
1.3. In fo rm ation  and C on trac tin g
Prior to  s ta rt-up  (t = 0) information is symmetric. Implicitly, we assume tha t 
any initial payoff-relevant information available to  the entrepreneur is obtained 
by the investor (venture capitalist) through its intensive screening procedures. 
However, some information can only ever become known to the entrepreneur and 
investor by undertaking the project and going forward in time. In the following 
we state and discuss our specific assumptions on the learning process, 
verifiability, and effort.
(a) te m p o ra ry  asym m etric learn ing : We postulate a  particularly simple passive 
learning process, which we call temporary asymmetric learning. Prior to  s ta rt-u p  
nature is assumed to choose between th re e  project types which differ according to  
their development cost, s e  {/&,£}, and according to  the date a t which the 
entrepreneur observes s. The three types are denoted by r ,  re { B 1,B2,G2}, where B 
is for high cost or ’’bad” projects, G is for low cost or ’’good” projects, and the 
subscript denotes the date of learning. The interpretation is as follows: If 
nature chooses Bi the entrepreneur receives a signal a t d a te  1 (before investing 
cx and exerting effort) that the project is high cost. If nature chooses B2 or G2 
the entrepreneur observes it’s true type a t d a te  2 (before investing c2). As a 
m atter of notation, we cater for the fact that B2 and G2 cannot be distinguished 
at date 1 by forming a purely notional type called BG1? which indicates tha t the 
project is either type B2 or type G2. We assume the probability of a  good 
observation each period is y  and that y  is known to both the entrepreneur and 
investor. These features of the entrepreneur’s learning process are illustrated
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Figure 2: The Entrepreneur’s Learning Process
start-up
BG!
Bi
in Figure 2.
In contrast to the entrepreneur, the investor cannot distinguish between Bx 
and BG! a t date 1. Thus, irrespective of project type the investor only learns at 
date 2 whether the project is high or low cost; i.e. a t date 2 the investor can 
distinguish and B2 from G2 but cannot distinguish between Bx and B2. This is
the essence of the stopping problem.
The above learning process is independent of any actions or other resource 
expenditure by either party. Underlying this set-up  is the idea tha t the 
entrepreneur’s intimate involvement with the project may provide him or her with 
an informational advantage over the investor —  a t least during the initial R&D 
and marketing phases —  but that this advantage is a t most temporary. The 
investor will always eventually learn the true cost of the project, though in our 
model this information arrives after the ”p o in t-o f-n o -re tu rn ”.
(b) verifiability: We assume that g ro ss  costs and returns are non-verifiable 
but that n e t returns are verifiable! In particular, this means tha t contracts
cannot be made contingent on realisations of s and R. However, contracts can be
made contingent on retained earnings a t date 3, denoted RT. This assumption 
allows the use of equity contracts (cf. Townsend [1979] and Gale and Hellwig 
[1985]).
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(c) th e  e f fo r t  problem : We assume the entrepreneur’s level of effo rt is not 
observable by the investor a t any time during or a fte r exertion. The level of 
effort by the entrepreneur is therefore not directly contractible. Instead, the 
financial contract between entrepreneur and investor must be formulated to induce 
the appropriate level of effort.
1.4. Solution M ethod
To solve the problem described above we need to  be explicit about the form of 
the game being modelled. In the following it is helpful to distinguish between 
the initial contracting game and the possibility th a t the contract itself will 
define a  game to  be played as development of the project progresses. Let {Go,Gi} 
denote the sequence of games, where Go is the date 0 contracting game between the 
entrepreneur and many investors and G\ is the game played if the outcome of Go is 
for the project to be undertaken. In this section we describe Go in detail and 
give an overview of Gv  We wish to avoid specifying G\ in detail here as the 
intuition for our main results can best be appreciated by considering a  series of 
intermediate information structures.
In Sub-section 1.1 we stated that the ’’prices” of the financial contract are 
determined as in a Bertrand competitive equilibrium. We can now explain this more 
fully by describing Go• We begin with two definitions: (i) 0 t, t e  {0,1,2}, is a 
transfer from investor to  entrepreneur a t date t, and; (ii) 0(Rr ;r) defines a  
type r  entrepreneur’s repayment obligations a t date 3 as a function of retained 
earnings. In the following sections both <pt and 0(Rr ;r) may be contingent on 
verifiable states and/or messages transmitted between the contracting parties. 
These variations will be introduced later as required. In addition, the contract 
may also specify a  mechanism, Af, which allocates certain option rights between 
various parties to the contract (this is further explained below). A contract is 
denoted by C and defined by:
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C =  "j^O? 01? 02? ^(^7’?r )?
We assume G0 is a  three-stage game:
(1) the entrepreneur announces C\
(2) investors simultaneously make bids over the ’’prices” listed in C;
(3) the entrepreneur either accepts a single bid or rejects all bids.
Acceptance invokes G\ while rejection ends the entire game.
An example of Go would be where 0(Rr ;r) takes the form of a  debt contract.
This, along with transfers <pt, is announced by the entrepreneur in stage 1. Then 
in stage 2 investors post bids on the face value of debt. Finally, the
entrepreneur will either accept one bid or reject all bids.
We impose two requirements on our equilibrium contracts. The first is that 
they be renegotiation-proof. This rules out contracts specifying transfers which
the parties to the contract know they will later find mutually advantageous to
renegotiate. In particular, with symmetric information with respect to  states at 
date 2, neither party can pre-commit against renegotiation to avoid
g
inefficiencies ex post. The second requirement for contracts is tha t the 
repayment function d(RT;r) be monotonically increasing in Rr . Innes [1990] argues 
tha t the monotonicity constraint is reasonable on the basis th a t either the 
entrepreneur or investor would otherwise have an incentive to  manipulate profits. 
However, the restrictions implied by the monotonicity constraint are not crucial 
for this paper as it is the conversion and redemption rights held by various 
parties, ra ther than the exact form of the underlying repayment function, which
provide the main results in Section 3.
1.5. F irst-B est
As a bench-mark case we state here the optimal actions of an entrepreneur 
with sufficient wealth to  be completely self-financing1.0 Such an entrepreneur can
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unilaterally decide a t each date whether to continue or term inate the project. We 
assume the parameters of the model are such th a t an entrepreneur’s expected 
wealth is maximised by adhering to  the following policy:
(FBI) S tart-up  the project by investing c0;
y[R(e) -  tf>(e) -  ( ^  + (1 -7 )^ )]  > c0
(FB2) Terminate the project a t date 1 if it is Bx, i.e. continuation value 
(LHS) is less than termination value (RHS):
R(e/6) -  if>(efb) -  (Cj + c2) < 0,
where e^6 is first best level of effort, as explained below.
Otherwise continue the project by investing c1? i.e. there exists a 
range of effort levels for which
R(e) -  ip(e) -  (ci + U-rta) > 0 
This inequality holds by virtue of the condition for (FBI).
(FB3) If the project survives to date 2 then continue it to  completion 
irrespective of it’s type. (If type is either Bx or B2 completion will 
require a further investment amounting to  c2). i.e. there exist a  range 
of effort levels for which
R(e) -  c2 > 0
Finally, we need to determine the optimal level of effort, e ^ ,  chosen at 
date 1. This is extremely simple since, as previously noted, the value of effort 
is independent of state s. The only relevant factors are the expected operating 
return and the non-pecuniary cost of effort. Hence, the firs t-best level of 
effort maximises R (e )-^ (e ) . The first order condition (FOC) is:
R’(e/6) - 0 ’(e/ft) = O. (2)
To summarise, the self-financing entrepreneur will s ta rt-u p  the project by 
investing c0. If at date 1 the project turns out to be bad (Bx) it is immediately
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term inated and the entrepreneur’s earnings are zero. Otherwise the entrepreneur 
continues by investing q  and exerting effort ejb. If a t date 2 the project is 
found to  be good (G2) then no further action or investment is required. But if it 
is found to  be bad (B2) the entrepreneur completes the project by investing a 
further c2. Finally, the notation developed in this section is summarised in 
Table 1.
Table 1: Summary o f  Notation
C t investment a t date t, t  e  {0,1,2}.
e effort level a t date 1. Cost is tp{e).
R(e) expected return as function of effort.
R realised return a t date 3.
Rj> retained earnings a t date 3.
s cost-state  of project, se{/i,^}.
T project type, r e ^ . B ^ } .
BGi B2 and G2 from date 1 perspective.
r probability of s = £ per period.
<Pt transfer to entrepreneur a t date t, t e  {0,1,2}.
^(Rrlr ) entrepreneur’s repayment function a t date 3.
2. C on tin gen t C ontracts
We return to  the case where the entrepreneur’s initial wealth is zero. The 
information structure of the full model, as described in Section 1, is quite 
complex. It comprises a dual structure where unobservable effort determines 
expected return and also a hidden information problem with respect to  the 
project’s cost. However, analytical simplicity is maintained by the additive 
separability of costs and returns. Nevertheless, before considering the full 
model, it is worthwhile analysing the structure of optimal contracts for two 
simpler problems. First, we begin with the simplest possible structure where only 
the effort problem is present, i.e. project type (r) is verifiable and, hence,
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contractible. The optimal contract is shown to be a  debt contract with the 
following two properties: (i) the face value of debt is invariant across
cost-states (invariance property); and (ii) entrepreneurs who term inate their 
project receive zero return (zero-redundancy property).
The second contracting problem introduces the tem porary asymmetric learning 
hypothesis by assuming only state s —  rather than project type r  —  is 
verifiable a t date 2. We show that neither the invariance or zero-redundancy 
properties continue to  hold. These results then provide a  basis for the following 
section where state s is observable but non-verifiable. Our analysis shows that 
there is a range of parameter values for which it is possible to  implement the 
state-contingent outcome by designing either a one- or tw o-stage mechanism.
2.1. C o n trac tin g  on P ro jec t Type (r): th e  e f fo r t  problem
Assume tha t contracts contingent on r  are enforceable a t zero-cost. The 
entrepreneur and investor are then able to write the following r-con tingen t 
contract:
This contract has the following interpretation:
(a) The investor pays c0 to the entrepreneur for initial project development;
(b) If r  — Bj the second stage payment is zero and the entrepreneur is forced 
to  terminate the project a t date 1. Otherwise the investor pays a  further 
Cj and the entrepreneur exerts his own privately optimal level of effort;
(c) At date 2 the investor pays a further c2 if, and only if, r  = B2.
(d) A type r  entrepreneur pays 0 = 6(Rt ;t ) to  the investor a t date 3.
^ = U o - c 0; 0i(Bi) — 0, i^CBGj) —Cj;
02(B2) = c2 , 0 2( t ) = 0 for re { B 1?G2};
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Clauses (a) and (b) are clearly necessary for any state-contingent contract 
to  be an equilibrium contract. In particular, (b) follows directly from condition 
(FB2) th a t any project known a t date 1 to  be bad should be terminated. Thus, to 
fully characterise the optimal contract we need only determine the form of the 
repayment function 0(Rr ;r).
Define Et(0(Rr ;r),e,z) and Pt(0(RT;r),e,z) to be the date t  conditional 
expected return to  the entrepreneur and investor, respectively, where z is the 
information vector. For example, for the pure effort problem z =  r  a t date 2 while 
z = 0  (null) a t date 0. The entrepreneur’s problem is to  choose effo rt e and a 
function 9(Rt ]t ) to obtain the required finance a t the lowest price. More 
formally,
Maximise Eo(0(Rr ;r),e ,0 ) (3)
e , 0 ( . )
subject to
Po(0(R7sr),e,0) >C (4)
eeA rgm ax  E1(^(R7’;r),e,BG1) (5)
ee[ o , i ]
E jM R rjrJ^ B G ^ O , (6a)
E2(0(Rr ;r),e,T)>O, re { B 2,G2} (6b)
0(Rr ;B1)<O, all RT (7a)
0(Rt ',t ) ^R^, re { B 2,G2} and all RT (7b)
d9{RT’,T)/ dRr  > 0 for all RT (7c)
where C = c0 + yc1+ y ( l-y )c 2 is the unconditional expected development cost.
The above formulation states that the entrepreneur’s problem is to choose
effort e and repayment functions 0(Rr ;r) to maximise expected terminal wealth (3) 
subject to  the investor’s participation constraint (4), the incentive constraint 
for effort (5), the entrepreneur’s participation constraints for dates 1 and 2 
(6a,b), two ex post resource constraints (7a,b), and the monotonicity constraint 
(7c).
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The solution to the problem (3)-(7) is best proved by breaking it into two
parts. The first part is essentially the effort problem tha t would occur in a
one-period model while the second part allows for the possiblity of project
terminations and the participation constraints for intermediate dates. The effort
problem is defined by the investor’s participation constraint (4), the incentive
constraint for effort (5), the resource constraint11 (7b), and the monotonicity
constraint (7c). Innes [1990] shows tha t debt is the optimal contract for this
12effort problem when all entrepreneurs are identical. Applying this result to  our 
model we have 8(Rt ;t ) = p(Rr ,D*) where
(D*, if  Rr >D*
^(RT,Dr ) =  j  r e { B 2,G2}, (8)
[Rt , o therw ise
and D* is the minimum face value of debt consistent with investor participation. 
Debt is optimal because any other monotonic contract would induce lower effort by 
giving the entrepreneur a higher pay-off in some low profit states and lower 
pay -o ff in some high profit states. In addition to debt being optimal for each 
type t entrepreneur, we claim that the face value of debt is invariant across 
types, i.e. Dg — D = D? This follows because the good and bad states only refer 
to  the project’s development cost. Hence, as shown by the firs t-best solution
(2), the state s does not affect the marginal value of effort. Minimising 
distortions to  BGi’s effort choice therefore requires all projects to bear the 
same debt level.
The second part of the solution is to  re-in troduce the entrepreneur’s 
participation constraints (6a,b) and the resource constraint on termination 
payments (7a). We show: (i) the optimality of debt is unaffected; and (ii) tha t 
type Bx receive zero redundancy payment (i.e. 0(Rr ;B1) = 0). These results are 
explained as follows. First, the participation constraints (6a,b) say tha t any 
optimal date 0 contract must ensure that entrepreneurs have an incentive to 
continue socially profitable projects. However, neither of (6a) or (6b) binds
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provided the face value of debt is finite and the upper support for R is 
unbounded.
We next turn to  the question of redundancy payments for type Bi entrepreneurs 
(who terminate their project). With ^ (B j) = 0 the level of redundancy payment is 
defined using constraint (7a), 0(R7’,B1) < 0. Without loss of generality, we write 
0(Rr ;B!) = - b ,  where b > 0  implies positive redundancy payment by the investor. An 
optimal r-contingent contract specifies zero-redundancy (b = 0) for type Bx 
entrepreneurs. Any b > 0 would fail to be optimal because the investor’s 
participation constraint (4) would require higher D*. Higher debt would create 
additional distortions due to  the impact of risky debt on effort levels. On the 
other hand, setting b = 0 involves no additional costs ex ante as entrepreneurs are 
risk neutral. Thus, for r-contingent contracts zero-redundancy is optimal because 
it minimises the face value of debt.
The discussion above is summarised in the following proposition:
P ro p o sitio n  1: (Second-Best)
I f  project type r  is verifiable then the optimal equilibrium contract is a debt 
contract with the following properties:
(i) invariance: the face value of debt is identical fo r  all completed projects,
(ii) zero redundancy'. b = 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above results are crucially dependent on the ability of the investor to 
observe and distinguish between types Bt and BGj. This allows contract C to 
specify </>1(B1) = 0 so that a type Bi is forced to  terminate. In the next two 
contracting problems we solve for the optimal contract when types Bx and BGX are 
not observable by the investor. We find that neither the invariance nor 
zero-redundancy properties continue to hold.
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2.2. Contracting on Cost State (s): temporary asymmetric learning
Assume the entrepreneur gains a temporary informational advantage over the 
investor a t date 1 but that state s, se{/i,£}, is publicly observed a t date 2 and, 
hence, contractible. The impact on the transfer and repayment functions in C are 
tw o-fold. First, since s is verifiable a t date 2 all subsequent transfers and 
repayments (i.e. (f>2 and 0(Rr ;r)) can be made contingent on s. Accordingly, define 
Da as the face value of debt conditional on state  s, s e  {/&,£}. Second, the 
transfer <j>x can no longer be a  direct function of r .  The contract must now 
provide incentives for a  type Bx entrepreneur to term inate a t date 1. Thus, we 
re-define (j)x as a function of the messages that the entrepreneur may send to  the 
investor. These messages will be a function of r  and are denoted by m = m (r), where 
m, re { B 1,BG1}. Thus, the date 1 payment is given by 0 1(m(r)). In the following we 
employ Myerson’s [1979] Revelation Principle to  enable our search for the optimal 
equilibrium contract to be restricted to those contracts which induce 
tru th-telling , i.e. we require m(r) = r  for re-tB^BGx}. Hence, for r  = B1 we require 
the termination value from truthfully reporting m = Bx to  exceed the continuation 
value from reporting m = BG! (and eventually being allocated Dft).
b > E^D^e^BO (9)
where eB is determined by
eBeA r^m axE 1(D/l,e,B1) (10)
e € [ 0 , l ]
Similarly, for r  = BGi truth-telling requires that the continuation value exceeds
the termination value. Since BGj will be high cost with probability y  and low
cost with probability 1-y, the entrepreneur’s continuation value is a  function of
both Dfc and Dr We require:
Ei(D/ ,Dfc,eflGr,BG1) > b (11)
where eBG is determined by (5).
In formal terms we augment the original problem, as defined by (3 )-(7 ) , with
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the additional constraints (9)-(11). Accordingly, consider a  new contract:
C’ = ^0o = col 0i(Bi) = O, 0i(BG1) = c1; 0 2(h) = c2,
<J>2(1) = 0, 0(R7’;B1) = -b , 0(Rr ;s) = />(Rr ,Da) j, 
where se{A,<}. C’ has the following interpretation:
(a) The investor pays c0 ...[as in C]\
(b) At date 1 the entrepreneur reports his type. If he reports m = BG1 then the 
investor pays cv  Alternatively, if m = B! then the project is terminated and 
a t date 3 the entrepreneur receives b from the investor;
(c) If a t date 2 the project is observed to be high cost (s = h) the investor 
pays c2 to  the entrepreneur and the face value of debt is Dft. Otherwise, if 
development costs are low (s = i)  the face value of debt is D/ .
We have:
Proposition 2. (Temporary Asymmetric Learning)
I f  project type at date 1 is private information of the entrepreneur but states 
are publicly observable at date 2 then an optimal equilibrium contract is C’ with 
the following properties:
(i) state -  contingent debt with Dft>D^;
(ii) positive redundancy payment (b>0).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Properties (i) and (ii) differ from those of Proposition 1. Beginning with 
property (ii), the change to strictly positive redundancy can be understood by 
inspecting (9). Zero-redundancy is now not feasible because it violates the 
tru th-telling  constraint by setting the LHS of (9) to zero. With b = 0 and any 
finite Dft, a  type Bt entrepreneur would fail to terminate the project.
Property (i), that debt becomes state-contingent, can be understood by 
recalling tha t the optimal contract will maximise entrepreneurial effort (which
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is always below first-best level). Suppose we were to  set D /^ D , = 6 , with 6 chosen 
to  give zero expected profits for investors. Then the effo rt choices and
continuation values of types and BGX will be equal, i.e. eB = eBG and
E1(D/l,eB,B1) = E 1(D/ ,D/l,e#(?,BG1). Thus, the truth-telling constraints (9) and (11)
must both hold with equality. Suppose now we allow a  small increase in and a 
decrease in such tha t the investor’s participation constraint continues to 
bind. Unambiguously, both eB and E ^D /pe#^) fall since a  type Bx who chooses to 
continue will la ter be identified as high cost (s = h) and will be allocated D .^ 
Thus, B^s truth-telling constraint (9) is satisfied. It is also true tha t the
decrease in D, will be sufficient to cause type BG^s effo rt to  increase. Since 
the investor’s expected profit is zero, it is the entrepreneur who gains from the 
increased effort.
Finally for this contracting problem, Proposition 2 states tha t C' is an 
optimal contract. It is not uniquely optimal. In C  we specified tha t only high 
cost projects receive the date 2 instalment, c2. An alternative contract, which 
will be useful in next section, is to transfer c2 to all entrepreneurs and 
compensate with an increase in D,:
t '  =  |. ..a s  in C  except 4>2{RGi) = C21 0(Rr>r ) — ), se{€,/&}|,
where Dj = Dh and D* = D, + c2, and Dh and D, are the solution to Proposition 2. We 
have:
Lemma 1: C  and t ’ are equivalent in the sense that the entrepreneur's expected 
return is identical.
P roof: See the Appendix.
Sub-sections 2.1 and 2.2 have developed two key propositions. The first is 
tha t the efficiency of effort is enhanced when the level of debt is invariant 
across states. The second is that this second-best solution is unobtainable when
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the entrepreneur gains private information a t date 1. The contract must be 
structured to  induce entrepreneurs with type Bi projects to term inate a t date 1. 
In Sub-section 2.2 this was achieved by making the face value of debt conditional 
on state s. In the next section we take the analysis one step further by assuming 
s is non-verifiable by third parties.
3. N on-V erifiab le S ta te s :
In the previous section the form of the optimal financial contract was 
analysed under fairly strong informational assumptions. Essentially, we assumed 
th a t either one or the other of the two parties to the contract could produce 
incontrovertible evidence about project cost to  some third party  (e.g. to  the law 
courts). We now relax this assumption by assuming state s is observable to  both 
entrepreneur and investor but non-verifiable by third parties. The aim is to 
characterise the type of mechanisms necessary to implement the state-contingent 
debt solution as found Proposition 2. We show that the form of the mechanism 
depends on the magnitude of Dft -  D,: (i) If Dh -  D, > c2 but not too  large, then 
a single-stage mechanism with the option belonging to the entrepreneur will 
implement the correct allocation; (ii) If c2 > -  D, then a tw o-stage mechanism
with both entrepreneur and investor owning options will implement the correct 
allocation; and, (Hi) if Dh -  D, is too large the correct allocation can not be 
implemented.
The general form of the contract considered in this section is as follows:
C” =  | 0 o = co; 0 1(B1) = O, 0(RT;B1) = -b ; 0 1(BG1) = c1, play M a t date 2^, 
which is interpreted as follows:
(a) The investor pays c0 ... [as in C]\
(b) If the entrepreneur’s date 1 report is m = B! then the project is terminated 
and a t date 3 the investor pays b. If m = BG! then the investor pays ct
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immediately and payoffs are finally determined by the outcome of the 
mechanism M, which is played a t date 2.
Figure 3 illustrates this interpretation of C \  In the following sub­
sections we consider a number of mechanisms. In terms of this paper a  mechanism M 
assigns to  one or more of the contracting parties the right to  choose between two 
pre-specified payment functions or sets of payment functions. Since our 
mechanisms are played a t date 2 each set of payment functions can include only <j>2 
and /?(Rr ,D). Accordingly, a  set of payment functions is denoted by a = 
{ ^ ^ (R ^ D )} . For example, from Proposition 2 we know tha t efficiency requires 
tha t high and low cost entrepreneurs be allocated schedules ah =  {c2,p(Rr ,Dh)} 
and at = {0,p(Rr ,D/ )}, respectively. Equivalently, using Lemma 1 the two 
entrepreneur types could be allocated aJ = an<  ^ ° \  —
Both types will be used in the following sub-sections.
3.1. Single-Stage Mechanisms
To analyse the potential role and limitations of single-stage mechanisms we
begin by briefly considering the outcome with recontracting a t date 2. With
recontracting, the entrepreneur and investor agree a t date 0 to an initial face
value of debt of D„ and agree to  recontract a t date 2 in the event tha t c2 is
required for project completion. We assume the recontracting process allows the
entrepreneur to  raise finance from the competitive financial m arket1.3 Assuming
further tha t the initial debt, D„ has seniority the market will offer to  finance
c2 with debt of 6 such that:
Dt +6
J (R-D,)f(R,e)dR + <5[l-F(D,+<5,e)] =  c2 (12)
D,
Thus, the high cost entrepreneur has to tal debt of D,+<5, while the low cost 
entrepreneur’s debt is D,. Clearly, to implement the results of Proposition 2 we 
require 8 = Dk -  Dr  Hence, recontracting is not a generic solution and we
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Figure 3: Form of C”
( " )
r ( i - r )
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KEY: N = nature m = entrepreneur’s report
E = entrepreneur —  = information set
I = investor payoff order: {E,I>
[ M \  = play mechanism M
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therefore proceed to consider single-stage mechanisms.
A single-stage mechanism gives one of the two parties to  the contract the 
right to  choose between two pre-specified a schedules. From Proposition 2 we know 
th a t the low cost entrepreneur should be allocated at =  {0,p(Rr ,DJ} (or a*) and 
the high cost entrepreneur should be allocated ah = {c2,p(R;r,Dfc)} (or aJJ). Any 
other allocation would lead to  an additional efficiency loss. For mechanisms with 
a  single option the number of alternative mechanisms is limited to  the number of 
contracting parties. In our context, this implies tha t the relevant two 
single-stage mechanisms are:
M echanism >Ml(a)
At date 2 the entrepreneur has an option to choose between at and crh.
M echanism Atl(b)
As in Afl(a) except that the option belongs to the investor.
In C” with Afl(a) all moves, apart from the initial move by nature, are by 
the entrepreneur. Once the investor has signed the contract she has no choice but 
to abide by the decisions of the entrepreneur. With Afl(a), therefore, the game G1 
degenerates so that the actions of the entrepreneur can be determined by backward 
induction. In contrast, for C  with M(b)  the entrepreneur reports m = B! or m = BG1 
a t date 1 and then a t date 2 the investor observes s and chooses either to  accept 
at or exercise her option over ah. The following proposition characterises the 
potential role of these single-stage mechanisms:
P ro p o sitio n  3. (Single-Stage Mechanisms)
Contract C” with Afl(a) implements the results of Proposition 2 provided + 6 > 
> D, + c2. Contract C” with Ml(b) can never implement Proposition 2.
Proof: We consider the two mechanisms separately. Mechanism X l ( a ) : In this case a 
low cost entrepreneur can freely choose between at = {0,p(Rr ,D/ )} and ah =
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{c2,/9(Rr ,Dh)} without recourse to the credit market. Since a  type I
entrepreneur requires no further funds, the effective (risky) debt burden
associated with some a  = {02iP(Rr?D)} is D -  <j>2. Accordingly, the low cost
entrepreneur will choose at if and only if
Dh -  c2 > Dr  (13)
The high cost entrepreneur, on the other hand, requires c2 fo r investment and
can only choose {0,p(.,D/)} by simultaneously raising additional funds of c2.
This can be done by selling debt amounting to <5, as determined in (12).
Therefore, a high cost entrepreneur will choose ah if and only if
D, + 6 > Dfc. (14)
Taken together, the conditions (13) and (14) show tha t Afl(a) will implement
the correct allocation if and only if D, + <5 > > D, + c2.
Mechanism Afl(b): The right to choose between ah and <rt now belongs to the 
investor. Since we have a zero-sum game at date 2, the investor will 
implement the correct allocation provided the inequalities in (13) and (14) 
are reversed. However, since 6 > c2 this implies Dh > D, + 6 > D, + c2 > Dh, 
which is a  contradiction. Thus, Ml(b) cannot implement the correct 
allocation.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 shows that a one-stage mechanism with the option owned by the 
entrepreneur can successfully allocate Dh and D, provided D, + 6 > Dh > D, + c2. 
For a low cost entrepreneur the benefit from choosing at is the lower face value 
of debt, while the benefit from choosing oh is an increase in retained earnings 
from Rr  = R to  RT = R + c2 (for any realisation of R). However, if Dh -  D, > c2 
then the additional retained earnings from ah accrue back to the investor and a 
low cost entrepreneur will prefer at to ah. For a  high cost entrepreneur the 
choice is between funding c2 from ah or from the market. The entrepreneur will 
thus choose the option with the lowest total face value of debt.
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Two aspects of the above analysis are worth discussing here. The first 
relates to  the assumption that c2 can be funded from the market. In one respect 
this is an important assumption because without recourse to  the m arket the high 
cost entrepreneur would be forced to choose ah irrespective o f whether Dft < D, + 
<5. In this case successful implementation by Afl(a) would only require > D, + 
c2. However, it is the possibility that D, + c2 > Dh > D, which leads to  a  role 
for tw o-stage mechanisms. The second, and more important, feature of our analysis 
is the absence of intermediate returns. For example, suppose the entrepreneur
14receives a  return, R2, a t date 2 , with R2 > c2. Then a  high cost entrepreneur 
can self-finance c2 without recourse to the market and, as in the case of a  low 
cost entrepreneur, will choose ah if and only if D& -  c2 < Dr  Thus, All(a) would 
no longer implement the correct allocation because all entrepreneurial types 
would choose the same a. This problem does not arise in the tw o-stage mechanism 
developed below because it is based on schedules 0 % and a*. Each of these specify 
0 2 = c2 so that, irrespective of project type, any schedule can be chosen without 
recourse to  the financial market.
3.2. Two-Stage Mechanisms
Our tw o-stage mechanism has the property tha t the option available to  the 
second player a t the second stage is contingent on the exercise decision of the 
first player a t the first stage. This sequential structure effectively reduces 
the degrees of freedom available to  the first player because he or she must take 
into account the action of the second player. Applying the theory  of 
’’Implementation by Stage-Mechanisms” (see Moore and Repullo [1988]) we show th a t 
a tw o-stage mechanism can implement the solution to  Proposition 2 as the outcome 
of a  fully-revealing perfect Bayesian equilibrium whenever Dh + c2 > Dh > D/.
Implementation is achievable because, conditional on effo rt e, the expected 
net return on high and low cost entrepreneurs differ by c2. This provides a  wedge
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between high and low cost entrepreneurs and enables the design of a  mechanism 
which creates a  type of ”single-crossing property” (see Figure 5). Since the 
final allocation will be either aJJ = {c2,p(Rj’,D^)} or a* = {c2,p(Rj’,D*)}, where 
and D* = D, + c2 as in contract t \  the single-crossing property is 
obtained using some non-debt schedule, such as equity. Accordingly, we define the 
schedule a& = {c2,/9(Rj*,a,D)}, where the combined debt-equity  repayment function 
p(RT,a,D) is defined by:
p  + a(R j—D), if 
p( Rr ,a,D) = j , (8’)
^Rr , o therw ise
where a  is the equity share of the investor.
We define15:
Mechanism M2
(i) At da te  2 the initial schedule is a T h e  investor has an option to either 
accept <rj or reject it in favour of a
(ii) I f  the o p tio n  in (i) is exercised then the entrepreneur has an option to
either accept or reject it in favour o f a*.
The structure of M2 is illustrated in Figure 4. Contract C” with M2 defines 
as a four-stage game:
(i ) Nature chooses project type r, re { B 1, B2,G2}.
(ii) The entrepreneur observes his type as either Bx or BGX and sends a  message
m, m e{B1,BG1};
(Hi) The investor observes the state s, s e { / i /} ,  and chooses A (accept or X
(exercise option in favour of <7^ );
(iv ) The entrepreneur fully learns his type r, tg { B 1,B2,G2}, and chooses A
(accept <7q) or X (exercise in favour of a*).
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F igure 4: E x ten siv e  Form For M echanism M2
{E2(<t*|  e , r ) ,  P2 (<r* | e , r ) }
{ E 2 (&oc | e , r ) ,  P 2 ( ^ a | e , r ) }
{V2{o*h | e , r ) ,  P 2(<7*| e , r ) }
Key: X = e x e r c i s e  o p t i o n
A = accep t e x i s t i n g  c o n t r a c t
T  =  { P i  5 ^ 2  5 ^ 2  }
a h =  {c 2iP(Rr>Dfc)} 
<?Z =  {c 2 , p (R r , a , D ) }  
=  {c2 , />(Rr , D*)}
The extensive form for Gi is represented by appending Figure 4 onto Figure 3. We 
are interested in perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies, where the 
strategy spaces for entrepreneur16 and investor are  S E = {B1,BG1}x{X,A} and 
«Sj = {X,A}, respectively. Since the investor’s exercise decision is made after 
observing s, s g { ^ } ,  she will be unable to  distinguish types Bx and B2. We 
represent the investor’s beliefs over types by f i ( r |s,m ), re { B 1,B2,G2}, which is a 
function of the entrepreneur’s message, m and state  s. Trivially, ^(G2|£,m) = l  
since only type G2 can enter state i .  Also, fi(B1 |/i,m )+//(B2|/i,m) = 1 for m e{B1,BG1}. 
In the usual manner, we define a perfect Bayesian equilibrium as a  set of 
strategies such that each strategy is a  best response to  the other, given 
beliefs. In particular, consider the following pair of strategies which implement 
tru th-telling by the entrepreneur at date 1 and the appropriate allocation of 
high and low debt (where E, I and N denote entrepreneur, investor and nature, 
respectively):
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Figure 5: The Admissible Region fo r  (a,D)
-  Entrepreneur’s strategy:
/if N chooses report m=B!, otherw ise report n ^ B G ^
aF = vif I chooses X choose X i f  r=G2, o therw ise  choose  Ay
-  Investor’s strategy:
| if s = i  choose X, otherwise choose A j
We note that the truth-telling property of uE implies that all paths are 
equilibrium paths. Thus, Bayes’ rule implies /i(B21/^BGj) = 1.
The next proposition states the conditions required for {&£,&/} to be an 
equilibrium to the game defined by C” with M2. In the process we define 
T t as the set of (a,D) where a type G2 entrepreneur is better-off with a* rather 
than <7^ . Tfo in contrast, is the set for which type B2 prefers to a*h. These 
sets are illustrated in Figure 5 for the case DJJ<D*, i.e.
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T t s  {(a,D): E2(<t* |e,G2) <E2(<7* |e,G2), 0 < a < l ,  D>0}
?h  =  E2(<7q|e,B2) > E2(<t]J|e,B2), 0 < a < l ,  D>0}
We have:
Proposition 4. (Two-Stage Mechanisms)
Let C” with M2 specify values (b,Dj,D*) as prescribed, by the state -  contingent 
contract t \  I f:
(i) D£<D*, and ;
(ii) 7 ,  n  J  j, ^ 0 ?
then there exists a schedule (a,D) such that the strategy pair are
perfect Bayesian equilibria whose outcome implements tru th -te lling .
Proof: The solution to  6 ’ has been shown to induce type Bx to  report truthfully. 
Thus, if {&£,&/} are equilibrium strategies for C” with M2 then Bx will 
continue to report n ^ B j  and, hence, from Bayes’ rule ^(B2| /^BGj) = 1. The task, 
therefore, is to  show that (i) and (ii) imply oE and are best responses to 
each other given rational beliefs. First, consider the case where t  = G2. 
Inspection of Figure 3 shows that the mechanism beginning a t this node 
constitutes a proper subgame. Applying subgame perfectness to  Figure 4 the 
following set of inequalities ensure tha t oE and a* are best responses to 
each other for type G2 projects:
E2(<r*|e,G2) < E2(<j * |e,G2) (15)
P2(<7h|e,G2) < P2(<7?|e,G2) _ (16)
Since D]J<D* by condition (i), equation (16) is always satisfied. T t is 
defined to  ensure tha t (15) is satisfied.
Secondly, consider the case of r  = B2. Figure 3 shows th a t Bx and B2 are 
members of the same information set for the investor a t date 2. However, as
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noted above, given the entrepreneur’s strategy of truthfully reporting Bx the 
investor rationally believes tha t any high cost project observed a t date 2 is 
type B2. i.e. //(B21 /^BGj) = 1. For a type B2 the entrepreneur and investor each 
choose A provided:
E2(^a |e ,B 2) > E2(<7*|e,B2) (17)
P2( ^ |e ,B 2) > P2(cra | e?B2) (18)
Since the entrepreneur’s return equals project return  minus payments to  the 
investor, (18) is equivalent to:
E2 (<7* | e,B2) > E 2{a*h | e,B2) (18’)
Also, since E2(<jJ|e,B2)>E 2(a*|e,B2) whenever D]J<D* it follows tha t (18’) 
implies (17). T h satisfies (18’).
Thus, provided T t n  T h ^  0  there exists some (a,D) such tha t the correct 
assignment of debt levels occurs.
Q.E.D.
A natural question arising from Proposition 4 is whether the conditions (x)
and (ii) are restrictive. In particular, from Proposition 2 we know tha t Dft>D, is
optimal while Proposition 4 requres DjJ<D*, where Dfc = D]J and D/ = D *-c2. Hence, to 
replicate the optimal state-contingent contract with M2 we require the param eters 
to be such that D, < Dh < D, + c2. From (A6) in the Proof of Proposition 2 the 
magnitude of Dh -  D, depends on the parameter values and functional forms of the 
effort and distribution functions. Consequently, in the general framework of this 
paper it is not possible to  determine the conditions on the underlying param eters 
for which D/ <Dft<D/ + c2 and T t n  T h ^  0  are satisfied1.7 We argue, though, that this 
is not a  significant drawback as comparative static exercises have little 
relevance here.
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3.3. In te rp re ta tio n  o f  M echanisms AfL(a) and M2
Mechanisms Ail(a) and M2 have both been shown to  implement the solution 
described in Proposition 2. Mechanism Afl(a) gives the entrepreneur the right to  
choose between an initial face value of debt, D„ and a  higher face value, Dft. By 
choosing Dh the entrepreneur receives funds of c2. The additional face value of 
debt, Dh -  D„ exceeds c2 but is less than <5, the face value offered by the 
market. Thus, the contract C” with Afl(a) can be interpreted as a  debt contract 
with a  loan commitment option attached. Options of this type have also been shown 
to  resolve certain types of adverse selection and under-investm ent problems (see 
Thakor [1989] and Berkovitch and Greenbaum [1991]).
Mechanism M2 is a  tw o-stage mechanism which gives option rights to  both 
entrepreneur and investor. A similar mechanism is analysed by Chiesa [1988] as a  
method of reducing under-investment in growth options. The two models are similar 
in tha t both posit an effort problem. In Chiesa [1988] the option rights expire 
before the entrepreneur’s effort decision, whereas in this paper effort is 
predetermined a t the time the options become available. However, the analysis is 
similar because rational agents correctly anticipate the outcome of the 
’’mechanism game”. A more important distinction is tha t Chiesa assumes symmetric 
information and focuses on the Myers’ under-investment problem, while we assume 
temporary asymmetric learning and analyse a stopping problem.
Chiesa interprets her tw o-stage mechanism as a  deb t-w arran t contract with a 
call provision. In our context a better interpretation of M2 may be as a 
convertible and redeemable Preference share with fixed dividends. This 
interpretation is particularly relevant for this paper because the project is 
assumed to  be specific to the entrepreneur. Thus, failure to meet scheduled 
repayments would not lead to bankruptcy in the sense tha t the entrepreneur loses 
control and ownership of the project. Rather, the payments would be either 
ro lled-over or w ritten-off by the investor. Hence, the function pfR^D),  which we
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have called debt, can also be interpreted as fixed-dividend Preference shares. 
Our result that financial structures may include convertible and redeemable 
Preference shares is consistent with case studies of venture capital deals (see 
Lorenz [1985] and Sahlman [1990]).
4. Further D iscu ssio n :
Throughout this paper we have maintained the assumption th a t entrepreneurs 
have zero initial wealth and that the project and other outside opportunities are 
mutually exclusive. This reflects our aim of modeling the provision of venture 
capital finance to  business start-ups, rather than the financing of larger, 
established businesses. One problem encountered with any attem pt to  model venture 
capital finance is the lack of a comprehensive and rigorous empirical analysis of 
their characteristics. However, some assessment of our results above can be made 
from the less formal information from case studies. Lorenz [1985], who is a  U.K. 
venture capital practitioner, describes the nature of project financing and the 
types o f financial contracts employed. In the proto-typical examples provided by 
Lorenz the financing deal almost always included Ordinary shares, Preferred 
ordinary shares, convertible Preference shares and redeemable Preference shares. 
Some support is also provided by Chapter Four of this thesis which shows tha t 3i, 
the largest U.K. venture capital company, holds some form of hybrid share in 
around 40 per cent of their portfolio companies (although it was not possible to 
identify whether these shares were convertible or redeemable). Another source of 
support for the importance of convertible shares is provided by Sahlman [1990, 
Table 3]. His case studies of multiple financing rounds by U.S. venture capital 
funds all involve convertible Preferred shares.
On the theoretical side, the nature of venture capital contracts is also 
analysed by Chan, Siegel and Thakor [1990]. They derive the opitmal financial
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contract in a  dynamic principal-agent model with symmetric learning about
18entrepreneurial skill. Their contract has three key features:
(i) there is a performance requirement where the entrepreneur is relieved of
productive control after the first period if certain minimum skill levels
are  not obtained;
(ii) if the entrepreneur retains control then the sharing rule corresponds to 
equity;
(in) an entrepreneur who is relieved of control is paid a  fixed amount 
independent of his demonstrated skill and subsequent cash flows of the firm 
(called the ”buy-out” option for the investor).
Parts (i) and (ii) contrast with the results of this paper. In part, this is 
because we assume the entrepreneur to be essential for project development and 
completion; the venture capitalist has no managerial or productive ability and is 
only concerned with efficient implementation of optimal stopping. Thus, in our 
model the entrepreneur always retains control of the project. Another difference 
between the models is that Chan et. al. assume the entrepreneur is risk averse 
whereas we assume risk neutrality. This difference explains the use of equity 
shares in (**) compared for our debt or Preference share contracts. Finally, the 
buy-out provision in (Hi) is similar to our redundancy payment. However, the 
former arises from risk aversion while the la tter is due to  the need to  induce 
optimal stopping with minimal distortion to effort incentives.
Some support for both models is provided in Gorman and Sahlman [1988], who 
found in their survey of venture capitalists that both skill deficiencies and
19delayed product development were important and frequent causes of fa ilu re . At the 
theoretical level, consideration of monitoring costs suggests the two models are 
complementary. If d ay -to -d ay  monitoring costs are large we would expect to  see 
the Chan et. al. model applying to only the most profitable projects where a  high
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level of skill is very important. For most projects, however, such intensive
monitoring would not be profitable. Instead, the asymmetric learning model of
this paper would be more appropriate, especially if the entrepreneur’s skill
20improves from "learning by doing” .
5. C onclu sion s
This paper highlights the difficulties tha t arise when arrival of information 
during the development phase of projects is private to  the entrepreneur. In
particular, when the entrepreneur has no wealth or collateral, previous tranches 
of finance must be treated  by the investor as sunk costs. As a result, standard 
debt contracts are no longer viable. Instead, if cost-states are contractible the 
optimal monotonic contract will specify the face value of debt as being 
contingent on the state and will also provide redundancy payments for 
entrepreneurs who terminate their project. If cost-states are non-verifiable, and 
hence non-contractible, then a loan commitment option or convertible and
redeemable Preference shares may implement the correct allocation of debt among 
entrepreneur types.
The use of equity in the two-stage mechanism occurs despite the risk neutral 
principal-agent setting. This is because the equity component of our financial 
contracts acts purely as a fulcrum between high and low debt outcomes, rather 
than as a  means of sharing risk. The model predicts tha t in equilibrium investors 
would never need to convert their Preference shares into Ordinary shares because 
the entrepreneur will agree to redeem the appropriate portion of the Preference 
shares.
Issues for future research arise on two levels. The first is to  allow the
possibility of an entrepreneur contracting simultaneously with more than one
investor. From an empirical point of view this would be interesting because many
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projects are financed by syndicates of venture capitalists, particularly in the 
U.S. On a  theoretical level we have the basic theoretical result that 
implementation by stage-mechanisms requires weaker assumptions when there are 
three or more players. It would be interesting to  analyse whether and how this 
basic result carries over to  the mechanisms of Section 3. A second line of 
research could focus on integrating the learning models of venture capital 
finance with the asymmetric information models of finance for larger, established 
business enterprises. Such models would be useful fo r analysing how financial and 
investment policies change over the ”life-cycle” of firms.
E ndnotes:
1 This has become a  very large literature. The main pioneering papers are 
Leland and Pyle [1977], Myers and Majluf [1984], Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] and 
Ross [1977]. See also de Meza and Webb [1987] for an example of the importance 
of deriving the form of the optimal contract.
In contrast to signalling models, all the results in this paper go through if 
entrepreneur has small positive wealth.
This normalisation does not affect the substance of any of our results.
However, if wages were strictly positive the redundancy payment described in 
Proposition 2 could then be re-in terpreted in terms of the degree of limited 
liability.
4 All the results of the paper would hold if we were to  weaken our assumption by
assuming tha t any buyer of the patent could develop the same project but a t a 
cost which is some multiple of the ct’s. Provided this multiple is 
sufficiently large it would always be better for the originator of the project 
idea to  seek finance for his project, rather than sell it.
5 However, except in the case of two-point distributions, FOSD does not imply
MLRP. Nevertheless the MLRP condition characterises a  large class of
distribution functions (see Milgrom [1981]).
CDFC is a restrictive assumption since most of the distribution functions 
commonly used in economic analysis, such as the exponential distribution, fail 
to  satisfy this condition. Jewitt [1988] has provided some alternative 
sufficient conditions which also validates the First-O rder Approach for the 
traditional principal-agent problem with a risk neutral principal and risk 
averse agent. However, our assumption that both the entrepreneur and investor 
are risk neutral rules-out a direct application of Jew itt’s conditions.
7 A state  is verifiable when objective evidence can be presented to  independent 
third parties (e.g. law courts). This makes verifiability a  stronger 
assumption than symmetric information.
8 If the investor could pre-commit the problem of this paper becomes trivial.
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There are two arguments. The first relies on the fact tha t any repayment 
function with a decreasing segment will provide the entrepreneur with an 
incentive to  enter the decreasing segment by borrowing from third parties 
a fte r observing the realisation of returns. The second is th a t investors will 
also have an incentive to avoid the decreasing segment. Possibly, investors 
may be in a  position to  sabotage the firm, essentially burning profits 
sufficient to  take the firm out of the decreasing segment.
The symmetric information case tha t follows in Section 2  is not the same as 
self-finance because effort is not observable.
Sappington [1983] also studies a  principal-agent problem with ex post 
limitations on payments by an agent. However, his model assumes th a t the 
observed state affects the productivity of effort. Our model, on the other 
hand, maintains an independence between states and productivity of effo rt by 
relating the former to the project’s development costs and the la tte r to  
expected future net operating income. Without this separation the simple debt 
schedule derived in this section would be suboptimal.
With out the monotonicity constraint the optimal contract is a  ”liv e -o r-d ie” 
contract where the entrepreneur receives either all or none of the project’s 
return.
The alternative is to assume the contract restricts the entrepreneur’s access 
to the financial market. In this case it would be necessary to  explicitly 
model the recontracting process as a bargaining game. A particularly simple 
bargaining structure is to give one of the parties the right to  make a  
T ake-It-O r-L eave-It (TIOLI) offer. On the one hand, allowing the entrepreneur 
to  make a TIOLI offer is equivalent to assuming a competitive financial 
market. On the other hand, if the original investor can make a TIOLI offer she 
will appropriate the surplus, R{eBG) -  c2, by setting the face value of debt 
to infinity. In this case, the adverse consequence for the entrepreneur’s 
effort choice suggests that a  contract restricting access to  the financial 
market will be dominated ex ante by a  contract with no restrictions.
Formally including intermediate returns would alter our interpretation of the 
mechanisms as the standard debt contract would no longer be an optimal 
contract for the effort problem (see Proposition 1).
Mechanism M2 gives the investor the first move. An analysis similar to  tha t of 
this sub-section would apply were the order of moves reversed.
Strictly, the date 1 report (m) by the entrepreneur should include his report 
about effort, e. Then we would have S E = [O ^x JB ^B G Jx ^A } . However, for 
simplicity, we avoid this additional notational complication.
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A minimal requirement for the derivation of an explicit solution would be to 
specify the functional form of F(R,e) and tp{e). In the principal-agent
literature it has become almost traditional to  follow the Mirrlees-Rogerson 
approach, which assumes F(R,e) to  be convex in e a t each level of output 
(CDFC). This CDFC assumption, combined with MLRP, validates the so called 
”first-o rder approach” as the solution to the principal-agent problem.
However, a  major problem with the CDFC assumption is tha t almost all of the 
distributional forms commonly used in economics fail this test. In response to 
this problem Jewitt [1988] has recently developed alternative conditions for 
the first-o rder approach and has shown that these are  satisfied by the Gamma, 
Poisson and Chi-squared distributions. However, his results do not carry -over
directly to  the model of this paper since our model does not conform to  the
proto-typical principal-agent problem. In particular, Jewitt’s proofs require 
a t least some positive risk aversion by the agent, which contrasts with our 
assumption of risk neutrality. One possibility is th a t our limited liability
constraint may negate this problem. But any such analysis is fa r beyond the
scope of this paper. Given the limited guidance of the theoretical literature 
on the appropriate functional form for F(R,e) we believe tha t a  numerical 
example is the best approach.
Other papers on venture capital finance include Chan [1983] and Cooper and 
Carleton [1979] but their analyses don’t involve either learning or the
stopping problem.
Gorman and Sahlman’s results show that venture capitalists identified 
entrepreneurial deficiencies much more highly than any other category. 
However, they argue that this could partly be due to  the fact tha t the
entrepreneur is usually the point of contact for the venture capitalist and so 
have been unfairly blamed.
This conclusion has also been reinforced by my discussions with Ms. C. Biggs 
and Mr. D. Clarke of 3t PLC. In circumstances where the managerial team has 
serious deficiencies 3i rely on moral suasion to  introduce a  new member to 
management. They also report that some leverage is possible through the 
investor’s control over future tranches of finance. However, even where there 
are problems the entrepreneur retains his original ownership claims.
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A p p e n d ix : P ro o fs
P ro o f  o f  Lemma 1 : Equivalence of C  and t \
Comparing C  and t 1 we see there are two differences: a  type G2 receives an 
additional c2 from 0 2 and the face value of debt for this type increases by c2. 
By substitution into the entrepreneur’s payoff function conditional on e, we see 
th a t these effects cancel so tha t G2’s payoff with is the same as with C:
E2(D*,e,G2) = J°°# (c2 +R-D*)f(R,e)dR 
d / - c 2
=  j “ (R -D , )f (R ,e )dR
= E2(D,,e,G2)
Q.E.D.
P ro o f fo r  P ro p o sitio n  1: The invariance property.
Proof of the zero-redundancy property is trivial. We prove here the 
invariance property for the effort problem defined by (3), (4), (5), (7b) and 
(7c). The problem can be simplified in two ways. First, following Innes [1990] we 
know tha t debt is optimal and thus we can eliminate constraints (7b) and (7c). 
Second, for the purposes of choosing Dh and D„ the maximand (3) and the
incentive constraint (5) are complementary since:
Eo^DjnD^e#,-) = yEiP/nD^e^c) + ( l-y )b .
Thus, subject to zero expected profits for investors, maximising the value of eBG 
on [0,e^6] is equivalent to maximising E0(b,D/l,D^,efi<7 ). Also, for given b, the 
investor’s participation constraint P0(b,Dh,D/,e) > C can be rewritten as
P1(Dfc,D/,e) > C1? where Cx = y _1{C + (l-y)b}. Thus, the problem essentially boils 
down to choosing debt levels Dh and D, to:
maximise e^D /^D ,) (Al)
subject to P1(Dfc,D/,e) > Cx, (A2 )
where the function e ^ D ^ D ,)  is determined by the FOC for effort,
dE^D ^D ^ej/de = 0 . The FOC’s for (A1)-(A2) are:
I c f 2 + = ° ’ s c ^ ’ <A3>
where A is the Lagrange multiplier.
The first term in (A3) can be evaluated by taking to ta l differential of the 
FOC for effort, dE^D/^D^eJ/de = 0 . In the process, we use the fact th a t 
expected returns for the entrepreneur and investor must sum up to  expected 
project returns (i.e. E^Dj^D^e) + P^D^D^e) = R(e) -  tp(e)), and thus re-w rite
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(A3) as:
d e d b 3 + AdD* "  ° ’
Finally, noting that
Pi (D/»A,e) = yP2(D„e,G2) + (l-y )P 2(D*,e,B2)
and
P2(D,e,r) = J °  Rf(R,e)dR + D[l-F(D,e)],
(A4)
the conditions (A3) can be shown to  require (upon elimination of A):
-F„(D,,,e) _ - F „ ( D , ,e)
1 -  F( , e ) -  r^TTD^e)-
Clearly, Dh =  D, is sufficient for (A4). Invariance is also necessary since MLRP
implies Fc(D,e) < 0  for all D, so that -Fe(D,e)/[l -  F(D,e)] is increasing D.
Q.E.D.
Proof fo r  Proposition 2: D^>D/ is optimal with temporary asymmetric learning.
The proof is similar to Proof 1 except for the addition of constraint (9) 
(which is re-w ritten here as (A5)); i.e. we have:
maximise e ^ D ^ D ,)  (Al)
subject to yP^D^D^e) -  ( l - y ) b  > C, (A2 ’)
b > E1(Dfc,eJ3,B1) (A5)
Solving for b, and D/ (in the same manner as for Proof 1 ) we obtain:
- F    _  ~ P e ( P / ?e BGr)  / A f i \
y [l -  F(Dh ,e BG-)] + 1 -  F(Dh,efi) y [l -  F ( D/? eBG)]
In comparison with (A4), the above condition has the additional term 1 -  F(DhieB) 
> 0  in the denominator of the LHS. Thus, for Dh = D/? which satisfies (A4), the
LHS of (A6 ) would be less than the RHS. Since -Fe(D ,e)/(l-F(D,e)) is increasing
in D it follows tha t Dh > D, is necessary for (A6 ) to hold.
Q.E.D.
Venture Capital Finance 91
R eferen ces:
Allen, F., 1990, "The Changing Nature of Debt and Equity: A Financial
Perspective”, in R.W. Kopcke and E.S. Rosengren (eds., Are The Distinctions 
Between Debt and Equity Disappearing?, Conference Series No.33 Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston, pp.12-48.
Berkovitch, E., and S.I. Greenbaum, 1991, ”The Loan Commitment as an Optimal 
Financing Contract”, Journal o f Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 26, 
83-95.
Chan, Y-S, 1983, ”On the Positive Role of Financial Interm ediation in Allocation 
of Venture Capital in a  Market with Imperfect Information”, Journal of 
Finance, XXXVIII, 1543-68.
---------- , D. Siegel and A.V. Thakor, 1990, "Learning, Corporate Control and
Performance Requirements in Venture Capital Contracts”, International 
Economic Review, 31, 365-81.
Chiesa, G., 1988, "Debt and Warrants: A Rationalisation of the Popular View”, 
Discussion Paper 46, Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics.
Cooper, I.A., and W.T. Carleton, 1979, "Dynamics of Borrower-Lender Interaction: 
Partitioning Final Payoff in Venture Capital Finance”, Journal o f Finance, 
XXXIV, 517-29.
Dewatripont, M., and E. Maskin, 1989, ’’Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and 
Decentralized Economies”, mimeo, October 1989.
de Meza, D., and D.C. Webb, 1987, ’Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric 
Information”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 281-92.
Diamond, D.W., 1989, "Reputation Aquisition in Debt Markets”, Journal of
Political Economy, 97, 828-62.
Gale, D., and M. Hellwig, 1985, ’’Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The 
One-Period Problem”, Review of Economic Studies, 52, 647-65.
Gorman, M., and W.A. Sahlman, 1988, ’’What Do Venture Capitalists Do?”, Journal of 
Business Venturing , 4, 231-48.
Grossman, S., and O. Hart, 1983, ”An Analysis of the Principal Agent Problem”, 
Econometrica, 51, 7-45.
Hansen, E.W., 1991, ’’Financial Structure and the Role of Collateral”, Chapter 
Four, this thesis.
Harris, M., and A. Raviv, 1991, ’’Financial Contracting Theory”, Journal of 
Finance, XLVI, 297-355.
Holmstrom, B., 1979, ’’Moral Hazard and Observability”, Bell Journal o f Economics, 
10, 74-91.
Venture Capital Finance 92
Innes, R.D., 1990, "Limited Liability and Contracting with E x-ante Action
Choices”, Journal of Economic Theory, 52, 45-67.
Jensen, M.C., and W.H. Meckling, 1976, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Cost and Ownership Structure”, Journal o f Financial Economics, 3, 
305-60.
Jewitt, I., 1988, "Justifying the First-Order Approach to  Principal-Agent
Problems”, Econometrica, 56, 1177-90.
Leland, H.E., and D.H. Pyle, 1977, "Information Asymmetry, Financial Structure 
and Financial Intermediation” Journal o f Finance, XXXII, 371-87.
Lorenz, T., 1985, Venture Capital Today, Woodhead-FaulkneriCambridge, England.
Milgrom, P.R., 1981, "Goodnews and Bad News: Representation Theorems and 
Applications”, Bell Journal o f Economics, 1 2 , 380-91.
Moore, J., and R. Repullo, 1988, "Subgame Perfect Implementation”, Econometrica, 
56, 1191-220.
Myers, S., and N. Majluf, 1984, "Corporate Finance and Investment Decisions When 
Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have”. Journal o f Financial 
Economics, 13, 187-221.
Myerson, R., 1979, "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem”,
Econometrica, 47, 61-73.
Ross, S., 1977, ’The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-
Signalling Approach”, Bell Journal of Economics. 8 , 23-40.
Sahlman, W.A., 1990, ’The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital
Organisations”, Journal o f Financial Economics, 27, 473-521.
Shavell, S., 1979, ’’Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent 
Relationship”, Bell Journal of Economics, 1 0 , 55-73.
Stiglitz, J.E., and A. Weiss, 1981, ’’Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information”, American Economic Review, 71, 393-411.
Thakor, A.V., 1989, ’’Competitive Equilibrium with Type Convergence in an 
Asymmetrically Informed Market”, Review o f Financial Studies, 2, 49-71.
Townsend, R.M., 1979, ’’Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with
Costly-State Verification”, Journal of Economic Theory, 21, 265-93.
CHAPTER THREE
CONTRACTUAL COVENANTS AND PREMATURE INVESTMENT
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This paper is concerned with the role of asymmetric information in 
determining whether projects should be incorporated jointly as a  single firm or 
separated as legally distinct entities. Our approach to  this question is based on 
the possibility that, prior to raising finance for new projects, entrepreneurs or 
firms may try  to mislead the market about the performance of their existing 
projects. If an existing project can be characterised as an investment option, 
then one way tha t they might do this is by prematurely exercising a  low value 
investment under the pretence tha t it is in a  high state. An adverse selection 
problem is created because entrepreneurs whose projects actually axe in the high 
state would optimally exercise their project; failure to  do so would risk the 
project falling into the low state in future periods. This type of adverse 
selection problem, which we call premature investment, has not been studied in 
the literature. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, our explanation of 
whether projects will be jointly or separately incorporated is the first which 
does not rely on exogeneous factors, such as corporate taxation rules (cf. Shah 
and Thakor [1987]).
Until recently the literature on asymmetric information and optimal financial 
structure has focused on models where projects are characterised as a single, 
instantaneous investment followed by a flow of returns. In particular, two of the 
most important results are that debt outstanding may lead to under-investment in 
growth options (see Myers [1977] and discussion below) or to over-investm ent due 
to risk-shifting behaviour (Jensen and Meckling [1976]). Under-investment may 
also occur when the existing assets of a firm are under-valued (Myers and Majluf 
[1984]). In these contexts over-investment occurs when the firm invests in 
projects with negative net present value (NPV) and under-investm ent occurs when 
the firm passes up projects with positive NPV. An important characteristic of the 
above class of models is that the instantaneous nature of investment precludes 
any role for information arrival during the investment process. While this may be
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appropriate when the project represents an extension or replacement of existing 
assets, it is less so for new projects involving innovations. Implementation of 
the la tte r will usually require several stages of investment before returns are 
appropriated.
Allowing for a  sequence of investments opens additional avenues through which 
information may affect a  firm’s investment decisions. For example, in Dewatripont 
and Maskin [1989] and Hansen [1991] (which is Chapter Two of this thesis) there 
are  low cost and high cost projects and there is a  critical stage beyond which it 
is socially optimal for any project to be completed. This means tha t financiers 
generally cannot precommit to  not refinance high cost projects once they are past 
the critical ”no return” stage. The two papers differ in their assumptions about 
private information a t the time of the first investment. In Hansen there is 
initially symmetric information but the entrepreneur receives private information 
about costs prior to  the ”no return” stage. The paper shows th a t tru th-telling  
with minimum efficiency loss may be achieved with loan commitment options or 
convertible and redeemable Preference shares. In contrast, Dewatripont and Maskin 
assume an ex ante informational asymmetry and show tha t financiers may 
deliberately remain of small size in order to  credibly commit to not refinance 
high cost projects. In another paper, Webb [1991] considers project choice in an 
optimal stopping model where the entrepreneur also has private information about 
his or her ability. He shows tha t high quality entrepreneurs may prefer low value 
projects with intermediate cash flows over higher value projects with long 
gestation periods. The reason is that early cash flows reveal information about 
entrepreneurial quality and so lead to subsequent financing terms which are 
closer to  actuarially fair terms. Thus, contrary to  received wisdom, project 
choice based on the timing of cash flows may be better than simply choosing 
projects according to  NPV.
Each of the above papers limit the entrepreneur’s action a t each date to
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either continue the project by investing or stopping the project by not 
investing. In the la tter case the project is lost as the entrepreneur does not 
have an opportunity to  s ta rt it up again. In contrast, this paper analyses an 
investment timing problem where a  project has positive expected NPV provided it 
is implemented on one of several dates. The problem for the firm is to  choose the 
best date a t which to implement the project, i.e. the firm essentially owns a 
call option. In this context, suboptimal investment does not refer to  o v er- or 
under-investment as conventionally defined, but rather whether the firm 
implements the project before or after it reaches maximal NPV. We focus on the 
former case, referred to as premature investment.
A natural starting point for our analysis is Myers’ [1977] model of growth 
options. This is a one-period model where the firm begins with some level of debt 
outstanding1 and an investment option which can be exercised only a t the end of 
the period. Prior to  the exercise decision the firm observes the state of nature 
which determines NPV with certainty. The key insight of Myers’ model is tha t the 
entrepreneur will under-invest by failing to  exercise the option whenever the 
amount of outstanding debt exceeds NPV. The reason is tha t all proceeds from the 
project accrue to debtholders (and, implicitly, the entrepreneur has an 
arbitrarily  small non-pecuniary cost of investment). The model in our paper 
introduces a timing problem into the Myers’ analysis by supposing tha t investment 
options have two periods to maturity and can be exercised a t either date. We 
assume the entrepreneur operates two projects, labelled 1 and 2 , which are 
identical apart from the fact that Project 2  becomes available one period after 
Project 1 . In addition, the space of feasible contracts is restricted by two 
assumptions: first, exercise decisions are observable but, due to  costs of 
writing contracts, are non-contractible (see discussion below); the contract to 
finance Project 2  is written only when this project first becomes available. This 
la tter assumption is realistic as it rules out the possibility of writing
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all-encompassing ”life-tim e” contracts at the birth of the firm (see also the 
discussion below).
Since there are two projects there arises the question of whether they should 
be incorporated jointly or separately. Joint incorporation of projects creates a 
single distinct legal entity upon which financial claims can be issued. Hence, a 
claim written before Project 2  becomes available will give the holders of this 
claim some recourse to  cash flows generated by Project 2. The same is not 
necessarily the case when projects are incorporated separately. We assume tha t 
the covenants attached to contracts can specify whether or not joint 
incorporation is compulsory.
Beginning with symmetric information, we show there is a range of param eter 
values for which joint incorporation of projects creates a diversification effect 
and so minimises Myers’ type distortions. However, ex post incentives may not be 
aligned with ex ante optimality and so for some param eter values equilibrium 
contracts would specify covenants binding the firm to joint incorporation. In 
contrast, when state realisations are private information of the entrepreneur, 
the above results no longer hold. With asymmetric information there arises a 
signalling game where the exercise decision for Project 1 affects the terms of 
the financial contract for Project 2 . A disadvantage of joint incorporation is 
th a t there may now exist a premature-investment pooling equilibrium in the sense 
of excessive early exercise of Project 1 . On the other hand, ability to  separate 
projects may allow the pooling equilibrium to be broken. For this to happen the 
benefits to  entrepreneurs in bad states, which arise from the elimination of 
prem ature investment and also a transfer in market value from debt holders, must 
outweigh the costs. These costs arise from higher probability of future 
under-investm ent. Hence, in contrast to the case of symmetric information, 
p rivate information means that covenants of equilibrium contracts will not 
necessarily require joint incorporation of projects.
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The paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the model in 
formal terms. Section 2 analyses some properties of the model under the 
assumption of symmetric information, including the diversification benefits from 
joint incorporation of projects. Section 3 begins by specifying a  reduced-form  
signalling game and shows how asymmetric information can result in premature 
investment. Section 3 also analyses how contractual covenants allowing separate 
incorporation of projects may overcome the early exercise problem. Finally, 
conclusions are presented.
1. The Model
In this section we provide a formal description of the model, including types 
of agents and market structure, project technology, information and verifiability 
assumptions, and a description of the contracting game. The model is kept as 
simple as possible and is intended to be illustrative only.
1.1. A gents
The economy comprises both entrepreneurs and investors, both of which are 
risk neutral. Each representative entrepreneur (or firm) is endowed with two 
projects, labelled 1 and 2, and lives for three periods, dated t = l,2 ,3 ,4 . 
However, the entrepreneur has zero wealth and so requires outside finance to 
undertake the necessary investments. Investors have wealth available to invest 
but are not endowed with projects. They value consumption a t each date and have a 
constant ra te  of time preference between consumption a t any two adjacent dates, 
which for simplicity is set equal to zero. The financial markets through which 
entrepreneurs and investors meet are characterised by Bertrand competition. Thus, 
given the above assumptions, the optimal equilibrium financial contract will 
maximise the entrepreneur’s terminal wealth subject to  the investor’s
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participation constraint and other resource- and inform ation-based constraints 
(as specified below).
We assume the technology is specific to  each entrepreneur so tha t it is not 
possible for any investor with a large wealth endowment to  buy-out the 
entrepreneur. In the absence of this specificity assumption the inefficiencies 
derived below could be avoided by a  transfer of ownership and managerial 
decision-making to  a  wealthy individual.
1.2. Project Technologies
The entrepreneur’s two projects are identical technologies except that 
Project 1 becomes available a t t = l  while Project 2 becomes available a t t  = 2. The 
lagged arrival of project opportunities is exogenous to  the model. For simplicity 
we assume their state realisations are independently distributed. A project 
requires a  sequence of two investments of fixed amounts before any return from 
th a t project can be produced. The first investment is C. However, once C has been
invested the firm has some discretion over the timing of the second investment,
I. Specifically, we assume that I can be invested either one or two periods after 
C. Failure to invest I at either of these dates results in the opportunity
lapsing in the sense that the return falls to zero. Thus, to use a  financial
contracting analogy, each project is an American Call Option (in discrete time) 
with two periods to  maturity and an exercise price of I. The purchase price of 
the option is C.
The structure described above is illustrated in Figure 1 , which shows how 
lagged arrival of projects leads to an overlapping a t t = 2  and possibly also at 
t=3. Let sit be the state of project i a t date t  and s t=(slt1s2t) the 
corresponding state vector. For simplicity, we assume sit is either high (h ) or 
low (I) and that, for given t, sit are independently distributed across i. For a 
project which starts a t date t = r  the probability distribution of s, r+ 1  is sir+1 = h
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Figure 1: Project Arrival and Exercise Decisions
t =  l  t =  2 t - 3  t = 4
C ?
C ?
and s i r+1 — ^ with probability p and 1-p , respectively. Then, if sir+ 1  =  s the 
transition probability for remaining in state s is q3 and the probability of
transferring to the other state is l - q s. Hence, the transition probabilities are 
state-dependent and the transition probabilities are state-dependent and Markov. 
We do not place restrictions on the relative sizes of qh and q / a t this stage, 
though the analysis below will generally require a low q^ and a  high q ,. The 
evolution of states is illustrated in Figure 2 .
For sit = s the non-random gross return of project i is Ga. The return net of
exercise costs is Ra =  Ga - I ,  and we assume
Rh > C > R' > 0  (1)
In (1 ) the first inequality allows positive net returns in the high state  while
the second inequality guarantees the project is risky. The last inequality 
ensures tha t the lowest return exceeds the exercise price so th a t it is never 
socially optimal to  let an investment option die unexercised?
Since Ra is non-random for given s we can, without loss of generality, set 
1 = 0  for the remainder of the paper? Thus, each project is formally analysed as 
though it requires only investment C. However, the problem retains the essential 
feature tha t the entrepreneur faces a sequence of exercise decisions. For a  given 
project and date the entrepreneur either exercises (denoted X) or waits (denoted 
W). Letting dit be the exercise decision for project * a t date t, we can write 
dite{X,W}, for *e{l,2} and te { r+ l,r+ 2 } , and dt = (dn ,d2t).
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Figure 2: Evolution o f  States for Project Beginning at Date r
sir+2 ~  ^
date r
s *r+2 — ^
Clearly, given (1 ), independence of state realisations across projects and 
the assumption that C is a  sunk cost, the first-best policy for each project is 
to  exercise the option a t t  =  r+ l if, and only if, sir+1 = h and to  always exercise 
any option which is unexercised a t t = r+2. The la tte r follows since (1) implies 
0 > R *-C >-C , so that the losses in the low state are minimised by exercising the 
investment option. Hence, first-best can be described as:
Given the policy as described in (2 ) and the probability distribution over 
states, the ex ante expected net present value of each project is
where y u = prob(str+ 1  = si r+ 2  = £) = <b(l-p) is the probability tha t the project is 
unsuccessful (i.e. enters and remains in state I). We assume Vy6 is positive.
1.3. Information and Contracting
We assume information is symmetric a t date 1 so tha t prior to the first 
investment neither the entrepreneur nor investors know the future states, s t. 
However, they all know the probability distributions described above, i.e. there 
is no adverse selection a t date 1 .
fb
*r+l dir +2 = X for all str+2e{M }- ( 2 )
V/6=(i-ru)R'‘ + r„R' - c, (3)
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Following Townsend [1979] and Gale and Hell wig [1985] we assume costly state 
verification for investors. Hence, although the state realisation s t is revealed 
costlessly to  the entrepreneur, investors must pay a  fixed cost to  observe it. 
This assumption implies that the optimal repayment function can be characterised 
as debt with bankruptcy where bankruptcy occurs whenever the entrepreneur fails 
to  repay the face value of debt! Furthermore, we assume tha t the process of 
bankruptcy destroys the investment option so tha t renegotiation to  avoid the 
under-investment problem is not possible. Thus, if the level of debt is too high 
it will not be possible to  implement the first-best investment policy described 
by (2 ).
Though s t is costly for investors to  observe, we assume they can costlessly 
observe the entrepreneur’s investment actions. However, it is important for the
/ g
results below tha t these actions be non-contractible. Following Grossman and Hart 
[1986] and Hart and Moore [1988] we justify non-contractibility of actions by 
pointing to the costs of writing contracts with detailed descriptions of future
9 •states and actions. An important implication of the assumption tha t exercise 
actions are observable is that investors can condition their beliefs about the 
state of the firm on these actions. It is this conditioning of the uninformed 
party ’s beliefs which gives rise a signalling problem and leads to  premature 
investment.
In addition to the above assumptions, we add a further important restriction 
on the contracting problem: we preclude contracting prior to project arrival. By 
this we are assuming tha t it is not possible to write a  single contract a t the 
birth of the firm (t= l)  which determines financial arrangements for the whole 
life of the firm (i.e. until t=4). Instead, we assume tha t financing arrangements 
for each project can only be written as a formal contract when the project first 
becomes available. In terms of our tw o-project firm described above, this means 
tha t the contract for Project 2  is determined a t t=2, while the contract for
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Project 1 is determined a t t= l. At both dates the terms of the contract are 
therefore determined by competition in financial markets. Hence, we are ruling 
out financial contracts with a single investor1.0 If "prior contracting” were 
permitted then the parties would be able to  avoid the signalling problem and 
associated premature investment developed below. Nevertheless, allowing for the 
possibility tha t a  firm may need to finance a new project while also taking 
observable actions on an existing project appears to  be a  realistic formulation.
In the following we denote the contract for project :, i e {1,2}, by C, = 
{/0 ,U J, where p is the repayment function and U, is a  vector of covenants 
attached to the contract. We have already noted th a t the repayment function p 
will be a  debt function. However, before specifying the exact form of p  we need 
to  discuss the nature of the covenants U*. Two covenants of particular interest 
are  the seniority rule applying to  repayments specified by Cx and C2 and any 
restrictions for projects to be jointly or separately incorporated. Let 
Ui = (u1,u2), where Uj is the maximum amount of senior claims tha t can be issued by 
any contract subsequent to  C, and u2e {CJI,CSI,0 } specifies either compulsory 
joint incorporation (CJI), compulsory separate incorporation (CSI) or a null 
covenant (0 ) with no restrictions on incorporation of projects. We follow the 
convention that covenants U,- must not contradict covenants from earlier 
contracts. Hence, if U1 = (u1,CJI) then u2 in C2 can specify either CJI or 0  but 
not CSI. A third covenant that may be attached to  Ct concerns restrictions on 
interim dividend and managerial remuneration. However, in contrast to Berkovitch 
and Kim [1990], it will become clear below that setting interim payments to zero 
can never be suboptimal in this model since the corresponding reduction in 
external financing requirements reduces the potential for under-investment. Thus, 
for simplicity, we assume zero dividend and other payments without adding this as 
an explicit covenant in our contracts.
We can now be explicit about the repayment function, p. Let p = p{b) specify
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th a t the face value of debt is b. Then Cl = {/9 (b),(u 1?u2)} specifies tha t the 
investor who signs this contract will receive
p(b) = min{b,max{0 ,R7’- u 1}}, (4)
where RT is to tal returns accruing a t t  = 4. Equation (4) says th a t the return net 
of payments on senior claims is max{0 ,Rr - u 1} and tha t the investor who signs Cx 
receives the lessor of this amount and b. If we let ux =  B then we would say th a t b 
and B are junior and senior debt, respectively.
1.4. The General Contracting Game
The general contracting game has the following form, as illustrated in Figure 
3. First, investors offer contracts Cx to finance investment C for Project 1 . 
Second, the entrepreneur either accepts one of these contracts or rejects all 
offers and ends the game with zero pay-offs. Third, the entrepreneur observes the 
first state realisation for Project 1 and then announces/precommits to  either 
exercise (X) Project 1 or wait (W). Fourth, investors offer contracts C2 to  
finance Project 2 . Fifth, the entrepreneur either accepts one of these contracts 
or rejects all. Sixth and seventh, the entrepreneur observes two state 
realisations and announces an exercise decisions afte r each observation. Eight, 
payments are made according to the rules specified in Cx and C2.
The game is analysed for pure strategies using the concept of perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium. This requires that equilibria satisfy the following 
conditions: (1) a t each of t = 3,4 the entrepreneur chooses exercise action dt 
optimally as a function of contracts C1 and C2, the sequence of sta te  
realisations and past decisions {dj}j~J~l ; (2 ) once the investors have
made their contract offers, the entrepreneur’s acceptance decision is made 
optimally to maximise his or her own expected terminal wealth; (3) given C1 and 
the entrepreneur’s announced action d2, each investor’s contract offer C2 is made 
given the optimal response of the entrepreneur in terms of both acceptance and
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Figure 4: The C on trac tin g  Game
In v e s to rs
o f f e r
c o n t ra c ts
Ci.
E n tre p r 
a c c e p ts  
one o r 
r e j e c t s  
a l l .
Ent  r e p r . 
o b s e r v e s
S2 ~ ( s 1 2 )» 
announces
d 2= ( d i 2 ) •
I n v e s t o r s
o f f e r
c o n t r a c t s
Ca.
E n t r e p r .  E n t r e p r .  E n t r e p r .  Paym ents
a c c e p t s  o b s e r v e s  o b s e r v e s  a r e  made,
one or s 3 = ( s i 3 , s 2 3 ) , s 4 = ( s 2 4 )?
r e j e c t s  announces  announces
a l l .  d 3 = ( d 1 3 , d 2 3 ).  d 4 = ( d 2 4 ).
future exercise decisions, beliefs about the entrepreneur’s current state (type) 
and given contract offers by other investors; (4) when offering C2 the beliefs of 
each investor must be consistent with the equilibrium strategies of the 
entrepreneur and other investors; (5) given and the current sta te  s2, the 
entrepreneur chooses exercise action d2 optimally, knowing th a t this action may 
affect the beliefs of the investors and hence their contract offers C2\ (6 ) each 
investor’s contract offer Cl is made given the optimal response of the 
entrepreneur in terms of both acceptance and future exercise decisions, beliefs 
about contract offers by other investors and the equilibrium contract C2.
A feature of the above description is that, given Cx and C2, actions d3 and 
d4 can be determined by backward induction. For the case of asymmetric 
information (Section 3), this fact will allow us to model the contracting process 
for C2 as a standard signalling game where the payoffs are  given by expected 
terminal wealth as a t date 2 . We will analyse equilibria of the signalling game 
for the two cases where u2 = CJI (compulsory joint incorporation) and u2 =  0  (no 
restrictions). It will become clear that the third case, u2 = CSI, can never be 
preferred to both CJI and 0 .
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As a  precursor to the signalling model, we next analyse the form of 
equilibrium contracts for the case of symmetric information.
2. Sym m etric In form ation
In this section we assume symmetric information so th a t outside investors can 
observe state realisations. Our main purpose is to  provide a  benchmark to  aid 
understanding of the asymmetric information case tha t follows. We show here how 
the face value of debt affects the level of inefficiency due to  under-investment 
and also characterise the nature of covenants. In the la ter the focus is on the 
role of covenants in preventing separate incorporation of projects ("project 
financing”) and the role of seniority rules. In addition, we show tha t premature 
investment cannot occur when information is symmetric. This therefore makes clear 
th a t it is the signalling induced by the informational asymmetry tha t leads to 
premature investment.
Our assumption that state realisations are commonly observed raises the 
possibility that investment inefficiencies could be avoided by ex post 
renegotiation. This is because in the event of a low state  realisation (at the 
terminal date) it is in the interests of the debtholder to ensure the 
entrepreneur exercises the project by setting the face value of debt sufficiently 
low. However, in view of our aim of providing a benchmark for the case of 
asymmetric information, we rule out these possibilities.
2.1. Under-Investment
For future reference it is useful to characterise here the under-investment 
problem for both CSI and CJI. In each case, the face value of debt, F, is assumed 
to  give zero-expected profits for the investor. For the case of CSI we can 
consider a single representative project, each with face value of debt equal to
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F. To begin with we note tha t F must satisfy Rh > F > R*. To see this, note first 
th a t if F > R*1 the entrepreneur will never exercise the project and the initial 
investment C would never be made. Also, from (1 ) F < R/ is also not feasible 
since R* < C implies F < C, which in turn implies negative expected profit for 
investors. With R*1 > F > R* the optimal exercise policies for each date axe:
Comparing with the first-best policy described by (2 ) we see tha t di r+ 1  is
firs t-best but d i r+ 2  is not since R* > 0  implies tha t exercise is always socially
optimal for projects reaching their terminal date. For each project, the
inefficiency occurs when str+ 1  = si r+ 2  = £, which has probability yu (see Figure 2 ). 
Given Rh > F > R*, therefore, zero expected profits for the investor requires 
th a t the debt F satisfy ( l - y u)F = C. Hence, a credit market will exist for 
individual projects provided the entrepreneur’s expected return on each project 
is positive, i.e. provided ( l - y u)RA -  C > 0. Equivalently, using (3) we can
rewrite the entrepreneur’s expected return per project as:
Hence, with CSI to tal expected return over two projects is 2 EX and the to ta l 
expected cost of distortions is 2 yuR*.
The case for CJI is similar to the forgoing analysis. There are two feasible 
cases of interest: namely, 2R* < F < R'+Rh and R'+Rft < F < 2 Rft, where F is now 
the to ta l face value of debt issued to raise funds of 2 C. The relevant results 
for these two cases are stated in the following two lemmas.
ie{ l,2 } and te { r+ l,r+ 2 } (5)
Ei = V/ 6  -  yuR' ( 6 )
Lemma 1:
I f  2R* < F < R*+Rh then the entrepreneur's optimal exercise policies are: 
( X ^  if S |2= ^
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W, if s23= l
X, if S23—h,
W, if s 12—S13—S23— S24=£
X, if Si2 5S!3,S23 Or S 24 = h
Proof: When F < R*+R* the entrepreneur will receive a  positive return provided
terminal date (if not previously exercised). It will be exercised 
irrespective of the state of either project because Project 2 has positive 
probability of being in the high state a t t  =  4, i.e. the entrepreneur has 
positive probability of profit of a t least Rl+Rh -  F > 0 . Also, if Project 1 
is exercised in state h then the effective level of debt outstanding is F0 = 
m ax{F-Rh,0 }. Since F0 < R* the entrepreneur would excerise Project 2  a t its 
terminal date (t = 4) irrespective of its own state. However, if Project 1 is 
exercised in state I  then debt outstanding is F0 = F - R /, where R* < F0 < Rh. In 
this case, Project 2 is exercised only if s24 = /&.
In Lemma 1 the exercise decisions d12 and d3 are firs t-best, but d24 is not since 
exercise of Project 2  is socially optimal for all realisations of s24. The
inefficiency occurs if, and only if, s12 = ^ , s3 =  (£,£) and s24 = £, which has
probability y j. Thus, when F < R'+Rft joint incorporation of projects leads to  a
diversification effect which reduces expected to tal distortionary costs to  yjR*
(cf. cost of 2 7 ^  for CSI). The entrepreneur’s expected return  is:
just one of the two projects enters state h. At t  = 3 Project 1 is a t its
Q.E.D.
E1(F<R/+R/l,CJI) = 2Vfb -  y*R' 
> 2Ex
(7)
where is defined by (3).
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Lemma 2 :
I f  R'+R71 < F < 2Rh then the entrepreneur’s optimal exercise policies are:
X, if s u =h
dit =
W, if s lf=£
for t  = 2,3
X, if s2^—h and Sj2 or Sjj — h 
W, if s2t= l o r s12= s 13=€
for t  = 3,4
Proof: When F^R'+R71 the entrepreneur’s realised return  is positive if and only if 
both projects are exercised in high states. Thus, if Project 1 enters and 
stays in the low state (i.e. s12=s13=£), the to tal return will never be 
sufficient to repay F. In this case, neither project will be exercised. If, 
however, Project 1 enters state h a t either date 2 or 3 then it will be 
exercised (irrespective of Project 2’s current state) because a t both dates 
there is positive probability that Project 2 will also enter state h and be 
exercised.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 shows that joint incorporation with F^R'+R7* leads to a  contagion effect.
The inefficiencies associated with individual projects are compounded because a
failure of the first project results in a debt over-hang which exceeds the 
maximum feasible return on the second project. As a  result, the entrepreneur 
obtains a positive return if and only if both projects enter sta te  h. Since state 
realisations are independent across projects this has probability ( l - y « )  • The 
entrepreneur’s expected return is:
E1(F>R'+Rft,CJI) = 2 ( 1 - y j V  -  2 C
= 2V/(, -  2y„{R' + ( l - r J R '1}, (8 )
< 2Ex
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where the second equality uses (3). Of the two terms in curly brackets, the first 
represents the inefficiencies associated with separated projects while the second 
is the additional inefficiency due to the contagion effect.
To summarise, the appropriate incorporation mode for minimising the costs of 
under-investment distortions depends on whether the to ta l face value of debt is 
greater or less than R*+R\ Joint incorporation has a  beneficial diversification 
effect when F < R'+R* and an adverse contagion effect when F>R*+Rfc.
2.2. Contractual Covenants
In the above we have characterised the entrepreneur’s optimal exercise 
policies as a  function of a  given face value of debt. In this subsection we 
analyse the nature of seniority covenants (ux) and incorporation covenants (u2) 
recognising tha t the face value of debt is a function of equilibrium exercise 
policies. In order to  derive results which will be comparable with the case of 
asymmetric information in Section 3, we exogenously rule out contract 
renegotiation once states are realised. Similarly, we continue to  consider only 
debt contracts.
As discussed in Section 1.3, we assume tha t it is not possible a t the birth 
of the firm (t=l)  to write financing contracts for projects arriving la ter during 
the life of the firm. In terms of our tw o-project model, this implies there are 
two contracts, C1 and C2, which are written a t t= l and t=2, respectively. Due to 
this lag in project arrival, the state s12 for Project 1 will be observed by all 
parties prior to  their agreement on C2. In general, therefore, the face value of 
debt specified in C2 will be conditional on s12.
An issue that arises naturally in this context is the seniority provisions in 
Cj. Clearly, if the covenants of Cx don’t forbid it, issuing debt which is senior 
to tha t of C1 will always be optimal for the entrepreneur a t t= 2 . Ex post of C1 
this minimises the to tal face value of debt outstanding. Ex ante, however, the
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seniority covenant of Cx will be indeterminate unless there are implications for 
the efficiency of the entrepreneur’s exercise decisions. Proposition 1 below 
shows tha t there are parameter values for which Ct can reduce inefficiencies by 
allowing future debt issues to be senior to  any debt outstanding a t th a t time. In 
the following we represent junior and senior debt by b and B, respectively (with 
the addition, where necessary, of date subscripts and sta te  superscripts).
P ro p o sitio n  1 : (Seniority)
Consider two alternative contracts £!={/?( b^B j,C JI} and &1={B1,0 ,CJI}. Cx 
specifies that debt bj is raised to finance project 1 and that this debt is 
junior to debt B2 issued fo r project 2  when s12 =  s. specifies the reverse 
seniority rule. Assume both contracts imply zero expected pro fits fo r  the 
investor. Then with symmetric information the risk neutral entrepreneur always 
weakly prefers Cx to t x and there exist parameter values for which Cx is strictly  
preferred to t v
Proof: See Appendix.
Junior debt is optimal for Project 1 because this reduces the variation 
across states in the face value of Project 2 ’s debt. Compared for the issue of 
senior debt a t t= l, the to tal debt will be higher in state h but lower in state 
i , i.e. b!+B$ > Bi + bjj and b ^ B ^  < B ^ b j .  But only state i  is relevant for 
efficiency because there are no distortions in good states.
It may be noted that the role of seniority covenants in this model is 
analogous to Stulz and Johnson [1985] and Berkovitch and Kim [1990]. There is 
also some similarity to Hart and Moore [1990] except tha t we wish to  encourage, 
rather than discourage, investment. In the remainder of the paper we will use the 
result of Proposition 1 and assume date 2  debt is senior to  date 1 debt whenever
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projects are incorporated jointly.
We now turn to  an analysis of the optimality of covenants on incorporation. 
Since we know from Lemma 1 tha t bj+B^ < R*+R* is sufficient for joint
incorporation to be optimal ex ante. Proposition 2  below shows th a t bj+B^ < R'+R^ 
is also a  necessary condition. In addition, the proposition shows th a t for some 
param eter values there is a  time-inconsistency problem where ex post ( t= 2 ) 
incentives differ with ex ante optimality (t = l). Hence, in these cases any 
announcement by the entrepreneur that the projects will be incorporated jointly 
is credible only if Cx includes a CJI covenant.
P ro p o sitio n  2 : [Time -  Inconsistency)
Let bl and Bs2, s = s12e{h ,l} , be the face values of junior and senior debt with C JI 
such that expected profits o f investors are zero. Provided there exists a credit 
market fo r  individual projects, joint incorporation o f projects is optimal ex 
ante i f , and only i f , b1+B2<Rh + Rt. When, in addition, p is close to 1 a C JI 
covenant will be a binding constraint on the entrepreneur at t = 2 i f  Rh is 
sufficiently high and Project 1 is the low state (i.e. s l2 = l) .
Proof: See Appendix.
When s12 = I  the CJI covenant may become binding ex post because separation of 
projects increases the probability of default on outstanding debt (i.e. on b^ . 
Hence, separation of projects leads to  a  fall in the m arket value of bj which 
represents a  transfer to the entrepreneur. If p is high, so tha t Project 2  has a 
high probability of immediate success, then the value of the transfer will 
outweigh the expected costs of additional distortions due to  separation of 
projects.
Although the time-inconsistency problem is undesirable when information is 
symmetric, it is not necessarily so with asymmetric information. This is because
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the time-inconsistency problem can eliminate the premature investment problem by 
causing projects to  be separated whenever s12 = I. Thus, in the next section we 
will find tha t for some param eter values, a  null covenant may be preferred to  a 
CJI covenant even though to tal debt is less than R*+R\
Finally for this section, we note another im portant implication of this 
section: exercise and investment decisions a t date 2  are always first-best. This 
is due to  two factors. First, a t t  = 2  neither of the projects have reached their 
terminal date so there remains some positive probability tha t the high state will 
be attained. Hence, there is potential for under-investment only when one or more 
of the investment options have reached their terminal date. Second, information 
is symmetric. The public observability of project states means tha t the 
entrepreneur’s actions for Project 1 have no external effects on financing terms 
for Project 2 . The face value of debt negotiated a t t = 2  is conditioned directly 
on observations of the state s12. In the next section we introduce asymmetric 
information so tha t state realisations are private information of the
entrepreneur. In this case the actions of the entrepreneur are potential signals 
of the current state of the firm, and this leads to premature investment a t t= 2 .
3. A sym m etric In form ation
The purpose of this section is to show that asymmetric information can 
reverse some properties of the model with symmetric information. The first stage 
of the analysis focuses on the contracting game played a t t= 2 . Given tha t the 
entrepreneur has observed a state realisation for Project 1 , we can formulate a 
reduced-form  signalling game to analyse the possibility of sub-optim al exercise 
and investment decisions a t t= 2 . In Subsection 3.1, we show tha t when Cx has a 
CJI covenant there exists a pooling equilibrium where Project 1 is exercised at 
date 2  irrespective of its state, i.e. d12=X, for all s 12e{/i,^}. This contrasts
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with the first-best policy which is to exercise Project 1 a t date 2  if, and only 
if, s12=h. In Subsection 3.2 we show there are param eter values for which the 
pooling equilibrium is robust to  the Intuitive Criterion. In Subsection 3.3 we 
replace CJI with a null covenant and show that the time-inconsistency identified 
in Proposition 2  can break the pooling equilibrium. Finally, in light of our 
pooling and separating equilibria Subsection 3.4 discusses whether the 
equilibrium Cx will include a  CJI or null covenant. We argue tha t this depends on 
whether premature investment or under-investment represents the greater 
inefficiency. Our results for the case of asymmetric information contrast with 
those of symmetric information as the same param eters would imply CJI covenants 
are unambiguously optimal.
3.1. The t = 2  Signalling Game w ith  CJI
In this section the general contracting game described in Section 1.4 is 
reduced to  a standard signalling game where the payoffs are defined as the 
expected terminal wealth as a t t= 2 . This is feasible because the entrepreneur’s 
exercise decisions d3 and d24 have been shown to  be unique functions of state 
realisations and the to tal debt outstanding (see Lemmas 1 and 2). An advantage of 
the reduced-form  formulation is that selection among equilibria can be based on 
standard tests for signalling games, as discussed below.
In the following it is convenient to  omit the subscripts on most variables, 
so that, for example, b1? B2, d12 and s12 become b, B, d and s. Also we define S 
=  {h ,l}. With Cx = {p(b),B,CJI} the t=2 game is formulated as follows: The 
entrepreneur observes the state  s and then either exercises (X) Project 1 or 
waits (W). This action is publicly observable and, in the context of the 
signalling game, may be thought of as a message to investors. The message of an 
entrepreneur in state s is denoted d(s), where d(s)e{X,W }. Each investor’s 
response to message d, denoted B(d), is to offer a  face value of debt Be[C,oo).
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In general, the entrepreneur’s announcement of d will cause each investor to 
revise beliefs about the current state of Project 1 . As before we assume prior 
beliefs are identical across all investors. In addition, we now assume posterior 
distributions conditional on message d are identical across investors, and are 
denoted by /x(s|d).
Given state s, message d and response B, the reduced-form  payoffs (net of 
existing debt claims, b) to the entrepreneur and chosen investor are  denoted 
E(s,d,B) and p(s,d,B). These payoffs can be given precise formulations using 
Lemmas 1 and 2 . However, since investors do not observe s, their expected gross 
return is:
P(d,B,/i) = £  />(s,d,B)/i(s|d) (9)
seS
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies for our reduced-form  
game is defined as a  set of entrepreneur strategies, d*(s), investor offer 
functions, B*(d), and posterior probability measures, /i( . |d ) , satisfying the 
following conditions:
(i) Given state s and the response strategy of investo rs, B*(d), the 
entrepreneur selects d to maximise expected terminal wealth, i.e. for all 
sgS ,
d*(s) e  arg max E(s,d,B*(d))
d e { X , W }
(i i) Given the entrepreneur’s message strategy d*(s), the offer strategy of 
other investors and posterior beliefs, /i( . |d ) , each investor selects 
response B as a Bertrand competitor1,1 i.e.
P(d*(s),B,//(. | d)) = C.
(Hi) Whenever m is an equilibrium (pure) strategy for some type s then ^ (- |d )  *s 
given by Bayes’ rule, i.e. if d*(s)=d and p(.) is the distribution of prior 
probabilities, then:
M(s|d) = - £ p ( j ) S>
{ j :d* (j)= d>
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Since the CJI covenant restricts d to  a  binary message there can exist only 
one pooling equilibrium and one separating equilibrium. The pooling equilibrium 
is characterised by premature investment and is based on the following reasoning. 
When in the low state the benefit to the entrepreneur of a  strategy to  announce 
d = X is tha t the credit market, being unable to distinguish types, will over-value 
the debt offered by the low quality type. Since competition ensures zero expected 
profits for investors, the over-valuation burden falls on firms in state h. 
Nevertheless, firms in state h will not deviate because of the potential loss of
value if Project 1 were to transfer into the low state. The intuition is made
precise as follows:
Proposition 3: (Premature Investment Pooling Equilibrium)
I f  states are private information of entrepreneurs and Cx = {/9 (b),Bp,CJI} then 
fo r  q, sufficiently high the unique equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium where 
all entrepreneur's exercise project 1 at the firs t available date, t == 2 . This 
equilibrium is represented as:
> d*( s ) = X fo r  all seS
- B*(X) = B P 
‘ prob(/i | d=W) = 7r
where Bp satisfies P(d*,Bp,p) = C and n is investors' beliefs fo r  
o f f  -  the -  equilibrium paths.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows tha t a premature investment problem may exist in an extended 
version of the Myers’ under-investment model. The intuition is easily understood 
by considering the limiting case where q ^ l .  In this case, since the project will 
remain in state i  with high probability, the extent of the inefficiency from 
early exercise becomes arbitrarily small. With zero costs from early exercise,
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the signalling content disappears and the problem essentially reduces to  one of 
pure adverse selection. This intuition can be made more precise by the following 
formulation of benefits and costs of early exercise. Let ^ (p ,^ )  be the benefit 
to  type I  from the reduction of -  Bp in the face value of debt. The extent
of this debt reduction is determined by the difference in default probabilities, 
say y^ (7r) and 7p- From the Appendix (see (A9) and (A1 0 )) we can show
0(p,<b) «  q /(i-p ){(i-7r)(p+q ,-i) + *r(P+q/»)}- 
Thus, the benefit remains strictly positive as q, -*> 1 provided we choose beliefs
such th a t Trq/j < p. On the other hand, the cost of premature investment is the
loss of option value plus any additional distortions to  future investment. The
sum of these costs is given by:
V>(p»q/) =  (i-<b)[(Rft-R') + r«R']-
The first term within the square brackets represents the loss from killing the
option (expected value of the option to exercise next period, (1-q JR *1 + q^ R*,
minus the value obtainable by exercising now, R'). The second term represents the
additional distortions to  future exercise decisions for Project 2. With 2R* < b +
Bp < Rh + R*, the inefficiency due to  premature exercise occurs because the 
effective level of debt outstanding becomes b+Bp-R*, which is greater than R*. 
Hence, Project 2  will expire unexercised with probability y u. However, if 
premature exercise were avoided then Project 1 has probability 1-q^ of entering 
state h and so avoiding any inefficiency with Project 2 . Hence, in addition to 
the direct loss of option value, premature exercise leads to an indirect cost of 
(1-qJyuR*. Clearly, for 0 < p < l,  lim  0(p,q,) -  ^ (p ,^ )  > 0 . It follows, then, thatq^  •* 1
the pooling equilibrium will exist for all q, in some interval (q/9l] and tha t 
this equilibrium is a premature investment equilibrium for ^ ( q ^ l ) .
The benefit and cost functions, 0(p,q,) and ^ ( p ^ ) ,  are also useful for 
indicating conditions for which pooling equilibria cannot exist. In particular, 
lim  <p(p ,q j  -  ^ ( p ^ )  < 0  indicates that pooling equilibria cannot exist for pp-* i
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sufficiently high (provided ^ < 1 ) . This makes sense because as p»l the investment 
in each project becomes riskless and so the face value of debt (for each project) 
falls to C. In this case there exists a separating equilibrium as the 
entrepreneur benefits from the improved efficiency.
3.2. A Refinement o f  the Equilibrium
A well known problem with the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) concept is 
tha t it generally admits a large number of equilibria. The source of this problem 
is tha t although beliefs of the uninformed are determined by Bayes’ rule when 
equilibrium strategies are played, there are no restrictions on beliefs for
off-equilibrium strategies. In terms of our pooling equilibrium where all
entrepreneurs exercise Project 1 a t t= 2 , the uninformed investors should never 
observe a  failure to  exercise Project 1, which is an out-of-equilibrium  action. 
But if such a deviation does occur then how should it be interpreted by 
investors? i.e. what value is taken by n. With the PBE concept the modeller is 
free to  assign to 7r any value on [0,1]. Moreover, the value of 7r, which is 
assumed to  be common knowledge of both entrepreneur and investor, may be critical 
for the equilibrium to exist. A small change in n may destroy the proposed 
equilibrium. It is useful, therefore, to  test the robustness of proposed
equilibria with refinements which are more restrictive than PBE. In this section 
we employ the Intuitive Criterion, as developed in Cho and Kreps [1987]. Our view 
is that this is a minimal test which any reasonable equilibria in signalling
games should pass1.2
A formal definition of the Intuitive Criterion is provided a t the beginning 
of the Appendix. The intuition for the test can be stated as follows: Recall that 
the state space for Project 1 a t t = 2  is S={h,l}. Since the intrinsic value of the 
firm varies across these states, the set S can be reinterpreted as the set of 
entrepreneur types a t t= 2 . Now suppose we pick some PBE, denoted by (d*,B*,/i),
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and consider some off-the-equilibrium -path strategy, d0. Define T(d0) as the set 
of entrepreneur types which, irrespective of investor response (from the set of 
best responses), are strictly worse off with d0 than with the supposed 
equilibrium (d*,B*,/i). Now we ask the following question: if the investors 
observe do, is it reasonable for them to attach even some small positive 
probability tha t the entrepreneur is of type T(d0)? If we require investors to  be 
sequentially rational, the answer is no because the investors know tha t each 
member of T(d0) strictly prefers the equilibrium. On this basis a  sequentially 
rational investor will surmise that d0 could only be sent by some type in S\T(d0) 
and so we must concentrate the investor’s beliefs to  have support on S\T(d0). In 
general, however, the reduced support may alter the set of best responses for 
investors, which in turn could affect the ranking of dQ relative to  d* for some 
type in S\T(d0). Indeed, if concentrated beliefs imply there is just one type who 
is strictly better off with d0, then the original equilibrium is said to  fail the 
Intuitive Criterion. Otherwise, the equilibrium passes the test. We now apply 
this test to  show:
P ro p o sitio n  4:
I f  q, and Rh are sufficiently high and q/ > l - p > l - q /l the pooling equilibrium o f 
Proposition 3 passes the Intuitive Criterion.
Proof: See Appendix.
Once again the intuition is simplest for the case of pure adverse selection 
(i.e. ^  = 1). The essential feature of the Intuitive Criterion applied to this 
paper is tha t concentrating the beliefs of investors requires tha t we set 7r=0, 
i.e. if an investor observes a deviation they assume the deviation is by a  type i  
entrepreneur. But if type i  entrepreneurs are more likely than type h to  be in 
the low state next period (i.e. q ,> l-q ft) then the reduction in it to  zero
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increases investors’ estimates of default probability, which in turn increases 
the face value of debt. Indeed, with 7r = 0  the debt for deviants will exceed the 
debt for non-deviants and so a deviant is w orse-off (since with q, =  l  there are no
13efficiency gains to  be obtained by deviating).
3.3. Equilibria w ith  a  Null C ovenant in C1
The above equilibria were derived with the signalling space restricted by a 
CJI covenant in Cv  The purpose of that analysis was to  show tha t with asymmetric 
information CJI can lead to  distortions which are not present with symmetric 
information. We now consider the case where Cx includes the null covenant. 
Specifically, we are able to give a simple condition for which the premature 
investment pooling equilibrium cannot exist and we identify a separating 
equilibrium which does exist. In this equilibrium a  type h entrepreneur 
incorporates projects jointly and exercises Project 1 , while a  type i  
entrepreneur incorporates projects separately and defers Project 1.
Compared for CJI, a null covenant alters slightly the form of the signalling 
game. We expand the entrepreneur’s decision space from {X,W} to  {X,W}x{J,S}, 
where J and S are announcements that projects are incorporated jointly or 
separately. For example, under this specification of the game the pooling 
equilibrium of Proposition 3 would specify d* = (X,J) for all se{ /i/} . We have:
P ro p o sitio n  5: (No Premature Investment)
R/Suppose the credit market for an individual project exists. Then i f  p > the 
pooling equilbrium o f Proposition 3 can not exist.
Proof: See Appendix.
The above proposition says that it is possible to  break the premature 
investment equilibrium even when q/ = 1. This contrasts with the CJI covenant
Premature Investment 121
because in that case a pooling equilibrium always exists when ^  =  1. The ex tra  
power afforded by the null covenant derives from the time-inconsistency 
identified in Proposition 2. Compared for the message (W,J), the additional gain 
to  the entrepreneur from announcing (W,S) is due to the loss of market value for 
existing holders of b when projects are separated. Unlike the benefit ^(Pjq,) 
associated with an announcment of (X,J), the value of the transfer associated 
with an announcement of (W,S) is increasing in q^ . In fact, for ^  = 1 an 
announcement of (W,S) causes the market value of b to fall to  zero since Project 
1 will never be exercised.
The next proposition shows that with a  null covenant the unique equilibrium 
is a separating equilibrium where a type i  entrepreneurs separate the projects 
while type h entrepreneurs incorporate projects jointly. The result is 
essentially the asymmetric information analogue of the time-inconsistency 
analysed with symmetric information in Proposition 2 .
Proposition 6: (.4 Separating Equilibrium with 0)
I f  states are private information of entrepreneurs and Cl = {p(b),B,0 } then for  p, 
q^  and Rh sufficiently high and q/ +q/l> l  the unique equilibrium is a separating 
equilibrium where:
(i) type h entrepreneur exercise project 1 and incorporate project 2  within the 
same firm , and]
(ii) type i  entrepreneurs do not exercise project 1 and incorporate project 2  
independently o f project 1 ;
and this equilibrium is robust to the Intuitive Criterion. The equilibrium is 
represented as:
d*(h)  = (X , J ) ,  m*( I )  = (W ,S)
- B*(X, J ) = BXJ, B* ( W,S ) = B 
prob(h |d e { (X ,S ) , (W , J )} )  = tt
Premature Investment 122
where BXj  and B ensure zero expected profit for investors and it is investors' 
beliefs fo r  o ff-th e -eq u ilib r iu m  paths.
P roof: See Appendix.
3.4. Ex A nte E ffic ien t C ovenants
Given the above analysis for the two cases of CJI and 0  covenants, we now
seek to determine which of the two covenants is ex ante efficient. Clearly, the
potential for risk-shifting behaviour by entrepreneurs entering state I  will be 
anticipated a t t= l and the face value of debt, b, appropriately adjusted. 
Therefore, whether the list of covenants will or will not include joint 
incorporation depends only on the relative inefficiencies associated with each of 
the pooling and separating equilibria analysed above. We recall tha t the
inefficiencies from premature investment are given by:
= (i-q/)(Rfc-R*) + rJi-qJR'*
Inefficiencies due to the separating equilibrium of Proposition 6  are (see Lemma 
A1 in the Appendix):
A(p,q,) = q,R' + y J l-q J R '.
The first term in A(p,q,) is the inefficiency that results if Project 1 remains
in state i  and expires unexercised. The second term is the inefficiency in the 
exercise policy for Project 2  that would be avoided with the message (W,J). It is 
the same inefficiency for Project 2  that occurs with premature investment (i.e. 
message (X,J)).
The null covenant is optimal for Cx whenever A(p,qJ < ip{p ,^ ) . This 
requires:
R' < (l-q,)Rh
Hence, it is possible for asymmetric information to  lead to separate 
incorporation of projects for the same parameter values for which CJI would be 
optimal for symmetric information.
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4. C onclusions
This paper has analysed the role of asymmetric information in generating 
premature investment in the sense that projects are exercised before they reach 
their maximal NPV. We believe this is the first paper to  consider such timing 
issues as previous papers define suboptimal investment more narrowly in terms of 
whether negative NPV projects are undertaken or positive NPV projects are 
foregone.
The model assumes the entrepreneur operates two projects which are identical 
apart from independent state realisations and the fact tha t the second project 
becomes available one period after the first project. In addition, a  number of 
critical assumptions were made concerning the observability and contractibility 
of certain variables, including a  restriction that contracts to finance a  given 
project cannot be written in advance of it’s arrival. We showed tha t with 
symmetric information, joint incorporation of projects is optimal whenever this 
minimises distortions due to the under-investment problem. However, when state 
realisations are private information of the entrepreneur, covenants requiring 
joint incorporation of projects may lead to premature investment pooling 
equilibrium. On the other hand, ability to separate projects may allow the 
pooling equilibrium to  be broken. This fact then leads to  a revision of the 
conditions for which equilibrium contracts will include joint incorporation 
covenants. In essence, the equilibrium is determined by trading off the cost of 
premature investment against the efficiency cost of separate incorporation.
Clearly, the model in this paper has a number of special characteristics. The 
most important feature is the binary nature of the exercise decision which acts 
as a potential signal of quality. It is well known that pooling equilibria are 
generally not robust to extensions to continuous action space. However, the 
binary specification does seem natural in the context of an investment model. For
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example, when projects take time to build, it is not difficult to  imagine tha t 
’’precommitments” to  large projects can be reversed once the contract for the 
second project is signed.
Future research could extend the model in a  number of directions. For 
example, a  more general formulation would allow projects to  differ in terms of 
return and risk characteristics. The state space might also usefully be extended 
to  a  continuum as this would eliminate discontinuities and enable easier 
derivation of comparative statics. Another logical extension would be to  allow 
endogenous project selection.
E n d n o te s :
1 In Myers [1977] the level of debt is exogeneous to  the model. One 
interpretation is that it arises from past failures of earlier investment 
projects. On this basis it is unclear why the new project is not incorporated 
independently of the existing firm. In contrast, in this paper the level of 
debt and incorporation mode are determined endogeneously from the sequence of 
investments required for each project.
A number of potential resolutions of the Myers problem have been proposed in 
the literature, including renegotiation and financing with convertible bonds 
(Chiesa [1988]). Nevertheless, the main features of our model remain as the 
timing of investments still creates a signalling problem.
3 ,This linkage between investment decisions for Project 1 and financing terms 
for Project 2 is similar to John and Nachman [1985]. However, a  crucial 
difference is that John and Nachman require the expected return on the second 
investment to depend on the state realisation of the first investment whereas 
we don’t require this. The linkage in our paper operates through the 
under-investment problem due to outstanding debt.
4 This assumption of zero wealth is made for simplicity and is not crucial. Some 
small but positive level of wealth would not change any of the results below.
5 We could allow R*<0 if the state space were enlarged to  three or more states, 
but this should not detract from the main results.
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Setting 1 = 0  affords considerable simplification when defining the contracting 
game. If I > 0  then our assumption below that investment requirements cannot be 
contracted for prior to  their investment date would lead to  a  dynamic model 
with a  contracting game being played a t each potential investment date. The 
entrepreneur’s exercise policy for each date would then need to  be 
characterised as the equilibrium of the corresponding contracting game. 
Setting 1 = 0  reduces the number of contracting games to  one per project so that 
the exercise policy is characterised by the entrepreneur’s optimal policy 
given the initial contract.
Strictly, debt is optimal within the class of contracts with deterministic 
auditing.
If we allowed actions to be contractible then for Rh and p sufficiently high 
and qh sufficiently low it would be possible to  atta in  first-best. This 
follows since when s 12=h the opportunity cost of not exercising Project 1 is 
increasing in R*1 and p and decreasing in qh. The higher the opportunity cost 
the higher can be repayments to the investor in this state without violating 
the incentive to  exercise the project.
Since exercise decisions are binary decisions it may appear extreme to suppose 
tha t it is costly to  write contracts contingent on these decisions. One 
possible approach is to suppose that the entrepreneur also manages other 
specific assets (i.e. assets with no collateral value) which have positive 
probability of breakdowns and so requiring (unforeseen) costly repairs. It may 
then be difficult to  specify in advance how to distinguish between investments 
in repairs and investments resulting from the exercise of Project 1 . However, 
it is beyond the scope of this paper to formally model this possibility.
It is clear that this is unrestrictive with respect to  contracts giving the 
entrepreneur a credit facility (option). This is because the entrepreneur 
would only exercise the option if the face value of debt is less than in the 
market. Thus the investor would lose money. On the other hand, a  contractual 
structure which gave an investor exclusive financing rights would likely have 
problems due to strong bargaining power of the investor a t t  = 2 (A low initial 
debt being traded for the right to extract all benefits from Project 2). 
Clearly, this would be inefficient if the entrepreneur has specific 
investments which affect either the arrival probability or return  distribution 
of Project 2 . However, we do not attempt to model these effects.
That these conditions arise from the Nash equilibrium of a  Bertrand 
competition game between the two investors can be reasoned in the following 
manner. First, it is not optimal for investors to  refuse to offer if there 
exists an offer which would generate strictly positive expected profits. For, 
if all investors refuse to  make an offer, then there is an incentive for each 
investor to deviate from the equilibrium and make an offer a t positive profit. 
Second, condition (i t ) follows from the fact that the entrepreneur chooses the 
offer with lowest face value of debt, as implied by (i). While if all offers 
are identical then each investor has some probability strictly less than one 
of being chosen by the entrepreneur. Thus, any collusive strategy to hold the 
face value of debt above B* cannot be an equilibrium since each investor has 
an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium by offering a slightly lower face 
value of debt.
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Other refinements belonging to the class of equilibrium domination tests are 
also available, such as Divinity and Universal Divinity of Banks and Sobel 
[1987], but they are not explored in this paper. In general, the Intuitive 
Criterion is weaker than these other refinements. However, the reader should 
be aware tha t the forward induction arguments employed in these tests are not 
with out controversy. See, for example, Cho and Kreps [1987,p.203].
A key feature which helps the pooling equilibrium to  pass the Intuitive 
Criterion is the restricted signalling space due to  the fact tha t exercise 
decisions are binary. If the exercise decision was accompanied by an 
observable decision on the size of investment (I) then the pooling equilibrium 
will fail the Intuitive Criterion.
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A pp en d ix : Proofs 
A Formal Definition o f  the Intuitive Criterion.
The formal definition of the Intuitive Criterion requires tha t we first
define the best response set of investors. In the following tt( s ) is some
probability distribution over the states (types) s and BR(7r,dG) is the best
response by investors to  off-equilibrium message d0, given beliefs 7r about the
type of entrepreneur proposing the alternative. From condition (i i ) o f the PBE
the best response is defined as:
BR(7r,d0) a  {Be[C,oo): P(d0,B,7r) -  C =  0 }, (Al)
Given some set S’, the set of best responses is defined as the union of best
responses over all probability distributions on S’, i.e.
BR(S’,d) = M BR(7T,d)(A2)
{n.n ( s’)=l>
Finally, if (d*,B*,/i) is some PBE then we can write the equilibrium payoff for 
the entrepreneur of type s as E*(s) = E(s,d*(s),B*(d*(s))).
D efin ition: (The Intuitive Criterion)
For each out-of-equilibrium message d0 form the set T(d0) consisting o f all 
states (types) s such that
E*(s) > max E(s,d(),B). (A3)
B e B R ( S , d 0 ]
I f  fo r  any one message d0 there is some type s ’eS (necessarily not in T(d0)) such 
that
E*(s’) < m in  E(s’ ,d0 ,B) (A4)
B e B R ( s \ n d 0 ) , d 0 )
then the equilibrium outcome is said to fa il the Intuitive Criterion.
P roof for  Proposition 1 : (Seniority)
The initial contracts, Cx = {p(b1),B2,CJI} and = {^(BJjOjCJI), can each be 
associated with some corresponding date 2  contract offered by the Bertrand
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competitive investors afte r observing s=s12e{/i,£}. These are C2 =  {Bj,O,0 } and 
t 2 =  {b2,O,0 }. Since both sets {CUC2} and { t u t 2} imply zero expected profits for 
investors the ranking of Cx relative to will be strict if, and only if, 
t 2} leads to  greater distortions in the entrepreneur’s exercise policy than 
{ C M .  By Lemmas 1 and 2  this will be true if there exist param eters such tha t 
b i+ B 2 < R^+R* < Bi + b2. (The value of t = 2  debt for sl2=k is irrelevant since Bj < 
B2 and b2 < b2). Such an inequality ranking is feasible if bx+B2 < B4 + b2 for all 
param eter values. This la ter inequality can be proved for all p and q / as 
follows. Assume max{b!+B2, B j+b2} < R**+R< so that both sets of contracts induce 
the same distortion. By Lemma 1 all debt is fully repaid unless
si2=si3=s23=s24=^* When this worst outcome occurs the senior debt pays R* while 
the junior debt pays zero. But a t t= l the market values of bx and Bx must be 
equal to  each other, so that:
( l - a j b i  + a.O = C = ( l-a J B j + aR*, (A5)
where a  = prob(s12=s13=s23=s24=€) = y j  is the unconditional probability of the
worst outcome. Similarly, a t t=2 the market values of b2 and B2 are equal:
( l- /? )b 2 + 0.0 = C = (1 -/?)B2 + /?R', (A6 )
where (3 = prob(s13=s23=s24=€ | s12=£) = q^yu is the probability of the worst
outcome conditional on being in the low state at t=2. Rearranging (A5) and (A6 ) 
and using the fact tha t ol<(3 we have b!+B2 < Bj + b^, as desired.
Q.E.D.
P ro o f  fo r  P ro p o sitio n  2 : (Tim e-Inconsistency)
The ex ante optimal covenant on incorporation, u2, will minimise distortion 
to  the entrepreneur’s investment policy. The total NPV with CSI is 2 EX where 
is given by (6 ). The sufficiency of bj+B^RN-R' for CJI is obvious by comparing 
this with the values given in Lemmas 1 and 2 (since B2 < B2 implies to ta l debt is 
highest in state i) .  That optimality of CJI also implies b!+B2 < Rft+R* can be 
shown by contradiction. Suppose b^B^ > Rh+R*, so tha t the entrepreneur’s
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expected return is E(b1+B2 >Rh+R/,CJI), as defined by (8 ). Joint incorporation is 
optimal provided E(b1+B2 >Rh+R/,CJI) > 2EV After some manipulation, this 
inequality reduces to R/ > ( l - y u)R/l, which contradicts the assumption tha t 
projects are individually profitable, i.e. ( l - y tt)Rh >C and C>R* by (1 ). Hence, 
with symmetric information, bj+Bj < R^+R* is necessary and sufficient for u2 =  CJI 
to  be ex ante optimal.
It remains to determine whether a  CJI covenant in Cx binds ex post. In sta te  
s 12 = h the firm would not separate projects because the immediate exercise of 
Project 1 yields revenue of Rh >Bj which reduces the effective debt burden on 
Project 2 to F2 = b^B^-R^. Thus, F2 < R* since b^B ^ < bi+B^ < Rft+R*. Hence, 
with CJI and sl2=h the exercise decisions d23 and d24 will be first-best. In 
sta te  S12 — I  there may be incentives to separate due to  the transfer in value from 
debt holders to  equity holders (the entrepreneur). Let P2(b1,S,s12 = £) and 
P2 (bi,J,s12 = £) be the date 2  market values of bj conditional on separation (S) 
and non-separation (J) and s12 = ^. Also let V2(S,s12 = £) and V2(J,s12 = £) be the 
corresponding intrinsic values of the firm. P2(b1,S,s12 = £) = ( l - q j b i  since with
separation the entrepreneur defaults on bx unless Project 1 transfers into state
h a t t=3. Similarly, P2(t>i>«Mi2 = ^) = ( l- ^ T u jb i  for non-separation. The combined 
intrinsic value of the two separated projects is V2(S,s12 = ^) = ( l - q J R ft + 
where is the value of Project 2 , as in (6 ). Using the exercise policies from 
Lemma 1 it is straight forward to verify
v2(J,su=<) = q,(i-r„)(RA+R') + (i-q,){(i-r„)2R'‘ + r«(Rfc+R‘)} - c
The benefit to the entrepreneur from separation is P2(b1,J,s12 = £ ) - P 2(b1,S,s12 = £)
> 0  (the fall in the market value of debt) and the cost is
V2(J ,si2 = * )-V 2(S,s12 = *) > 0 . Taking limits as p-*l we find lim
P2(b1,J,s12 = £ )-  P2(b1,S,s12 — t)  = q ,b j and lim V2(J,s12 = -6 ) -V 2(S,s12 = ^) = q^*.
Since bj > C > R* we have proved that there exists a p e (0 ,l)  such tha t for all p
> p the entrepreneur has an incentive ex post to separate projects. All this has
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assumed < R^+R*, but given that the above limits don’t involve Rfc we can
always choose Rh sufficiently high to ensure the inequality holds.
Q.E.D.
P ro o f fo r  P ro p o sitio n  3: (Premature Investment Pooling Equilibrium)
Existence of pooling equilibria d*=X, B*(X)=Bp for some n  requires tha t the 
following incentive compatibility (IC) and non-separation (NS) constraints be 
satisfied:
E(s,X,BP) > E(s,W,B^(7r)) for all se{A,£} (IC)
E(A,X,BP) > E(fc,X,B*) (NS1 )
E(^,X,Bp) > E(^,W,B^) (NS2)
where Bp and B^(7r) each imply zero expected profits for investors and the pair 
(Bj^Bjp) proposed by a deviating investor imply non-negative profits for that 
investor. It is straight forward to  show tha t any pair (B^Bjp) violating either 
(NS1 ) or (NS2 ) also implies negative profits. Given d* = X for all entrepreneur 
types, the deviating investor makes zero profit on B^ and can only make 
non-negative profit if B^>Bp. However, violation of (NS1) would require B*<Bp! 
The final part of the existence proof requires that there exist some n  such that 
(IC) holds. This is effectively proved in the proof for Proposition 4 on the 
Intuitive Criterion.
Uniqueness of the equilibrium for some param eter values requires tha t we show 
non-existence of a separating equilibrium where d*(h)=X and d*(£)=W. The proof is 
by contradiction. A necessary condition for the separating equilibrium to exist 
is the tru th-telling  constraint for type I:
E(£,W,B*(W)) > E(e,X,B*(X)). (A7)
Suppose B*(W) = B*(X) = $. Then the LHS and RHS of (A7) would differ only to  the 
extent tha t early exercise in state i  is inefficient. This inefficiency becomes 
arb itrarily  small as q,-»l i.e. lim E(€,W,§)-E(€,X,fi) = 0 . But since the proposedq^ -> 1
separating equilibrium is fully revealing we know from Section 2 .2  tha t B*(X) = C
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(i.e. when sl2=h debt is riskless) and B*(W) = B2 > C for all q / e ( 0 ,l]. Hence
lim  E(£,W,B2 )-E(£,X,C) < 0 , so tha t there exists a  q such tha t (A7) fails to  holdq -^M
for all q/ > q.
Q.E.D.
P ro o f  fo r  P ro p o sitio n  4:
This proof makes use of the Intuitive Criterion as described a t the beginning
of the appendix. The equilibrium strategy is d*=X and so the off-equilibrium
strategy  is d0=W. The proof begins with a  conjecture that d0 is equilibrium
dominated by d* when s—h but not with s=€. i.e. in terms of our earlier
definitions for the Intuitive Criterion we have T(d0 )={A} and S\T(d0)={£}. We
then derive the implications of conditions (A3) and (A4) of the Intuitive
Criterion and verify the existence of parameter values for which the proposed
equilibrium passes the Intuitive Criterion.
Since the entrepreneur’s future exercise decisions are a  function of to ta l
debt outstanding, the investors’ expected gross return is not everywhere
continuously differentiable with respect to B (investors’ response). In
particular, from Lemmas 1 and 2  there is a discontinuity in P(d,B,7r) a t
B = Rfc+R*-b. Nevertheless, we avoid this problem by showing existence for
B < RN-R'-b. For this case, P(d,B,7r) is strictly increasing in B and so from (Al)
the best response, BR(7r,d0), is a unique function of it. Since d0=W, we denote the
best response function as B^(7r), where ir is the investor’s belief tha t type h
sent message d0 = W. Also, since debt issued on Project 2 is senior to debt b, the
face value Bw(n) can easily be computed using the following fact: For senior debt
with face value B the market value is:
P(d,B,7r) = (l-y)B  + yR', (A8 )
where y  is the belief of investors about the probability of default. For the
off-equilibrium deviation we write y  =  y^(7r), where
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Twin)  =  prob(s23=s24=€)[7rprob(s13= € |s12=/i) + (l-7r)prob(s13= £ |s 12=€)]
= T tM l-q * ) + (l-7T)q/l- (A9)
For the proposed equilibrium we write y  = yP, where 
y P =  prob(s23=s24=£)prob(s12=£)
=  Ttt(l-P)- (A10)
Using (A8 ) with P(W,BlF(7r),7r) =  C we find dB^(^)/d^ < 0  provided q/+ q^> l.
We are now in a position to  consider condition (A3) of the Intuitive
Criterion. Since E(s,W,B^(7r)) is decreasing in B ^tf) and d&w{n)l&K < 0, it
follows that max E(s,W,B^(^)) = E(s,W,B^(l)). In summary, when q/+q* > 1 and
7 T e [ 0 , l ]
b+Bjy(l) < Rh+R*, our conjecture that dQ=W is equilibrium dominated only ii s = h 
requires:
E*(h) > E(A,W,B^(1 )) (All)
and
E*{i) < E(f,W,B^(l)) (A12)
Finally, to  obtain the full set of constraints we must consider (A4).
Concentrating beliefs on S\T(W)={£} implies that we set n=0. Thus, from (A4) a 
further necessary condition for the equilibrium outcome to  pass the Intuitive 
Criterion test is:
E*(l) > E(€,W,B^(0)) (A13)
We now wish to show tha t there exist parameters for which max{BP,B^(l)}<R^+R/ - b  
and (A11)-(A13) are satisfied. From (A9) and (A10) we see tha t the q/ > l - p > l- q ^  
implies jwi  1) < Tp < Yw'(O)- Using (A8 ) with P(d,B,7r) = C this in turn implies
Bj^(l) < Bp < B^(0 ). (A15)
i.e. high default probability implies high face value of debt. Clearly, B ^ l)  < 
Bp is a sufficient condition for (A1 2 ) since in this case the deviation d^ = W by 
type i  implies both an efficiency gain and lower debt. By using the exercise 
rules of Lemma 1 the remaining two inequalities, (All) and (A13), can be 
evaluated as:
(l-r„(0))B,,,(0) -  (l-Tu)Bp > ( l - q ^ R * )  (AH’)
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and
Bp -  (l-rn '(l))Bn'(l) < (l-qj.WR'*), (A13’)
where <5(Rft) =  y JR ^ + R '-b )  + ( l-T u X ^ -R ')-
(A9) and (A15) imply tha t the LHS of (A13’) is positive. Using (A8 ) and (A9) it 
is also straight forward to that there exists a q < l  such tha t the LHS of (AH’) 
is positive for <L>q. Also, the LHS of (A ll’) and (A13’) are both independent of 
Rh. Therefore, it is possible to satisfy both (A ll’) and (A13’) by choosing q/ 
and Rh sufficiently high. Thus, there exist param eter values for which the 
pooling equilibrium passes the test of the Intuitive Criterion.
Q.E.D.
Proof for  Proposition 5: (No Premature Investment)
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there did exist a  pooling equilibrium 
with d*(s) = (X,J) for s e{A,£}. The set of possible deviations is D =
{(W,J),(X,S),(W,S)}. The following incentive constraint is a  necessary condition 
for the proposed pooling equilibrium to exist:
E(s,(X,J),BP) > maxdeD E(s,d,B*(d,7r)) for all se{A,€} (A16)
As before, when d = (W,J) an important determinant of investors’ offers are their 
beliefs, n. However, investors’ beliefs are irrelevant for messages (X,S) and 
(W,S) since separate incorporation of Project 2  implies tha t the face value of 
debt to be issued is independent of Project l ’s state. For these two cases let B 
be the face value of debt to  finance Project 2  with zero expected profits for 
investors. Clearly, E(£,(W,S),B) > E(€,(X,S),B), since waiting is more efficient 
for type I.
We wish to show tha t p > R'/C implies E(£,(W,S),B) > E(£,(X,J),Bp), so that 
the necessary condition (A16) is violated. This can be proved by using the 
following equations:
E^,(W,S),B) = (l-q,)(RA- b )  + E„
E(«,(X,J),BP) =  ( l-y „)(R ',+R '-B P-b ) ,  and
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b  ,
l - T u ( l - P )
where Ej is defined by (6 ) and BP is as previously defined (using (A8 ) and 
(A1 0 )). Also, the value of the failure probability in b, y u(l-p ) , assumes the 
pooling equilibrium exists. After some manipulation we find tha t E(£,(W,S),B) > 
E(€,(X,J),BP) is equivalent to:
q ^ R '-p C )  < ( l - q ) [ ( l - T.(l-p))R * -  R'] (A17)
The RHS of (A17) is positive since ( l - y tt(l-p))R* > ( l - y ^ R *1 > C > R*, where the 
middle inequality follows from the existence of a  credit market for individual 
projects. In contrast, the LHS of (A17) is negative if p > R'/C. Thus, p > R*/C 
is a sufficient (but not necessary condition) for the pooling equilibrium to  not 
exist.
Q.E.D.
Proof for  Proposition 6: (A Separating Equilibrium with 0)
E xistence. The proposed equilibrium strategies for the entrepreneur are d*(h) 
= (X,J) and d *{i) — (W,S), which leaves {(W,J),(X,S)} as the set of
off-equilibrium strategies. Denoting E*(s) = E(s,d*(s),B*(d*)) the proposed
separating equilibrium requires the following self-selection and non-pooling 
constraints be satisfied:
(self-selection) E*(s) > maxdtED E(s,d,B*(d,7r)) for all se{h ,l}
(non-pooling) E*(s) > maxdeD E(s,d,Bp(d)) for some se{A,£}
where BJ,(d) is investors best response if entrepreneurs were pooling a t d.
We begin with the self-selection constraints. Suppose type i  receive 
actuarily fair terms, so that B*(W,S) = B where p{l,{W,S),B) = C. Then the type i  
entrepreneur’s to tal expected return is the sum of return on Project 1 , 
( l-q J (R ft- b ) ,  and return on Project 2 , EL. i.e. E*(£) = ( l-q /)(R/l- b )  + Ex. Also, 
letting B^j be the investors response to  message (X,J), we can compute
-b ) .  The self-selection constraint for type i
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requires E*(€) > E(^,(X,J),B^j). Some manipulation shows tha t the constraint is 
satisfied provided
n * C -  ( l -q ,)(R»-R<)  -  q.p(b-R')
° XJ ~  l - q , ( l - p )
However, Bertrand competition implies actuarily fair terms for type h
entrepreneurs, i.e. p(/t,(X,J),B*j) = C. Hence, B^j =  C since we assume b + B ^  <
R^+R*. Thus, if we define
Bv,  -  maxtC  C -  ( H ) ( R M < )  -  q , p( b- RM1 uXJ -  ma x ^ ,  1 _  q , ( l - p ) >'
then there exists some p such that BXj  = C and for all p > p  the Bertrand equilibrium 
exists. Note also tha t for p > p  the definition of B^j ensures type h will
self-select (X,J) rather than (W,S).
Now consider the off-equilibrium strategies {(W,J),(X,S)}. For d0 =  (X,S) the 
separation of projects implies that investors’ best response is B, which is
independent of their beliefs, n. Thus, using efficiency arguments we can readily 
establish E*(s) > E(s,(X,S),B) for all s. For d0 = (W,J) we can show the proposed 
equilibrium passes the Intuitive Criterion for p sufficiently high. First, for p 
sufficiently high we have Y$Xj = C and, since waiting is inefficient for type h 
and feasibility requires B(W,J,7r) > C, we also have E *(h) >
max E(/i,(W,J),B(W,J,tt)). Therefore, concentrating beliefs leads to  n = 0 . As in
r r e [ 0 , l ]
the proof to  Proposition 4 the assumption q^+qft>l implies B(W,J,7r) is decreasing 
in 7r (Note tha t B(W,J,7r) is identical to B^(7r) of Proof 4) . Hence we need only 
show E*(^) > E(£,(W,J),B(W,J,0 )). Using the equation for E(^,(W,J),B^(0)) from 
Proof 4 we find tha t the previous inequality requires ( l - y u)b > 
(l + (l-q^)(l-p))R /. This is true in the limit as p-»l since the LHS becomes b, the 
RHS becomes R*, and b> C > R /.
Finally, we need to check the non-pooling constraints. These require tha t we 
show for each of the four possible pooling equilibria there is a t least one 
entrepreneur type which prefers the proposed separating equilibrium. This is 
trivial to  prove since for p sufficiently large we have B*j = C and so a  type h
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entrepreneur receives the maximum feasible return. No pooling equilibrium could 
ever have debt less than C.
Uniqueness. We have shown that the pooling equilibrium will not exist for p
and q, sufficiently high. It remains therefore to show tha t the separating
equilibrium d*(A) = (X,J) and d*(£) = (W,J) does not exist. The proof is by
contradiction. A necessary condition for the CJI separating equilibrium to  exist
is E(£,(W,J),B*(W,J)) > E(£,(W,S),B). But since the proposed equilibrium is fully 
revealing, we have B*(W,J) = B2 as defined in Section 2.2. But this is precisely 
the combination of debt levels that were used in Proposition 2  to  prove the 
time-inconsistency problem. Hence, the proposed alternative separating 
equilibrium does not exist.
Q.E.D.
Lemma A l:
Let E ^  and Ef^ be the entrepreneur’s t = l  expected return conditional on the t = 2  
equilibria being pooling and separating, respectively. Using the analysis from 
earlier proofs we compute:
E f  = (1+p -  r«)R'“ + (l-p)(l+pq,)R ' -  2C 
= E1(F<RI*+R',CJI) -  (l-p)i/>(p,qi )
E f  =  2 (1  -  yJR * + py„R' -  2 C 
= E1(F<R',+R',CJI) -  (l-pW p.q ,) 
where E1(F<R^+R',CJI) is defined in (8 ).
Premature Investment 137
R eferen ce s:
Banks, J., and J. Sobel, 1987, "Equilibrium Selection in Signalling Gaines”, 
Econometrica, 55, 647-661.
Berkovitz, E.,and E.H. Kim, 1990, "Financial Contracting and Leverage Induced 
O ver- and Under-Investment Incentives”, Journal o f Finance, XLV, 765-794.
Chiesa, G., 1988, "Debt and Warrants: A Rationalisation of the Popular View”, 
Discussion Paper 46, Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics.
Cho, I., and D. Kreps, 1987, "Signalling Games and Stable Equilibria”, Quarterly 
Journal o f Economics, 1 0 2 , 197-221.
Dewatripont, M., and E. Maskin, 1989, "Credit and Efficiency in Centralised and 
Decentralised Economies,” mimeo, October.
Gale, D., and M. Hellwig, 1985, "Incentive Compatible Debt Contracts: The 
One-Period Problem”, Review o f Economic Studies, 52, 647-665.
Grossman, S., and O. Hart, 1986, "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory 
of Vertical and Lateral Integration”, Journal o f Political Economy, 94, 
691-719.
Hansen, E.W., 1991, "Venture Capital Finance with Temporary Asymmetric Learning,” 
Discussion Paper 112, Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics.
Hart, O., and J. Moore, 1988, ’’Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm”, 
Discussion Paper TE/88/174, STICERD, London School of Economics.
Hart, O., and J. Moore, 1990, ”A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on 
the Seniority of Claims,” Discussion Paper TE/90/217, STICERD, London School 
of Economics.
Jensen, M.C., and W.H. Meckling, 1976, ’Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Capital Structure”, Journal o f Financial Economics, 2, 
305-360.
John, K., and D.C. Nachman, 1985, ’’Risky Debt, Investment Incentives, and 
Reputation in a Sequential Equilibrium”, Journal of Finance, XL, 863-881
Myers, S.C., 1977, ’’Determinants of Corporate Borrowing”, Journal o f Financial 
Economics, 5, 147-175.
Myers, S.C., and N. Majluf, 1984, ’’Stock Issues and Investment Policy When Firms 
Have Information that Investors Do Not Have”, Journal o f Financial Economics, 
13, 187-221.
Shah, S., and A.V. Thakor, 1987, ’’Optimal Capital Structure and Project 
Financing”, Journal o f Economic Theory, 42, 209-243.
Townsend, R., 1979, ’’Optimal Contracts With Costly-State Verification,” Journal
Premature Investment 138
of Economic Theory, 2 0 , 265-293.
Webb, D.C., 1991, "Asymmetric Information and the Trade-O ff Between Cash Flow and 
Net Present Value,” Discussion Paper 117, Financial Markets Group, London 
School o f Economics.
CHAPTER FOUR:
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF COLLATERAL
EVIDENCE FROM THE 31 SAMPLE
3* Evidence 140
This paper has two main objectives. The first is to  characterise the capital 
structure of high growth entrepreneurial companies. The second objective relates 
to  the literature on collateral and risk. Some theoretical models predict a 
positive relation between collateral and risk, while others predict a  negative 
relation. We undertake a  range of econometric tests on this issue and find, 
contrary to  other recent studies, that there is no significant association 
between collateral and risk.
The data analysed in this paper are from a group of companies who have been 
financed by a leading U.K. venture capital company, 3* PLC. Our balance sheet 
data are  unique since previous studies of venture capital and project finance 
have relied on survey methods (e.g. Dixon [1989], Gorman and Sahlman [1988] and 
MacMillan et. al. [1989]). Also, these studies have focused on the venture 
capital process: investment appraisal, project selection, the extent of ex post 
involvement by venture capitalists, and portfolio performance. In contrast, our 
analysis focuses on the financial policies of companies. The main findings for 
the descriptive part of the paper can be summarised as follows:
(1) Both the in itia l capital structure a t s ta rt-up  and subsequent financing is 
dominated by debt claims, rather than equity.
(2) The venture capitalist holds a significant proportion of equity claims, 
though rarely obtains majority voting rights. The most im portant equity 
instrument for the venture capitalist is cumulative and participating 
Preferrred Ordinary shares. The venture capitalist also provides 
significant amounts of unsecured debt at s ta rt-up , but is a  much less 
important source thereafter.
(3) On the basis tha t the entrepreneur and associated company are separate and 
distinct legal entities, we find that a significant proportion of the 
average company’s debt claims are held by the entrepreneur. Typically, the 
entrepreneur’s debt holdings are similar in magnitude to  tha t of the 
venture capitalist. If it is true that the underlying source of these 
loans are bank loans secured on personal assets, then this implies that
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collateral has an important role in project finance.
The paper is organised into 7 sections. The next section briefly discusses 
the nature of venture capitalism and highlights the differences between young 
entrepreneurial companies and more mature publicly listed companies. Section 2 
describes the nature of our data. Section 3 analyses the capital and ownership 
structure of companies a t s tart-up , while Section 4 takes an incremental approach 
to  gross sources of finance and provides comparisons with UK publicly listed 
companies. Both Sections 3 and 4 find an important role for collateral in project 
finance, providing the basis for an analysis of the collateral-risk relation in 
Section 5. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 7.
1. The Nature o f  V enture Capitalism
The practitioner oriented literature describes venture capitalism as the 
process by which investors seek capital gain by providing both equity capital and 
business expertise to young, unquoted firms. According to  the British Venture 
Capital Association’s (BVCA) Report on Investment Activity [1989b,App.2] this 
description includes: finance for seed capital and business s tart-ups requiring 
product development; initial marketing and commercial manufacturing and sales 
expenses; finance for growth and expansion of companies beginning to  trade 
profitably; finance for the restructuring of poor performers; and finance for 
management buy-outs and buy-ins. In this section, however, the term venture 
capital refers to  s ta rt-u p  and other early stage financing. We do not 
specifically discuss expansion financing, restructuring, or management buy-outs 
and buy-ins because we wish to bring into sharp focus the essential nature of 
venture capitalism! The purpose of this section is to  discuss a number of key 
characteristics of venture capitalism in general. In particular, we argue that 
intensive pre-contract screening overcomes any ex ante asymmetric information, so 
tha t a key characteristic of venture capital and project finance is learning as
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the project develops.
A key feature of all new investments is th a t their profitability is 
inherently uncertain. Sources of uncertainty include incomplete information about 
the price elasticity of demand for a new product, the development and production 
cost of the product, and the overall level of skill of the entrepreneur or 
management team. For the venture capitalist (VC), financing early-stage 
investments is more risky than other investments because these firms typically 
have very little collaterisable assets relative to  the size of the proposed 
investment. Also, because their proposed investment project dominates the 
existing business, past performance may provide little guidance to  future 
performance. More mature firms will have assets in place generating a  positive 
cash flow which may be used to  partially finance the s ta rt-u p  phase of new 
projects. Thus, the VC’s return on an individual entrepreneur depends almost 
entirely on the success or failure of the new project. This is true irrespective 
of whether the financial contract is a debt or equity contract.
Given the level and types of risk encountered, the VC is likely to  develop 
specialised methods of investment appraisal and some form of continuing 
involvement afte r the initial investment. Typically, the VC operates an intensive 
screening procedure involving industrial ’’sector experts” and financial experts. 
For R&D type projects the VC may also commission reports from scientists in the 
academic community (Lorenz [1985,p.70]). In addition to  the project itself, the 
past experience and record of the entrepreneur or management team is also 
assessed. The high intensity of the screening process is illustrated by survey 
results reported tha t on average in the U.K. only 3.4 per cent of proposals to 
VC’s obtained funds (Dixon [1989,p.l3]). It would appear, therefore, tha t the VC 
will know almost as much, if not more, than the entrepreneur about prospects for 
success. On this basis, it seems reasonable to rule out any role for adverse 
selection generally, and signalling in particular, in the analysis of capital 
structure a t start-up .
Screening, however, does not eliminate the underlying risk. Some
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uncertainties can only ever be resolved by undertaking and developing the 
project. Thus, it is in the nature of early-stage investments tha t much 
information about the viability of a  project becomes available during the 
development and initial marketing phases. The degree of involvement of the VC is 
likely to  reflect the most important sources of risk. At one end of the scale 
there is the ‘hands-on’ fund, which forms a regular working partnership with the 
entrepreneur and has representation on the board. At the other extreme is the 
‘hands-off’ fund which is entirely passive following the initial investment. In 
between these extremes are ‘reactive’ and ‘eyes-on’ funds. These funds require 
financial statements a t more regular intervals than do ‘hands-off’ funds. In 
addition, the ‘reactive’ VC may have board representation and will have the right 
to be consulted on key decisions, such as major capital expenditure, acquisitions 
and board appointments (Lorenz [1985,p.71-2]).
As described a t the beginning of this section, there is a  popular perception 
that, in addition to finance, VC’s often contribute valuable business experience 
through a hands-on approach. However, a survey of the U.S. venture capital 
industry by Gorman and Sahlman [1988] finds that even for early -stage investments 
the average VC spends only around two hours per week in direct contact by phone 
or visiting the entrepreneur. Gorman and Sahlman conclude tha t this finding does 
not support the view that VC’s are deeply involved on a d ay -to -d a y  basis in their 
portfolio companies. Rather, a VC might be better described as a  conglomerate 
company which undertakes a primarily monitoring role. It thus appears tha t the 
VC’s business experience, though probably important for the initial screening and 
subsequent monitoring of projects, is not an important ingredient in the 
d ay -to -d ay  operations of their portfolio companies.
The key feature of venture capitalism, therefore, is the flow of information 
generated during the early stages of development. Clearly, there are  many forms 
this information can take, but a useful generic distinction can be made between 
information on the quality of management and information on product development 
and performance. In general, we would expect contracts between VC’s and their
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portfolio companies to  differ according to which of the two cases is most 
important for the learning process. If the possibility of ineffective senior 
management is thought to be more important, we would predict th a t the VC will 
wish to  acquire specific control rights, such as the right to  fire senior 
management. This is supported by the survey evidence2 of Gorman and Sahlman and 
Tyebjee and Bruno [1984], and has been modelled theoretically by Chan, Siegel and 
Thakor [1990]. Chan et. al. develop a two-period model of moral hazard where both 
parties learn about the entrepreneur’s level of management skill. Implicitly, the 
VC is closely involved in the project so that information is distributed 
symmetrically throughout the development phase. In this passive learning model 
the optimal equilibrium contract is for the VC to have a  risky share of the firm. 
The contract also allows for the VC to buy-out the entrepreneur if the revealed 
level of entrepreneurial skill is below some critical value.
The case of delayed or unsuccessful product development is studied in 
chapter two of this thesis (Hansen [1991]). In this model the VC monitors the 
project but is not intimately involved with it. Consequently, the initial 
situation of symmetric information may become one of asymmetric information as 
the entrepreneur gains an informational advantage during development. The task 
for the VC is to limit investment losses by designing contracts which induce the 
entrepreneur to  truthfully reveal bad news a t the earliest possible date. Hansen 
[1991a] shows that the potential for truthful revelation can be enhanced by 
including convertible and redeemable preference shares in the capital structure. 
The use of these types of instruments is supported by survey evidence (Tyebjee 
and Bruno [1984]) and also by the evidence presented below.
In conclusion, therefore, survey evidence of venture capital contracts 
generally support theoretical models where learning is important. Implicitly, 
these models assume the screening process is highly successful so that 
information is initially distributed symmetrically. In the following analysis we 
assume s ta rt-u p  projects are characterised by symmetric information.
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2. The 3z Sample
The results reported in this paper are based on a  sample of firms receiving 
finance from 3* PLC during 1979 to  1989. 3z, formerly Investors in Industry, is 
an independent unquoted company owned by the Bank of England and the G earing 
Banks. When originally incorporated, the primary role of Investors in Industry 
was to  remedy a perceived market failure by providing long-term  debt to  finance 
investment capital for small firms? Since 1979 3z has also provided equity 
capital and is now the largest member of the British Venture Capital Association 
(BVCA) with around £4 billion invested in 5000 companies (BVCA [1989a,p.62]). In 
1989 3i invested £406 million^ accounting for 29 per cent by value of all
investments reported by BVCA members (BVCA [1989b,p.13]).
In terms of its degree of post-investment involvement 3z can be classified 
as either a ‘hands-off’ or ‘eyes-on’ fund. In part, this continuation of the 
passive approach associated with 3z’s earlier role of providing longt-term  debt 
finance. But it also reflects the diversification of idiosyncratic risk obtained
from 3z’s large investment portfolio. This contrasts with many other venture 
capitalists, whose smaller portfolios make more a ttractive a  strategy of close 
involvement in order to reduce non-systematic portfolio risk. In addition, the 
lower costs associated with their passive approach enables 3z to apply slightly 
less restrictive screening criteria, in terms of both minimum investment size and 
upside potential, than would be the case for many venture capitalists. For
example, in 1989 the average value per investment by 3z was approximately £500 
000, which is one third less than the £750 000 average for all BVCA members (BVCA 
[1989b,p.13]).
The original sample obtained from 3z included investments ranging from
sta rt-u p  capital through to management buy-outs and buy-ins in all sectors of the 
economy and in many countries (particularly the U.K., E.E.C., and U.S.A.). 
However, for the purposes of this paper we deleted all companies whose accounts 
were reported in currencies other than the pound sterling. Management buy-outs
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and buy-ins (approximately 800 companies) were also eliminated from the data  set. 
But it was not possible to further classify between seed, s ta rt-u p  and expansion 
financing. Also eliminated were companies tha t changed their balance date, or had 
subsidiaries which could not be separately identified. Finally, due to  the late 
1970s shift in operating policy towards venture capital activity, the sample 
includes only those companies who received their first tranche of funds during 
1979-1989. As a result of the above adjustments we obtained an unbalanced panel 
of 9244 records on 1476 companies.
The data  are annual balance sheet records plus some additional information 
such as industry code and the date of the first investment by 3i. Figure 2.1 
illustrates the convention we have followed. In general, the date of initial 
investment by 3i, referred to as the ‘s ta rt-u p ’ date, does not correspond to  the 
first balance date. For this reason the first observation following sta rt-up , 
being less than 12 months for most companies, is referred to  as the end of year 
0. It is used as a proxy for the position of the company a t s ta rt-u p  (after 3i 
investment). For about one half of the companies year 0 is also the first record 
in the data. However, for some companies the data  also includes one or more 
balance dates prior to the first 3i investment. These dates are referred to  as 
years -1, -2 , and so on.
Background summary statistics are reported in Tables 2.1-2.4. Tables 2.1 and
2.2 report the number of start-ups for each year during 1979-89 and industry 
classifications, respectively. Table 2.3 reports the number of observations
Figure 2.1
’’ y e a r  0 ” 
l a s t  r e c o r d  f i r s t  r e c o r d
b e f o r  e 3i  a f t e r  3i
i n v e s t m e n t  i n v e s t m e n t
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available on companies by length of relationship (in years). Because of on-going 
investments a t the end of the sample it is not possible to  compute the average 
years to  m aturity of the investments. However, Table 2.3 does show tha t 25 per 
cent of investments were terminated by the end of the second full year and th a t 
only 50 per cent of the investments were on-going a t the end of year 5. The data  
do not provide information on the reason for a company’s exit. But given a 
reported investment horizon of around 7 years for the U.K. venture capital 
industry (Dixon [1989,p.14]) it is reasonable to suppose tha t most terminations 
during the first 2-3 years represent investment failures. Finally, Table 2.4 
reports tha t the sample of start-ups has an average turnover of 7.7 million
pounds (1985 prices) and an average book-value of fixed assets of 3.2 million
pounds. However, the size distribution for turnover is weighted to  the low end 
with nearly 80 per cent of start-ups having turnover of 4 million pounds or less. 
The annual average growth rate and standard deviation in real sales is 11.8 per 
cent and 46.6 per cent, respectively.
As a  m atter of notation, it is important to distinguish the entrepreneur 
from his or her company, which is a separate legal entity. For example, we will 
later refer to  the entrepreneur’s loans to the company in the same manner in 
which we refer to  3i’s debt claims on the company. In addition, many sta rt-ups 
are undertaken by a  team of two, three or four entrepreneurs and so references to  
’’the entrepreneur” should also be read as referring to  ’’the entrepreneurial 
team”.
3. Capital and O w nership Structure at Start-up
In this section we characterise capital structure features of companies
based on their book values at s tart-up  (i.e. year 0). The analysis begins with a
broad overview in terms of debt and equity and then proceeds with a more in-depth 
analysis of debt claims and of hybrid equity instruments. This is then followed 
by a summary of the main features and a discussion of capital structure theories.
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3.1. Debt versus Equity: An Overview
Table 3.1 presents a  breakdown of financial structure in terms of equity and 
fixed commitments. Fixed commitments are defined as sh o rt-  and long-term  debt and 
fixed-dividend shares. Equity includes all other instruments (see below), but 
excludes retained earnings. The table shows tha t on average equity accounts for 
about 18 per cent of to tal claims. However, the standard deviation of 23 per cent 
implies substantial variation across companies. In terms of ownership, 3* held an 
equity stake in one-half of all firms in the sample. For this half the 3* holding 
amounts to an average of 21 per cent of total issued equity, though in 14 per 
cent of companies 3* held majority voting rights. Profits participation rights 
for 3i were included in nearly all deals involving equity participation by 3i. In 
addition to  equity claims, 3t held fixed-commitment claims in nearly 9 out of 
every 10 companies, accounting for a conditional average of 30 per cent of such 
claims outstanding.
The broad picture, therefore, is tha t in book value terms most companies are 
operating with gearing (debt/to tal claims ratio) of between 60-100 per cent. 3i 
holds a significant proportion of both debt and equity claims, though rarely more 
than 50 per cent. The above analysis also finds tha t 3* held equity claims in 
approximately one half of the sample. To assess the extent of difference between 
companies with and without 3i equity claims, Table 3.2 provides a number of 
summary statistics, including average fixed assets and sales a t s ta rt-u p  and the 
ra te  of growth of sales. The table shows that on average companies receiving 
equity finance were smaller a t start-up , particularly in terms of fixed assets, 
but experienced higher rates of growth. Figure 3.1 shows th a t the higher growth 
in real sales for companies receiving equity participation by 3i is concentrated 
in the first one or two years. Thereafter, the average ra te  of growth more or 
less converges, with both groups experiencing a marked fall off in growth rates 
during years 4 to 6.
Assessing differences in riskiness across the two groups of companies is 
complicated by the disappearance of companies from the data  set. A complete
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analysis would require specification of distribution functions with mass points 
representing companies which have disappeared from the sample. We neglect these 
issues, however, and instead compute just two crude measures of risk. The first 
measure involves a  comparison of the rate a t which companies disappear from the 
sample. Table 3.2 shows tha t the proportion of the sample accounted for by the 3t 
equity group falls only slightly from 49.1 per cent a t s ta rt-u p  to  47.9 per cent 
in year 5. Thus, risk of a  to tal investment failure leading to  liquidation of the 
company appears similar across both groups. The second measure of risk is the 
standard deviation of real sales growth, which is reported in Figure 3.2. by age 
of investment. Apart from year 1, standard deviations for the two groups have 
similar profiles, with the group receiving 3i equity contributions having 
slightly lower standard deviation in most years. In summary, therefore, the data  
does not suggest that companies receiving equity finance are riskier than those 
receiving only debt finance. More significant distinguishing characteristics are 
the lower stock of fixed assets a t s ta rt-up  and the higher rates of sales growth 
during years 1 and 2.
In the next two subsections we go beyond the above generic analysis to 
consider in more detail the types of securities on issue. We begin with debt in 
Section 3.2, followed by hybrid equity instruments in Section 3.3. The key 
characteristics we identify are then related to theories of capital structure in 
Section 3.4.
3.2. Debt
Table 3.3 provides a disaggregated view of financial structure a t s ta rt-up . 
The table shows tha t debt accounts for 80 per cent of to tal claims and that, as 
with the broader class of fixed commitments, 3i is a major provider of debt 
finance. Conversations with 3i reveal that these loans are typically unsecured 
and have maturities of several years (though these characteristics cannot be 
identified from the data).
In addition to  3x’s contribution, we are able to identify the entrepreneur’s
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claims on the company. Table 3.3 reveals that in 9 out of every ten cases the 
entrepreneur holds debt claims against his or her own company. Moreover, on 
average these loans by the entrepreneur (40% of debt) are typically larger than 
loans by 3* (30% of debt). Discussions with 3t suggest th a t much of the 
entrepreneur’s contribution of debt is obtained by mortgaging personal property. 
Apart from issues of debt claims to the entrepreneur and 3i, o ther sources for 
loans are available through hire purchase and mortgage over the company’s assets. 
Table 3.3 shows tha t only around half of firms obtained funds in this manner and 
tha t even in these cases such claims amounted to  only around 15 per cent of to tal 
debt claims. Thus, as described in Section 1, a feature of project finance for 
entrepreneurial firms is the relatively low stock of company assets available as 
collateral. In Section 5 we analyse further the role of both ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ collateral and its relation to investment risk.
An important aspect of the above discussion is tha t it is based on a  sample
comprising a very wide range of industry groups. It is of interest, therefore, to 
assess robustness across industry groups. Table 3.4 reports three statistics for 
each of the nineteen industry groups. The first column of the table shows that 
the proportion of to tal claims accounted for by debt is virtually constant across 
industry groups. This confirms the dominance of debt found in the more aggregated 
sample. It is an interesting result because it means tha t very little of the 22 
per cent standard deviation recorded in the whole sample (see Table 3.3) is due 
to  industry characteristics, such as capital intensity and m arket structure. The 
second comparison across industries measures the degree of asset backing for
to tal debt outstanding. Since the book value of fixed assets is likely to  be an
upper bound on the market value of assets, the debt/asset ra tio  of Table 3.4 is 
intended to serve as a lower bound on the degree of asset backing. Two debt/asset 
ratios are reported. The first is the ratio  of to tal debt to  assets (column 2). 
This shows that for half of the industry groups the face value of debt is more 
than twice the book value of fixed assets. However, a  problem with this ra tio  is 
that it does not take account of asset-backing provided by the entrepreneur’s
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personal assets. Also, if we are interested in the exposure of debt holders 
without controlling interest then a more accurate picture of asset-backing is 
provided in column 3, which is the ratio  of n e t debt to  assets (where net debt is 
to tal debt minus loans from the entrepreneur). Nevertheless, even with this 
adjusted measure, the degree of asset-backing for loans varies from industry to 
industry, with around one half of the industries having ratios in excess of 100 
per cent.
3.3. Hybrid Equity Claims
In Table 3.1 we found that equity claims accounted for a  conditional average 
of around 20 per cent of to tal claims. Included in this class are fixed-dividend 
Preference and Preferred shares, Preference shares, cumulative and participating 
Preferred Ordinary shares, Ordinary shares and deferred Ordinary shares? Table
3.3 provides a  break down of the relative importance of these instruments. Of the
20 per cent of to tal claims accounted for by non-debt claims, three quarters are
Ordinary shares. The next most important equity claim is the fixed-dividend 
share, which was previously included in the term ‘Fixed Commitments’ due to  the 
close similarity of fixed-dividend requirements with interest payments on debt.
Turning to  ownership of claims, the claim most frequently held by 3x is the 
cumulative and participating Preferred Ordinary (CPPO) share, which forms part of 
the 3x’s portfolio in 40 per cent of companies. Holdings of CPPO shares account 
for more of 3i’s claims than the combined holdings of fixed-dividend, Preference, 
Ordinary, and deferred Ordinary shares. Although Ordinary shares account on
average for 14 per cent of claims by book value, in only 10 per cent of cases are
any of these shares held by the 3i; most Ordinary shares are owned by the
entrepreneur.
Finally, as in the previous subsection, we note tha t the above statistics 
are based on a  sample comprising a wide range of industries. To assess the
robustness of the above statistics we present Table 3.5, which is a
reconstruction of the capital structure break down as in Table 3.3 but with the
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sample restricted to  the manufacturing sector (industry groups 2-12 in Table 
2.2). By comparing Tables 3.3 and 3.5 it is clear th a t there are no significant 
differences between the full and restricted samples. The previously noted 
importance of Ordinary shares in to tal claims and 3t’s holdings of CPPO claims 
axe reaffirmed.
3.3. Discussion
The above analysis has revealed a  number of interesting statistics about 
project finance which may be interpreted in terms of theories of optimal capital 
structure. However, before beginning the discussion, it is im portant to  recall 
the usual limitation tha t applies to any analysis of stocks. This is tha t due to 
costs of adjustment the capital structure observed a t any point in time will to 
some extent reflect disequilibrium dynamics, rather than the desired equilibrium 
structure! Clearly, the significance of disequilibrium dynamics depends on the 
magnitude of adjustment costs. On the basis of the previously noted close 
relationship between 3 i and their portfolio companies, it is likely that 
adjustment costs are relatively low compared for companies which raise finance on 
public securities markets. We therefore proceed with our discussion on the basis 
tha t observed capital structure at s ta rt-u p  is a close approximation to 
equilibrium capital structure.
In terms of book value, we have seen that 3i companies are often highly 
geared, though on average around 40 per cent of debt claims are held by the 
entrepreneur. The fact that a large proportion of the entrepreneur’s claims are 
held in the form of debt claims, rather than all as Ordinary shares, is partially 
consistent with the taxation theories of capital structure (see Miller [1077] and 
De Angelo and Masulis [1980]). These theories determine the firm’s optimal 
debt/equity ratio  by trading-off the value of interest tax  deductibles against 
expected bankruptcy costs of debt. In the case of the entrepreneur’s own holdings 
of debt claims, marginal expected bankruptcy costs are  zero since the 
entrepreneur can always forgive debt repayments if the company under performs
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relative to  expectations. Thus, to maximise company value from interest tax
deductibles the entrepreneur’s claims should be virtually all debt. Clearly, the 
data does not quite support this extreme conclusion. To explain the nature of the 
entrepreneur’s claims, therefore, it is necessary to  complement the
taxation-bankruptcy theory with some other theory. One possibility is th a t a t the 
margin a  larger entrepreneurial holding of debt claims reduces the entrepreneur’s 
share of equity (assuming 3* holds an equity claim). Agency costs arising from 
dilution of the entrepreneur’s equity share, in the form of excessive perquisite 
consumption and suboptimal effort on the part of the entrepreneur-m anager, would 
reduce firm value (Jensen and Meckling [1976]). These factors would, therefore, 
tend to  reduce the optimal debt-equity ratio.
In addition to the entrepreneur’s personal debt/equity ratio , we have found 
a high overall level of debt relative to asset backing. In part, some of the
arguments above can also be applied here. For example, since debt claims are not
widely dispersed the costs of renegotiation if a  firm under performs are 
relatively low. Hence, in comparison to firms with widely dispersed debt 
holdings, expected bankruptcy costs are lower and the equilibrium debt/equity 
ratio  will be higher. Furthermore, to the extent th a t 3* holds a  share of the 
equity there will be additional incentives for debt renegotiation, which further 
reinforces the argument for high debt/equity ratios. However, there are two cost 
associated with debt claims held by outside investors which did not apply in the 
case of the entrepreneur’s holdings of debt! First, there is an agency cost 
associated with debt due to  risk-shifting incentives (Jensen and Meckling 
[1976]). These incentives arise because the debt repayment function is a  concave 
function of profits, which results in the entrepreneur’s payoff being a  convex 
function of profits. As a consequence, the entrepreneur has an incentive to 
undertake a high risk R&D and marketing strategy.
A second incentive problem with debt, which is particularly appropriate to 
the high growth, entrepreneurial companies of the 3i sample, is identified in 
Myers [1977]. This is the problem of a firm with debt outstanding when an option
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to  invest reaches its exercise date. Since the debt holders have prior claim over 
the proceeds from the investment option, it may be privately optimal for the 
entrepreneur to  allow the investment to pass unexercised. Myers [1977] claims 
tha t this may account for the observed regularity of debt being limited to  the 
book value of assets. However, in Section 3.2 we found th a t average debt to  
assets ratios (excluding the entrepreneur) exceeded 150 per cent for many 
industries. Moreover, an implication of Myers’ analysis is tha t short maturity 
debt is better than long m aturity debt because the repayment of debt then occurs 
before the exercise/investment decision is made. In contrast, for the 3x sample 
the.m ajority  of debt is known to be long term (i.e. 3, 4 or 5 years to  m aturity). 
Clearly, if profits in the first years of operation following s ta rt-u p  are 
expected to  be low or negative then the major portion of debt cannot feasibly be 
repaid during the early years. Hence, most short-term  debt would be short-term  in 
name only. Another crucial assumption in the Myers model is tha t debt contracts 
cannot be renegotiated in the event of a low state realisation. This assumption 
is clearly not very appropriate for the 3i sample.
Finally, another feature of the above characterisation of capital structure 
is tha t the claims of the main outside investor, 3x, rarely  involve Ordinary 
shares. Instead, fixed-dividend shares and CPPO shares are most important. Two 
key characteristics of these shares are the combination of debt-like fixed coupon 
payments and the equity-like inability to force a transfer of control in the 
event of non-payment. Thus, in contrast to Aghion and Bolton [1988] and Chan, 
Siegel and Thakor [1990], a  transfer of control will not be socially beneficial 
if project value is specific to the entrepreneur. If 3x, being a passive venture 
capitalist, does not possess the high level of managerial skill required to 
operate projects and if the market value of an incompletely successful project is 
very low, then allowing the entrepreneur to continue the project in the event of 
non-payment will be optimal1.0
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4. Incremental Sources o f Finance
A major shortcoming of the previous section is the reliance on book values
for measures of debt and equity claims. In most economic contexts it is the 
market value and underlying cash flows which are important. The aim of this 
section, therefore, is to  attempt a partial remedy by analysing companies’ 
principle sources of investment finance during the years subsequent to  s ta rt-up . 
Another feature of the present section is that we are able to compare the 
incremental financing characteristics of our sample with similar statistics for 
U.K. publicly listed companies.
Although the incremental approach of this section eliminates many problems 
associated with interpreting book values, there do arise other problems. These
are discussed in the next subsection. Then, following the form at of Section 3, we
proceed to describe a range of statistics in Subsections 4 .2 -4 .4 , and end the 
section with a discussion in Subsection 4.5.
4.1. Data Limitations and Methodology
It is important to  note that the following analysis suffers from a  number of 
data  limitations. First, the analysis below should ideally be conducted on a 
‘flow of funds’ basis. However, such data are not available for the 3i sample, so 
flow of funds are proxied by changes in balance sheet totals. In the case of 
debt, the potential bias will be limited to  the extent tha t the face value of 
debt reflects the loan principal, as in conventional bank loans. This will be the 
case if the risk premium is computed into interim interest payments rather than 
into the face value of debt.
In the case of new equity issues the total cash injection has been estimated 
on the basis of 3i’s purchase cost. This is necessary because balance sheet 
records show only the par value of total shares on issue. However, we do have 
information on both the cash cost and par value of shares purchased by 3i. The 
to tal cash injection from new share issues is estimated on the assumption that
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all purchasers pay the same price per share. Thus, letting and P3t- be the 
cash cost and par value of shares issued to 3: in a  given year, the estimated
to tal cash raised, C^, from issuing an amount P j in th a t year is:
GT  —  (rr^Pr.
r  3 s
Two types of bias may arise from this procedure. First, there are  observations 
where 3* do not participate in the share issue. In these cases we attempted to 
limit the extent of bias by eliminating all observations fo r tha t firm 
(approximately 10 per cent of sample). Nevertheless, there is likely to  be some 
downward bias in the share of equity issues as a source of finance. A second, but
positive, bias may result from differential prices paid for shares. In
particular, entrepreneur’s with particular abilities or knowledge a t the time of 
s ta rt-u p  are likely to have been allocated shares a t a large discount relative to 
other purchasers. Our estimates do not account for this possibility.
Finally, it should be noted that the sources of finance reported here are 
based on gross magnitudes. No account has been taken of changes in corresponding 
financial assets such as bank current and deposit accounts. Conceptually, since 
the objective is to measure how investment is being financed, the net approach is 
the appropriate measure. However, with the net approach there arises the problem 
of how to  trea t items such as changes in minority interests, short-term  and other 
provisions, and the change in intangibles, which neither relate to  financial 
flows nor to  real investments. One approach is to  adjust retentions for these 
variables, as in Mayer and Alexander [1990]. However, while adjusting retentions 
may be adequate for a set of large, established companies, it would be much less 
so for the 3i sample. For example, the inclusion of intangibles in retentions may 
lead to a  much greater downward bias in retentions due to large R&D programmes 
during the first few years of operations. For all these reasons our financing 
ratios are  computed on a gross basis.
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4.2. Internal versus External Funds
We begin our description of incremental financing with a  comparison of 
investment ratios and internal and external sources of funds between the 3i
sample and U.K. quoted companies. The investment ratio reported in Table 4.1 is 
defined as the ratio  of physical investment (including stocks of raw materials 
and work-in-progress) to zero-distribution profits, where the la tte r is defined
in Appendix C. Table 4.1 also reports the average dividend, distribution and
external financing ratios. The dividend p a y -o u t ratio is defined as the gross 
(cash) dividend as a percentage of zero-distribution profits. However, due to  the 
dividend imputation system of taxation in the U.K. (see Appendix C) the 
retentions foregone by a dividend may be less than the gross payment. Adjusting 
for these factors, the distribution ratio is a measure of retentions forgone as a 
percentage of zero-distribution profits. Given dividend behaviour, the external 
financing ratio measures the amount of external finance required, again as a 
percentage of zero-distribution profits. This ratio is computed as the sum of the 
investment and distribution ratios minus one.
The investment ratio  shows that on average the increment to  physical capital 
by 3i-backed companies is more than two and a half times current profit. This 
compares with an average for the U.K. quoted sector reported by Mayer and 
Alexander [1990] of around eight tenths of current profit. As would be expected, 
therefore, 3i companies are high growth firms relative to the average and, 
consequently, require high levels of external financing. In contrast, the 
external financing ratio  for the quoted sector indicates th a t the average 
publicly listed firm finances both investment and dividend distributions from 
profit retentions.
The distribution ratio  in Table 4.1 shows tha t retentions foregone by 
3x-backed companies amount to around 20 per cent of profits. This ratio  is 
similar to tha t of the quoted sector, despite the very large disparity in their 
investment requirements. Moreover, column (3) of Table 4.1 reports a  similar 
distribution ratio  for the case where the 3i sample is restricted to  years 0 and
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1 afte r s ta rt-u p 1.1 A similar picture also holds for quoted/3i comparisons of small 
electrical engineering companies1.2
Overall, therefore, we find that even high growth companies have dividend 
pay-outs which are on average significantly different from zero. The resulting 
contribution of retentions as a proportion of to ta l gross sources of finance is 
reported in Table 4.2. For the full 3» sample, retentions account for one third 
of to ta l gross finance, while for years 0 and 1 the average contribution is -10 
per cent.
4.3. External Finance: Debt versus Equity
Table 4.2 also reports the relative importance of new equity issues and new 
debt as sources of finance. In contrast to quoted companies, where new equity 
issues dominate all other sources of external finance, debt issues are dominant 
for 3i-backed companies. On a gross basis, debt accounts for 42 per cent of all
13sources for 3i companies, compared for 9 per cent for quoted com panies. A similar 
comparison can be made for the electrical engineering sector, which forms part B 
of Table 4.2. The dominance of debt (78 per cent) is further illustrated by 
column (3), which reports financing proportions for 3i companies during the first 
two years when profits are generally low or negative. In these first years debt 
accounts for 78 per cent of gross sources while trade credit accounts for a 
further 25 per cent. Finally, Figure 4.1 shows how the proportions financed by
retentions and debt vary with age (number of years afte r s ta rt-u p ).
4.4. Ownership o f  Debt Issues
The previous subsection has demonstrated the dominance of debt a s-a  source 
of external finance during the rapid growth phase of 3x companies. In this brief
section, therefore, we report the ownership claims on new debt issues. Four
classifications have been constructed from the data: loans by the entrepreneur; 
loans by 3x; other loans secured; and, other loans unspecified. Secured loans 
include mortgages and hire purchase loans. Figure 4.2 reports, by age of 3*
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relationship, the first three classifications as proportions of to ta l new debt. 
The figure reaffirms the conclusions of Section 3 tha t the entrepreneur is a 
major provider of debt finance. It also illustrates tha t the entrepreneur is the 
dominant source of debt finance over the longer term. After the initial s ta rt-u p  
phase, 3* becomes less important as a source of finance, providing around 10-15 
per cent of to tal new debt. The average contribution of the entrepreneur, on the 
other hand, falls to  around 10 per cent during years 1-3 but then increases to in 
excess of 30 per cent. The data do not provide any indication of how 
entrepreneurs are able to  play such a major role in the provision of expansion 
finance for their companies. It is likely, however, tha t part o f the explanation 
derives from rapidly increasing asset prices during the 1980s, such as house 
prices, which has allowed increased borrowing on personal wealth. Hence, 
collateral appears to  play an important role in project finance. In Section 7 we 
explore further the role of collateral in terms of its interaction with project 
risk.
4.5. Discussion
The above analysis has revealed several interesting statistics. One of the 
most interesting is that the distribution ratios of 3i-backed companies are 
clearly significantly greater than zero, despite high investment ratios. In 
competitive capital and credit markets the role of internal versus external 
sources of finance is indeterminate provided there are no taxes (Modigliani and
Miller [1958, 1961]). However, this indeterminateness breaks down in the presence
of taxes. With taxes debt and new equity issues are each preferred to  retentions 
if:
1 -m  > (1 — t)( l — z) (debt)
and
1 -m  > (1 — z)(l — c), (equity)
where m is the marginal personal tax rate on interest income, z is the tax  rate  
on capital gains, t is the corporate tax rate and c is the ra te  of imputation for
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Advance Corporation Tax (King [1977]). In the case of individual investors, such 
as the entrepreneur, the above two inequalities may or may not be satisfied. 
Following Keen and Schiantarelli [1988] we can identify three factors which 
favour retentions over new issues to  entrepreneurs. First, small companies may 
qualify for a  lower corporate tax ra te  (t). Second, the effective ra te  of 
imputation (c) is reduced if profits are likely to  remain negative for some years 
so th a t imputations cannot be offset against mainstream corporation tax. Third, 
there is a  high allowance for capital gains which results in z=0 for investors 
earning less than about 6000 pounds annually. These factors suggest tha t 
entrepreneurs should prefer to re-invest profits rather than issue new claims to  
themselves.
On the other hand, the above inequalities will always be satisfied for 
institutional investors, such as 3i, since m = z = 0. Thus, on the basis of taxation 
advantages, issuing new debt or new equity to 3i and banks would be preferred to  
retentions. We observe, however, that most new claims are issued to  the 
entrepreneur.
5. C ollateral and Risk
The nature of venture capitalism was described in Section 1 as involving the 
financing of entrepreneurs with low collateral value relative to  their proposed 
risky investment. However, the analysis of Sections 3 and 4 show that significant 
amounts of collateral are often supplied by entrepreneurs. More generally, there 
are a  number of interesting issues concerning the role of collateral. In 
particular, many, but not all, theoretical models predict tha t safer borrowers 
are more likely to pledge collateral. On the other hand, recent empirical 
evidence supports conventional banking wisdom that high-risk borrowers tend to  
pledge more collateral (Berger and Udell [1990] and Leeth and Scott [1989]). It 
seems appropriate, therefore, that this paper provide an introductory empirical 
analysis of the relation between collateral and risk.
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There are two key features of the tests in this paper which other papers 
(see below) have omitted. The first is the distinction between inside and outside 
collateral. The second is the use of company-by-company data  for ex post measures 
of risk. In the next subsection we briefly review the main theories for the role 
of collateral. This is followed by a description of regression variables and a 
discussion of the results. Our principle finding for this section is tha t neither 
inside nor outside collateral provide significant explanatory power for risk.
5.1. D istinguishing between Inside and Outside Collateral
The empirical predictions of the theoretical literature differ according to  
whether collateral is ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ and on the information structure. 
‘Outside collateral’ refers to the case where the entrepreneur pledges personal 
assets not owned by the firm, while the pledging of ‘inside collateral’ occurs 
when company-owned assets are used as security for a  lender. The largest p art of 
the literature analyses the optimality of outside collateral when the borrower 
has private information about risk. In Bester [1985] and Chan and Kanatas [1985] 
collateral acts as an incentive or sorting device because the expected loss from 
posting outside collateral is higher for high-risk projects. Similarly, Besanko 
and Thakor [1987] show tha t collateral may mitigate credit-rationing problems in 
an equilibrium where low-risk borrowers pledge more collateral than high-risk 
borrowers. However, the negative association between outside collateral and risk 
predicted by these screening models can be reversed when borrower wealth, in 
addition to risk, is private information of the borrower (Stiglitz and Weiss 
[1986]).
Other types of information structures also predict a positive relation 
between collateral and risk. In Boot, Thakor and Udell [1988] the quality of the 
project is observable by all parties but lenders cannot observe the borrow er’s 
actions. This moral hazard problem leads, under certain conditions, to  a  positive 
association between outside collateral and risk. Another form of informational 
asymmetry leading to a positive association is that of costly state verification.
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In Bester [1990] outside collateral acts as a bonding device to  ensure truthful 
reporting of the state outcome by the entrepreneur: failure to  meet a  debt 
repayment allows the lender to invoke bankruptcy and appropriate the collateral. 
However, when asset liquidation is costly, the lender may prefer to  renegotiate 
the loan rather than force bankruptcy. Thus, in the absence of precommitment to 
bankruptcy by the lender, the borrower will have an incentive to  under report the 
true state. Posting outside collateral weakens this under-reporting incentive 
while simultaneously increasing the probability of debt forgiveness (a 
Pareto-improvem ent). Bester shows that offering collateral is especially 
advantageous for high risk firms.
Issues relating to inside collateral have been considered by Smith and 
Warner [1979], Stulz and Johnson [1985] and Swary and Udell [1988]. Although, 
Smith and Warner and Stulz and Johnson are able to  show tha t inside collateral 
can weaken adverse incentive problems, such as asset-substitution and 
under-investment, they do not demonstrate a clear relation between collateral and 
risk. Swary and Udell, on the other hand, do demonstrate a positive 
collateral-risk relationship. They develop a model where secured debt enforces 
optimal firm closure and where the closure problem is positively related with 
firm risk.
5.2. Previous Empirical Studies
Analysing the relation between collateral and risk requires knowledge of 
collateral arrangements and some consistent measure of either the ex ante risk of 
each loan or the realised outcome (e.g. bankruptcy). Due to the limited number of 
data  sets containing such information there have been only a  few empirical 
studies in this area. In earlier years in particular, empirical studies relied 
upon official bank examination reports or book accounting ratios as proxies for 
risk (Orgler [1970] and Hester [1979]). Similarly, in a recent study of survey 
data, Leeth and Scott [1989] found a positive collateral-risk  relation by using 
the number of years the firm has been in business as a proxy for risk of default.
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This approach relies on studies of small business failure which show that 
survival probability and age are positively correlated.
Finally, Berger and Udell [1990] undertake both ex ante and ex post tests 
using a  very large, high quality data set. Their ex ante test is to  regress loan 
risk premia on collateral and various control variables. For their ex post test 
they replace loan risk premia with an examination of realised loan performance in 
terms of net charge-offs (bad loans), overdue repayments and renegotiation 
status. These la tter dependent variables are computed as ratios to  to tal loans on 
a bank-by-bank basis, rather than on a  com pany-by-company basis. In both the ex 
ante and ex post tests, Berger and Udell are able to report a  statistically 
significant (at 1 per cent level) positive relation for most equations. However, 
in view of the theoretical distinction between inside and outside collateral, an 
im portant limitation of the Berger and Udell tests is tha t they do not identify 
the source of the collateral in terms of being ‘inside’ or ‘outside’. In 
addition, their ex post test may have low power due to the pooling of data. In 
contrast, the ex post tests below do distinguish between inside and outside 
collateral and, moreover, are carried out directly on company data.
5.3. C o n stru c tio n  o f  R egression V ariables
In this section we describe the construction of endogenous and exogenous 
regression variables. The exogenous variables are constructed from observed 
variables for year 0 —  the year of s ta rt-up . The endogenous variable, 
‘investment failure’, is measured ex post by an indicator variable for company 
survival. Thus, for each of the regressions there is one observation per company. 
Details of variable construction are as follows:
(a) Investm en t Failure: For our purposes, risk of investment failure is measured 
on an ex post basis by whether the company liquidates within a  certain number of 
years from start-up . However, although we can observe the number of years after 
which a  company is absent from the data set, we do not know the reason for its 
absence. Nevertheless, we proxy for failure by constructing two indicator
3x Evidence 164
variables for whether the firm disappears from the database afte r two or after 
three years1,4 denoted FAIL2 and FAIL3 respectively (see Table 5.1). These
indicator variables are likely to be good proxies for investment failure since,
as noted in Section 1, most venture capital investments are intended to  last
between 5-7 years. Thus, a disappearance from the data  set within the first few 
years of s ta rt-u p  is very likely to be due to failure of the company.
(b) O utside C olla tera l: Outside collateral refers to  the extent to  which finance 
provided to  the company is secured on the entrepreneur’s personal wealth. We use 
the entrepreneur’s debt claims as proxies for outside collateral on the basis 
tha t the entrepreneur raised this finance with loans secured against personal 
property, such as a  house mortgage. This variable, which is listed in Table 5.1 
as OC, is the entrepreneur’s loan capital as a per cent of to tal debt plus 
leasehold costs.
(c) Inside C olla te ra l: The key feature of collateral is tha t in the event of 
failure the collaterised assets become the property of the lender. It is clear,
therefore, tha t although the literature on inside collateral focuses on secured 
debt as the classical form of asset-backed financial contract, the results carry 
over to  other financial contracts with similar ownership provisions. For this 
reason, our proxies for inside collateral include not only mortgages (denoted 
IC_MORT) but also hire purchase (IC_HP) and leasing (IC_LH). Each is computed as 
a  per cent of to tal debt plus leasehold costs.
(d) 3i E quity  Claims: A universal assumption in the theoretical literature on 
collateral is that debt holders have no other interests in the company. G early, 
this assumption is violated for many of the companies in the 3i sample. And 
although it is beyond the scope of this paper to  model theoretically the 
interactions between collateral and equity claims of various types, it is clear 
that the probability of failure in terms of observations on FAIL2 and FAIL3 
should be negatively related to the extent of 3i’s equity claims. This is due to 
the convex pay-o ff structure of equity claims, which would encourage 3i to 
ro ll-over debt rather than force bankruptcy. Hence, included in the regression
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are variables 3i_PREF, 3i_CPP0, 3i_0RD and 3i_DEF, which measure the proportion 
of to tal equity claims accounted for by 3i’s holdings of Preference shares, CPPO 
shares, Ordinary shares and deferred Ordinary shares.
(e) Dummy variables: Three dummy variables were constructed. First, since the
collateral value of an asset depends on it’s resale value, the availability of
collateral is likely to  be a t least partially dependent on the state  of the
economy. To account for this effect we include a dummy variable for all but one
year of the relevant sample (usually YR79, ...,YR85). The second set of dummy 
variables refer to the company’s trading history prior to  3z investment. ENTRY1, 
ENTRY2 and ENTRY3, which are indicator variables taking the value one if there 
are 1, 2, or 3 or more years of data prior to 3i investment, are  intended as 
proxy variables for underlying risk in terms of ea rly - and la te -stage  investment. 
Finally, we control for the fact that some industries employ mainly tangible 
assets while others comprise mainly intangible assets with industry dummy 
variables, IND1, ..., IND19.
The sample statistics for each of the regression variables described above 
are reported in Table 5.1.
5.4. The Results
Three sets of regressions for FAIL2 and FAIL3 were computed. The first set 
uses the full sample of 1191 observations. The second set of regressions, 
totalling 694 observations, excludes all companies where 3i holds equity claims. 
Apart from the elimination of potential confounding effects due to  equity claims, 
the ’’debt-only” sample provides a more direct comparison with Berger and Udell’s 
[1990] results for bank loans. Finally, there is the possibility tha t industry 
group effects are not well captured by including industry dummies IND1, ..., 
IND19 in linear form in regressions. For example, interaction terms between 
industry dummies and collateral and/or year dummies may be appropriate. However, 
given the large number of industry groups, the testing of all possible
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interactions would lead to a very large set of exogenous variables. Instead, 
therefore, we account for industry effects by computing separate regressions for 
the four largest groups, each of which have in excess of 100 observations.
In the following discussion a  n eg a t ive  sign on a  coefficient indicates a  
p o s i t  ive  impact on default probability. Beginning with the full sample 
regressions for FAIL2, Table 5.2 reports negative coefficients for all collateral 
measures except hire purchase. However, the t-ra tio s , which are  uniformly less 
than or equal to  one, are particularly low for hire purchase (ranging between 
0.03 to  0.17). Comparing these results with regressions for FAIL3 (Table 5.3), we 
find th a t the sign of the coefficient for outside collateral (OC) changes from 
negative to  positive, though this change coincides with a marked fall in the 
t- ra tio  to  0.07. In contrast, measures of inside collateral maintain their sign 
and generally have improved t-ra tio s . This is especially true for leaseholds 
(IC_LH) which have negative coefficients and t-ra tio s  above 2.
The overall low level of t-ra tio s  is reflected in low overall performance of 
both FAIL2 and FAIL3 regressions. The likelihood ratio  for joint significance of 
the four collateral variables is 1.4 and 7.4 for FAIL2 and FAIL3 regressions, 
respectively. With a  Chi-square statistic of 7.8 the collateral variables are not 
jointly significant a t the 10 per cent level. This result is supported by the 
‘within sample’ prediction statistics, which show tha t the FAIL2 and FAIL3 
equations make correct predictions in 79 per cent and 70 per cent of cases, 
respectively. These are extremely poor results since the sample means for FAIL2 
and FAIL3 (see Table 5.1) indicate that a passive policy of predicting success 
for every firm would obtain the same percentage of correct predictions.
Results for the ’’debt-only” sample are reported in Table 5.4, where, again, 
the t- ra tio s  are generally very low. Nevertheless, both outside collateral and 
hire purchase have positive signs for both FAIL2 and FAIL3, which provides some 
very weak evidence of collateral being associated with lower risks. This 
contrasts with the relatively strong positive association between collateral and 
risk reported by Berger and Udell [1990].
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Finally, we consider regressions for the four industry groups with the
largest number of observations. These are: Mechanical Engineering (group 5); 
Electrical and Instrument Engineering (group 6); Distribution, Hotels and 
Catering (group 14); and Business Services and Rentals (group 18). Sample 
statistics for these groups are reported in Table 5.5. Due to  the smaller number 
of observations for each subsample some of the exogenous variables have been 
omitted from the industry regressions. This applies particularly to  mortgages 
(IC_MORT) and leaseholds (IC_LH), but also some variables for 3i equity claims 
and the year dummies.
The results of the industry regressions are similar to those for the more 
aggregated samples. For outside collateral the coefficient is negative for 6 of 
the eight regressions (see Tables 5.6 and 5.7), with t-ra tio s  ranging from -0.16 
to  -1.45. On the other hand, the coefficient for hire purchase is again positive 
in the majority of regressions for which it is reported, with the highest t- ra tio
being 2.12. Thus, there is perhaps some very weak evidence of an overall
positive association between collateral and risk. However, given the generally 
low t-ra tio s  and low predictive power of the probit model, strong conclusions are 
obviously inappropriate.
There are a number of potential measurement errors which may be contributing 
to the poor performance of the regressions. First, the theory of collateral with 
asymmetric information (where collateral acts as a screening device) assumes that 
entrepreneur’s own sufficient assets to meet collateral requirements. But if the 
amount of collateral offered by entrepreneur’s is constrained by their limited 
holdings of assets, then the predictions break down. This may well be an 
important factor in this data set since a characteristic of venture capitalism is 
that new investments are large relative to existing operations. Alternatively, a 
measurement error in outside collateral may arise from tax considerations. For 
the purposes of the above regressions we have assumed that the entrepreneur’s 
to tal debt claims represent bank loans secured on personal property. However, 
given the tax  advantage of debt over equity (see Section 3.3), it may be the case
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that a  significant proportion of the entrepreneur’s debt is unrelated to  personal 
assets. The claims may be debt claims, rather than equity, simply because of 
interest deductibility advantages of debt.
Not with standing the above comments, an important avenue for future 
research with this data  set would be to  collect information on an some ex ante 
measure of risk. In contrast, in the above we have studied the relation between 
collateral and default probability measured on an ex post basis. Thus, it would 
be very desirable to  obtain data on the interest ra te  charged on each loan so as 
to enable the tests to  be repeated with risk premia as the dependent variable.
6. C onclu sion s
This paper has sought to characterise the nature of project finance for 
unquoted companies using balance sheet data. In contrast, previous studies have 
been based on survey data and, consequently, they were not able to  study issues 
such as capital and ownership structure. The main findings of the paper are  as 
follows:
(1) The in itia l capital structure a t s ta rt-u p  and subsequent financing of 
investments is dominated by debt claims, rather than equity.
(2) 3i holds a  significant proportion of equity claims, though does not often 
obtain majority voting rights. The most important equity instrument for 
the venture capitalist are cumulative and participating Preferred Ordinary 
shares. 3* also provide significant amounts of unsecured debt a t s ta rt-u p , 
but is a  much less important source thereafter.
(3) The entrepreneur typically lends to the company on a  scale similar to  tha t 
of 3i. On the basis that the source of these loans are bank loans secured 
on personal assets, the role of outside collateral appears im portant for 
entrepreneurial project finance.
(4) The relation between collateral and default risk was found to  be 
ambiguous. Our measures of collateral did not provide significant
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explanatory power for defaults. This contrasts with studies of bank loans 
which find a  significant positive association between collateral and riks.
The above conclusions should clearly be treated  with caution as they are 
based on simple correlations and other sample statistics, ra ther than properly 
specified econometric equations. However, due to  the inherent difficulties of 
testing theories based on private information, they should not be completely 
discarded.
Several areas for future research can be identified. First, as discussed in 
Section 5.4, the econometric analysis of the relation between collateral and risk 
could be greatly improved with further collection of data. In addition to  the ex 
post tests in this paper, some ex ante tests could be undertaken if the interest 
ra te  on loans could be added to the data set. There are also questions about the 
relation between collateral and hybrid securities, both of which have been 
suggested in the literature as remedies for under investment problems. Again this 
would require further data collection to enable correct identification of the 
convertible and redeemable rights attached to various securities.
E ndnotes:
We do not discuss the process by which venture capitalists choose between 
potential projects. These aspects are discussed in Dixon [19891 and Tyebjee 
and Bruno [1984].
This evidence refers only to the United States. In correspondence with 3* 
PLC it has become clear that giving the VC the option to remove the
entrepreneur is less frequent in the U.K.
One of the original aims for this paper was to  test the empirical 
implications of Hansen [1991]. However, it has since become apparent tha t
this is not possible due to data limitations.
There exists a  literature on the financial environment faced by small firms 
in general. This literature traces the historical development of the 
availability of both public and private sources of finance, including
venture capitalism. They discuss the findings of the Bolton and Wilson 
Committees and assess their relevance in the current financial environment. 
See, for example, Hutchinson and Ray [1983] and Woodcock [1986].
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This figure includes only those investments for which 3i obtained an equity 
stake. As shown in Table 3.1 these investments account for approximately 49 
per cent of investments by 3i.
A brief description of each hybrid is provided in Appendix B.
In principle, it is possible to  specify econometric equations for 
debt/equity ratios which allow for disequilibrium dynamics (see Bradley, 
Jarrell and Kim [1984], Long and Malitz [1985] and Titman and Wessels 
[1985]). Unfortunately, we have not been able to  undertake similar analyses 
due to  the small number of observations per company and the absence from our 
data  of important explanatory variables such as expenditure on research and 
development and advertising.
From our description of venture capitalism in Section 1 —  in particular, 
the intensive screening procedures —  it would seem reasonable to  assume 
symmetric information a t start-up . Thus, for the purposes of Section 3, we 
can discard signalling theories of capital structure.
Another implication of Myers’ under-investment problem is th a t convertible 
debt with warrants attached would be optimal (Chiesa [1988]). Unfortunately, 
it is not possible to identify convertible instruments in the 3i sample.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to identify the extent to  which debt and 
other fixed-coupon claims are convertible into Ordinary shares. This would 
be interesting to discover as the risk-shifting and under-investment 
incentives associated with fixed-coupon claims suggests tha t conversion will 
be optimal for under-performing companies. See Chiesa [1990], Green [1984] 
and Hansen [1991a].
Note, however, that the ratios may be distorted by the exclusion of 
observations for which profits are negative. Table 4.2 shows tha t average 
retentions are negative during years 0 and 1, indicating th a t the incidence 
of negative profits may be important for pay-ou t ratios during years 0 and 
1.
The electrical engineering industry was chosen for comparison because the 
U.K. figures were available from Mayer and Alexander [1990]. A company is 
defined as small if it had sales of less than 25 million pounds in 1982.
In the case of the U.K. quoted sector, Mayer and Alexander show tha t the 
positive 14 per cent contribution of new equity issues becomes negative once 
the financing of corporate takeovers are netted out. They also report that 
netting out financial assets reduces the average contribution of short-term  
debt from 1 per cent to around -25 per cent. However, given the clear 
dominance of short-term  debt in 3i-backed companies it is unlikely that 
similar netting-out transformations would reverse the order of importance of 
debt and equity.
An indicator variable for whether the company disappears from the database 
afte r the first year was also constructed but was dropped from the 
subsequent regressions due to convergence problems.
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Appendix A: Figures and Tables
Table 2.1: Number of Startups
Number Number
Year of Firms Year of Firms
1979 66 1985 167
1980 147 1986 124
1981 231 1987 108
1982 155 1988 103
1983 139 1989 75
1984 161 Total 1476
Table 2.2: Industry Groups
Number
of
Grp. Industry SIC Clas Firms
0 . Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 0-3 87
1 . Energy and Water Supply 11-17 5
2. Metals and metal goods 21,22,31 79
3. Other minerals and mineral products 23,24 19
4. Chemicals and man made fibres 25,26 27
5. Mechanical engineering 32,33 176
6. Electrical and instrument engineering 34,37 122
7. Motor Vehicles and transport equipment 35,36 24
8. Food, drink and tobacco 41,42 38
9. Textiles, clothing, leather and footwear 43,44,45 72
10. Timber and wooden furniture 46 25
11. Paper products and printing & publishing 47 80
12. Rubber, plastics and other manufacturing 48,49 61
13. Construction 50 49
14. Distribution, hotels and catering 61,63-66 290
15. Scrap and waste materials and repairs 62,67 19
16. Transport and communications 71-79 38
17. Banking/finance, insurance and real estate 81,82,85 27
18. Business services and rentals 83,84 167
19. Other services and R&D 92-99 71
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Table 2.3: Number of Observations
Length of Number of Survival
Relationship Firms Rate
(years)   (%)
0 1476 100
1 1196 85
2 972 75
3 768 64
4 601 56
5 437 49
6 314 43
7 218 36
8 111 25
9 42 20
10 4 6
Notes:
The survival rate for year x is computed as the percentage of 
companies whose first investment was x or more years before the end 
year of the sample.
Table 2.4: Start-Up Size and Growth Rates
(con ant prices, 1985)
Turnover Fixed Assets
(£m) (£m)
Ave. size at startup (£m) 7.7 3.2
Ave. ann. growth rate (%) 11.8
Std. Devn. of growth 46.6
Size Distribution (£m) (%) (%)
0 3.7 0.4
0-2 64.2 87.2
2-4 11.2 5.4
4-6 4.7 1.8
6-8 3.7 1.4
8 - 1 0  1 . 6  1 . 1
10-12 1.8 0.3
12-14 1.4 0.2
> 14 7.8 2. 1
Total 100.1 99.9
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Table 3.1: Capital Structure a t Start-Up
Condnl.
Frequency Average 
(•/.)
Condnl. 
Std. Devn.
Fixed commitments 
Equity claims
0.99
0.91
84.5
18.2
20 .1  
22.5
3 i - % of fixed commitments 
— % of issued equity
— majority voting
— participation rights
0.86  
0.49 
0.14 
0.96
30.0
21 . 2
14.6
10 .8
Notes:
The conditional average for claim type x is the average for all 
records with x > 0. Similarly for conditional standard deviation. 
Fixed commitments are debt plus fixed-dividend shares. Equity includes 
Preference shares, cumulative and participating Preferred Ordinary 
(CPPO) shares, Ordinary and deferred Ordinary shares, but excludes 
retained earnings. Total claims are the the sum of fixed commitments 
and equity claims.
Table 3.2: Characteristics of Firms With and Without 
3i Ownership of Equity Claims (averages)
3 1
equity
No 3 1  
equity
Fixed assets at startup (£m) 1.6 
Sales at startup ( £ m ) 6.3
Sales growth (ann. %) 14.7
% of sample in yr. 0 49. 1
% of sample in yr. 5 47. 9
4.6 
8.9 
9.2 
50.9 
52. 1
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Table 3.3: Capital Structure at Start-Up
Uncondnl. Condnl. Condnl.
Average Frequency Average Std. Devn.
C/.)
Total Debt
- as % of total claims 79.7 0.99 80.9 22.3
- entrepr.- % of debt 0.90 40.2 17.9
- 3 i  -  V, of debt 0.78 29.8 12.3
- (other) secured debt 0.52 15.0 19.6
Fixed-Dividend Shares
- as •/. of total claims 3.7 0.20 17.9 20.2
- 3 1  -  % of fix. divs. 0.12 82.2 28.5
Preference Shares
- as % of total claims 0.3 0.04 8.7 1.9
- 3 1  — % of pref. shares 0.03 88.0 25.2
Cumul. Partic. Preferred
- as % of total claims 1.9 0.37 5.2 7.3
- 3 i  -  % of CPPO shares 0.36 95.3 6.4
Ordinary Shares
- as % of total claims 14.0 0.91 15.4 19.7
- 3 1  — % of ord. shares 0.09 13.2 15.9
Deferred Ordinary Shares
- as % of total claims 0.4 0.05 9.3 14.7
- 3 1  — % of deff. shares 0.01 63.2 42.9
100. 0
Notes:
Secured debt (other) is mortgages and hire purchase agreements. See 
also the notes for Table 3.1.
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Table 3.4: Debt Claims by Industry Group
Industry
Group
Total Debt Total Debt Net Debt
Total Claims 
(*/.)
Fixed Assets 
(%)
Fixed Assets 
(%)
0 . 75.4 123.2 85.5
1 . 58.6 77. 1 46.6
2. 77.4 155.4 95.7
3. 78.8 134.7 78.2
4. 72.5 155.5 98. 1
5. 79.5 218.2 142.8
6. 81. 1 256.6 153. 1
7. 79.5 220.3 139.7
8. 79.4 113.7 58.2
9. 74.8 177. 1 112.7
10. 81.9 151.6 85.8
11. 84.9 406.6 210.0
12. 81.2 129.5 73.6
13. 80. 9 254. 8 170.2
14. 80.2 248.4 158.4
15. 89.2 146. 1 90.8
16. 78.9 151.9 99.5
17. 72.0 1921.1 676.4
18. 82.9 2145.4 530. 4
19. 78.4 300.0 114.2
175
Notes:
Net debt is total debt minus loans from the entrepreneur.
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Table 3.5: Capital Structure for Manufacturing
Uncondnl. Condnl. Condnl.
Average Frequency Average Std. Devn.
C/.)
Total Debt
— as % of total claims 79.6 1.00 80.2 22.3
— entrepr.- % of debt 0.91 40.1 17.9
- 3 1  -  % of debt 0.79 29.3 12.3
Fixed—Dividend Shares
— as % of total claims 4.1 0.22 19.0 20.5
- 3 1  -  7. of fix. divs. 0.13 83.9 9.0
Preference Shares
— as % of total claims 0.2 0.03 5.8 8.4
— 3 i  — % of pref. shares 0.02 80.1 31.0
Cummul. Partic. Preferred
— as % of total claims 1.7 0.36 4.8 6.4
— 3 1  - % of CPP0 shares 0.35 95.5 16.6
Ordinary Shares
— as % of total claims 13.8 0.97 14.3 18.0
— 3 1  — % of ord. shares 0.09 13.2 15.9
Deferred Ordinary Shares
— as % of total claims 0.6 0.06 10.3 17.1
— 3 1 - % of deff. shares 0.01 49.8 42.3
100.0
Notes:
Manufacturing includes industry groups 2-12. See also the notes to 
Table 3.3.
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Table 4.1: Investment and Pay-Out Ratios
UK 31  3  L
Quoted Full Sample Years 0—1
(1) (2) (3)
A: All Industry Groups
Investment ratio 78.0 268.8 324.3
Dividend payout ratio 30.9 22.7 19.2
Distribution ratio 21.9 20.1 17.2
External financing ratio 0.1 188.9 241.5
B: Electrical Engineering (small)
Investment ratio 127.8 223.3
Dividend payout ratio 41.4 27.6
Distribution ratio 29.4 25.4
External financing ratio 57.2 148.7
Notes:
Each ratio is an unweighted average for all observations for which 
profits are positive. The investment ratio is net physical investment 
plus change in stock of raw materials and work-in-progress divided by 
zero distribution profits (as defined in Appendix C). The dividend 
pay-out ratio is gross dividends as a percentage of zero-distribution 
profits. The distribution ratio is retentions forgone as a percentage 
of zero distribution profits. The external financing ratio is the sum 
of investment and distribution ratios minus one. Statistics for the 
U.K. ‘All Industry Groups’ and ‘Electrical Engineering (small)’ are 
from tables 4 and 6 in Mayer and Alexander [1990]. For the purposes of 
part B of the table, a small company is defined as having sales of 
less than 25 million pounds in 1982. All but three of the electrical 
engineering companies in the 3i data satisfied this definition of 
small. Mayer and Alexander [1990] report that their sample of quoted 
companies includes 13 electrical engineering companies satisfying our 
definition of small.
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Table 4.2: Gross Sources of Finance by Claims
UK 31 3 i
Quoted Full Sample Years 0—1
(1) (2) (3)
A: All Industry Groups
Retentions 58.2 33.1 —9.5
New Equity 14.3 1.6 6.5
New debt 9.0 41.6 77.7
Trade Credit 18.5 23.7 25.3
B: Electrical Engineering (small)
Retentions 32.2 16.4
New Equity 35.1 2.0
New debt 10.0 27.3
Trade Credit 22.7 54.2
Notes:
The proportions are computed as the percentage of total gross sources 
accounted for by each source. New equity includes fixed dividend, 
Preference, Preferred Ordinary, Ordinary, and deferred Ordinary 
shares. Figures for the UK ‘All Industry Groups’ and ‘Electrical 
Engineering (small)’ are from Tables 2 and 6 in Mayer and Alexander 
[1990]. See also the notes for Table 4.1.
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics for Regression Variables
Means Std. Dev. 
Dependent variable (%)
FAIL2 - 1 if company absent from 
data set after 2 years.
21.2 -
FAIL3 = 1 if company absent from 
data set after 3 years.
Exogeneous variables (as at year 0)
35.5
OC Entr.’s loan capital as per cent 
of debt plus leasing
35.9 19.7
IC_M0RT Mortgages as per cent of 
debt plus leasing
0.3 3.7
IC_HP Hire purchases as per cent of 
debt plus leasing
6.4 13.7
IC_LH Cost of leaseholds as per cent 
of debt plus leasing
0.9 5.2
3c_PREF 3c’s preference shares as per cent 
of total equity claims
2.9 16.4
3c_CPP0 3c’s CPPO shares as per cent 
of total equity claims
30.9 45.7
3c_0RD 3c* s ordinary shares as per cent 
of total equity claims
1. 1 6.0
3c_DEF 3c’s deferred ordinary shares as 
per cent of total equity claims
0.6 7.5
ENTRY1 = 1 if record shows one balance date 
previous to initial 3c investment.
45.5 —
ENTRY2 = 1 if record shows two balance dates 
previous to initial 3c investment.
4.3 —
ENTRY3 = 1 if record shows 3 or more bal.dates 
previous to initial 3c investment.
1.3 —
Notes:
Total number of observations equals 1191. Relative frequencies for
dummy variables YR79......  YR85 and IND1.....  IND19 can be
ascertained from Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
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Table 5.2: Probit Regressions for FAIL2 with Full Sample
(4)(1) (2) (3)
Constant -0.60
(-2.87)
-0.57
(-2.92)
-0.51
(-2.71)
OC -0.13 
(-0.54)
-0. 14 
(-0.57)
-0. 13 
(-0.55)
IC_M0RT -0.42
(-0.32)
-0.47
(-0.34)
-0.44
(-0.32)
IC_HP 0.96E-02 
(0.03)
0.18E-01 
(0.06)
0. 57E- 
(0.17)
IC_LH -1.01
(-1.08)
-1.00
(-1.08)
-0.94
(-1.01)
3t_PREF -0.11E-02 
(-0.41)
-0.12E-02 
(-0.42)
3c_CPP0 0.11E-02 
(1.16)
0.11E-02 
(1.15)
3i._0RD 0.42E-02
(0.58)
0.44E-02 
(0.61)
3i_DEFF 0.65E-02 
(1.31)
0.63E-02
(1.27)
LOG OF LIKELIHOOD 
% CORRECT PREDNS.
-573.7 
78.9
-574.2 
78. 8
-575.9 
78. 9
-0 .5 6
( -3 .4 1 )
-576.6 
78.7
N ote:
Industry group 15 (scrap and waste materials and repairs) is omitted 
due to the absence of observations. Equations (2)-(4) exclude the 
dummy variables ENTRY1- ENTRY3.
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Table 5.3: Probit Regressions for FAIL3 with Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.59
(0.92)
0.67
(3.51)
0.67
(3.66)
OC 0.15E-01 
(0.07)
0.70E-02
(0.03)
0.47
(0.21)
IC_M0RT -1.63
(-1.05)
-1.70
(-1.07)
-1.66
(-1.05)
IC_HP 0.20
(0.65)
0.22
(0.72)
0.26
(0.86)
IC_LH -2. 14 
(-2.07)
-2.29
(-2.09)
-2.08
(-2.02)
3L_PREF -0.43E-02 
(-1.49)
-0.43E-02 
(-1.51)
3L_CPPO 0.79E-03
(0.87)
0. 60E-03 
(0.67)
3L_0RD 0.14E-02 
(0.19)
0.16E-02 
(0.22)
3L_DEFF 0.68E-02 
(1.29)
0.66E-02
(1.26)
LOG OF LIKELIHOOD -680.2 -682.3 -684.7 -688.4
% CORRECT PREDNS. 71.0 70.5 70.7 70.6
N ote:
Industry group 15 (scrap and waste materials and repairs) is omitted 
due to the absence of observations. Equations (2)-(4) exclude the 
dummy variables ENTRY1- ENTRY3.
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Table 5.4: Probit Regressions with Debt-Only Sample
FAIL2 FAIL3
Constant -0.57 -0.69 0.81 0.85
(-1.97) (-3.08) (2.85) (3.41)
0C 0.28E-01 0.20
(0.07) (0.55)
IC_M0RT 0.43 -1.62
(0.18) (-0.73)
IC_HP 0.55 0.65
(0.93) (1.23)
IC_LH -1.53 -3.67
(-0.61) (-1.46)
LOG OF LIKELIHOOD -306.4 -309.1 -382.6a -385.4
% CORRECT PREDNS. 79.2 79.1 70.6 69.9
convergence not achieved after 20 iterations.
Table 5.5: Sample Frequency and Means for Four Industry Groups
Group Group Group Grouj
5 6 14 18
FAIL2 0.22 0. 15 0.32 0.25
FAIL3 0.31 0.35 0.42 0.46
OC 35.91 36.84 40.91 37.54
IC_HP 5.39 7.31 3.65 8.09
IC_LH 0. 00 0. 46 1.74 2. 14
3f_PREF 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.01
3t_CPP0 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.09
ENTRY1 0.49 0.49 0.35 0.39
No. of
Observatns. 137 105 119 122
Table 5.6
Constant
OC
IC_HP 
3i_PREF 
3 l _ C PPO
Notes:
Ommission of a 
observations.
Table 5.7:
Constant
OC
IC_HP
3i._PREF
3i.__CPP0
Notes:
Ommission of
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: Probit Regressions for FAIL2 by Industry Group
Group
5
-0.17 
(-0.33)
-0.11E-01 
(-1.45)
-0.92E-02 
(-0.55)
0. 80 
(0.75)
Group
6
-0.99
(-1.76)
0.77E-03
(0.08)
Group
14
0.35
(0.49)
-0.18E-02 
(-0.23)
Group
18
- 0.68
(-1.54)
-0.25E-02 
(-0.35)
0.88E-02 
(0.93)
2.58 -1.33 0.18
(2.02) (-1.05) (0.16)
variable indicates insufficient number of positive
Probit Regressions for FAIL3 by Industry Group
Group
5
-0. 18 
(-0.36)
-0.25E-02
(-0.35)
0.23E-01 
(1.56)
0. 53 
(0.52)
Group
6
0.41E-01
(0.09)
-0.99E-02
(-1.24)
1.60
(1.47)
Group
14
0. 43 
(0.79)
-0.12E-02 
(-0.16)
- 2.02
(-1.6 6)
Group
18
-0. 16 
(-0.34)
0.55E-02 
(0.81)
0.24E-01 
(2 . 12)
-0.56
(-0.51)
a variable indicates insufficient number of positive observa
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Figure 3.1: Growth in Real Sales 
by Age of Relationship
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Figure 4.1: Sources of Finance 
by Age of 3i Relationship
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Figure 4.2: Ownership of New Debt 
Claims by Age of 3i Relationship
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Appendix B: Description of Financing Instruments
The following is a  brief description of the types of equity claims referred 
to  in the text. The descriptions are based on Lorenz [1985,p.27].
1. Deferred (ordinary) shares are ordinary shares whose rights axe deferred for a  
period of years or until some future event such as a  quotation or sale of the 
company.
2. Ordinary shares have full equity and voting rights but no dividend commitment.
3. Preferred ordinary shares usually have full voting and equity rights, but 
often with a modest fixed dividend right and possibly also with right to  
profits participation.
4. Preference shares rank ahead of all types of ordinary shares upon liquidation. 
As with deffered shares, preference shares may be convertible into ordinary 
shares a t some future date or event. They may be irredeemable or more 
frequently redeemable, either a t par or a t a premium. The dividend may be 
cumulative and often can be increased through participating in future profits. 
Convertibility will often be a t a variable ra te  depending on profits 
performance over a  period of years.
A ppendix C: Computation o f Zero-Distribution P rofits
This appendix details the methodology for computing ‘zero-distribution 
profits’, which is defined as the a fte r-tax  profits with a  zero dividend 
distribution. In contrast, the Profit and Loss account shows the firm’s actual 
a f te r- ta x  profit given the dividend pay-ou t made by the firm. Mayer & Alexander 
[1990] provide an equation for zero-distribution profits but they don’t explain 
it’s derivation or provide references. Moreover, from the discussion below it 
will become apparent tha t their definition is not quite correct.
We begin our analysis with some definitions. Let G be gross cash dividend
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payments and D = ( l - r d)G the net cash dividend, where r d is the ra te  of tax  on 
dividends. Let FIp be taxable profit and T(D) the corporate tax  liability as a 
function of net dividends D. A fter-tax  profits are defined as:
IIA(D) =  -  T(D) (Cl)
Zero-distribution profit is defined to  be IIA{0). Using (Cl) with D=0 and then
substituting for IIp from (Cl) with dividends D gives:
nA(o) s  nT -  T(0)
=  nA(D) + (T(D) -  T(0)) (C2)
From (C2) we see tha t zero-distribution profits equal a f te r- ta x  profits plus the
increase in corporate tax liability due to  dividends D. Computation of the la tte r
adjustment requires an understanding of UK tax imputation system.
The imputation system for dividends, kown as Advance Corporation Tax (ACT),
was introduced in 1973 and is described in detail in Devereux [1986] and also in
King [1983]. Under the ACT scheme the company is responsible for paying the
income tax  liability of it’s shareholders on (cash) dividend income received.
This liability is computed a t the basic rate  of income tax, say r fc, so that
t  DACT(D) = . Hence, the company pays profits tax  of rcm axjO ,^}, where r c is
1 - T b
the tax  ra te  on profits, plus ACT. However, to avoid double taxation  of 
dividends, companies are also allowed to o ff-se t a portion of the ACT against 
their own mainstream corporate tax liability. This is known as Recoverable ACT 
(RACT). The to tal corporate tax  liability becomes:
T(D) = T<jna,x{0,IIp} + ACT(D) -  RACT(D), (C3)
where
RACT = ma.x{0,mm{ACT+STC_u TbII p}} (C4)
and STC_X is the stock of tax credits bought forward from the previous year.
The equation for RACT reflects two constraints. The first is the zero in 
max{0,min{.,T6/7p}}, which prevents the company from becoming a  ’’money machine” 
when profits are negative, IIp<0 (see King [1983]). The second constraint,
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represented by the min{} function, prevents the amount recovered from exceeding 
TjJIp, which would be the level of ACT if all profits were distributed. Finally, 
the stock of tax credits to  be carried forward, STC, is (there are  also carry 
forward constraints on STC, but they are not required in the following analysis, 
see Devereux [1986]):
One approach to  calculating T(D) -  T(0) would be to  compute (C3)-(C5) and 
other carry  forward constraints. However, this complicated set of computations 
can be avoided by simply using information provided in balance sheets on ACT and 
STC. In the following we show tha t T(D) -  T(0) = min{ACT,STC}. First, from (C3) 
we note that:
Clearly, if IIp<0 then (C4) and (C6) imply T(D) -  T(D) = ACT(D). This agrees with 
min{ACT,STC} since flp<0 and STC_i>0 imply STC > ACT. When n p>0 there are three 
cases to  consider:
Case (a): STC = 0. From (C5) this implies ACT + STC_i < rbTIp so th a t RACT(O) -  
RACT(D) =  min{STC_i,r6/7p} -  min{ACT(D)+STC_1,r i /7p} = -ACT(D). Hence T(D) -  
T(0) = 0, as predicted by min{ACT,STC}.
Case (b): STC > ACT. Again from (C5), STC > ACT implies STC.i > T\flp and hence 
RACT(O) -  RACT(D) = 0. Therefore T(D) -  T(0) = ACT(D), which again equals 
min{ACT,STC}.
Case (c): 0 < STC < ACT. The LHS inequality implies r bTlp < STC.i + ACT(D) while 
the RHS inequality implies STC.! < r bflp. Thus RACT(O) -  RACT(D) =  STC.! -  
TjJIp < 0, and T(D) -  T(0) = ACT(D) + STC.j -  TbIIp = STC, which also agrees 
with min{ACT,STC}.
Finally, it remains to point out that our equation T(D) -  T(0) = 
min{ACT,STC} is not quite the same as in Mayer & Alexander. They specify tha t STC
STC =  max-tOjACT+STC.i-r^/Zp} (C5)
T(D) -  T(0) = ACT(D) + [RACT(O) -  RACT(D)] (C6)
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is the stock of tax  credits bought forward from the previous period, whereas the 
discussion above shows tha t the correct interpretation of STC is as the stock of 
credits to  be carried to  the next period. Also in the actual computations we 
assume tha t companies claim all tax  deductions available to  them, so tha t taxable 
profits are equal to reported p re -tax  profits.
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